tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post121277120641955949..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Two types of degrees of responsibilityAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-15397959926524672002011-07-20T11:11:53.302-05:002011-07-20T11:11:53.302-05:00Alex,
I think this is really helpful. Are the r...Alex, <br /><br />I think this is really helpful. Are the relations something like this?<br /><br />One is S-responsible for A to the extent of the modal strength of "If I were to do what I did, A would have come about".<br /><br />One is N-responsible for A to the extent of the modal strength of "If I were not to have done what I did, A would not have come about."<br /><br />But I don't think there is a tradeoff between S- and N-responsibility as you suggest. Suppose there is a non-corrupt but very negligent policeman, and a burglar. The burglar successfully burgles a house because the policeman is eating a donut instead of walking his beat. Then it seems the policeman has near-maximal N-responsibility for the burglary, but the burglar has near-maximal S-responsibility for it. (For more impressive examples, think of the recent financial crisis.)Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-74710015133394642602011-07-19T23:53:34.002-05:002011-07-19T23:53:34.002-05:00Chris:
I am thinking of the sort of responsibilit...Chris:<br /><br />I am thinking of the sort of responsibility you have <em>for something you actually do</em>, not the sort of responsibility you have <em>to do something</em>. I don't know what connection there is between the two--if there is one, it's not simple. And I don't know if this distinction is germane to your case.<br /><br />That said, I think you've shown that the second bullet point is false as stated. Just to make the case perhaps a touch clearer, consider my writing this email or two plus two being five. I am responsible for this disjunctive state of affairs. But neither I nor God nor anybody else has any responsibility for two plus two being five, because two plus two isn't five. So, the second bullet point must be emended or rejected. I suggest emendation:<br /><br />One's moral N-responsibility for a disjunctive state of affairs is at most as great as one's moral N-responsibility for the <em>true</em> disjunct that one is least N-responsible for.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-35233501179338280982011-07-19T20:55:34.744-05:002011-07-19T20:55:34.744-05:00The first bullet point seems right to me but not t...The first bullet point seems right to me but not the second. Here's a case. I witness a mugging. I'm responsible for a) physically intervening to prevent the attack, b) calling 911, ..., or f) picking up a dandelion nearby and blowing the seeds at the attacker. It turns out the attacker is allergic to these seeds, and he always flees immediately when these seeds are blown at him. I don't know this, and I'm not responsible at all for (f), but I added it by disjunction intro. By the second bullet point, I'm at most responsible for (f), since (f) is the disjunct I'm least responsible for. So, I'm not responsible for preventing the attack.Chris Tweedthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10011727498507972278noreply@blogger.com