Monday, August 24, 2026

Libertarian universalism and open futurism

Consider an interesting pair of thesis. First, consider libertarian universalism, which holds that everyone eventually freely—and with the ability to do otherwise—definitively chooses for God. On the grounds of Christian revelation, I think libertarian universalism is false, but I also think it’s clearly logically possible, so it’s only contingently false.

Second, consider open future views of time on which there either are no facts about future contingents or the facts are all-false. Both open future views are logically compatible with the truth of libertarian universalism, but only in a funny sort of way. For it could be that “everyone” (in the sense of the libertarian universalist doctrine, which includes both past, present and future people) has already freely definitively chosen for God. This would require that the end of the world is predestined to come soon, because otherwise the “everyone” includes—or at least possibly includes!—people who have yet to be conceived, and they clearly have yet to definitively choose for God. Moreover, it would require that all the people now alive have already definitively chosen for God, which seems highly implausible.

Let’s suppose that, as seems plausible, that we all agree that some people have yet to already definitively choose for God. Then open futurists cannot affirm libertarian universalism. Can they deny it? Yes, in at least two ways. They might say that God predestined some to non-freely choose for God. Or they might hold that some who have died have already definitively rejected God and that God has predestined them to have no further chances after that rejection.

So open futurists can deny libertarian universalism but cannot affirm it. Can they be open to it? Well, it initially seems hard to say what it means that one is open to a view that one believes is not true. But open futurists can say that although they believe libertarian universalism is not true, it can become true. And that’s a way of being open to it. But a kind of weakish way.

I don’t accept either open future or libertarian universalism, of course.

3 comments:

  1. In 'Not a Hope in Hell,' I think that libertarian universalism - conceived one way - is not merely contingently false but necessarily false. Specifically, I think that it depends on the sense given to the claim that everyone freely will be saved, something of an modal ambiguity between two related claims. If the claim is that it is possible everyone is saved, freely, then I think that's not a problem and I agree with you it is possible. But the situation where God's love entails necessarily that everyone will be freely saved, albeit through libertarian decisions, is (I argue) necessarily false. This is because I take universalism ordinarily as affirming a thesis about whether God will ensure everyone will be saved, or cannot tolerate anyone to be lost, or something of this sort - it's not simply speculation regarding how many people will actually or possibly be saved, which is less interesting and seems unsupportable absent such global metaphysical considerations.

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    1. I suppose God *could* ensure with probability one that everyone is saved through their free decisions. He could just create a person who has to make a decision whether to be saved or not, with a character balanced 50-50 between the decisions, and then if the person chooses the bad thing, God could wipe their mind and character, restoring to them to the point of the 50-50 decision, and make them decide again. With probability one, the person will eventually choose rightly. But this doesn't seem to me to be a particularly good way for God to respect the person's freedom, and hence it would be implausible to think that God *necessarily* would do this (or anything akin to this).

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  2. I think the only way this view can be reconciled is via some sort of reincarnation, if God keeps reincarnating people until everyone eventually chooses God freely. But this raises the question, what if some people don't choose God even until the heat death of the universe? God will have to keep creating new worlds and reincarnating people in them until everyone eventually chooses God.

    This is the view that was apparently held by Origen of Alexandria. Origen believed God will keep creating cyclical worlds one after another until all people are eventually reconciled to God.

    Of course, Origen's views were condemned as heretical by the Church.

    Regardless, some modern Christian theologians have written books about how reincarnation isn't as incompatible with Christianity as is often assumed.

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