tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post1261707391106088689..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The independence of the attributes in SpinozaAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-59060662407647243102018-04-23T10:36:22.368-05:002018-04-23T10:36:22.368-05:00As I read Spinoza, he thinks each idea is an idea ...As I read Spinoza, he thinks each idea is an idea *of* (or about) something, and the something is the body that the idea is identical with. The parallelism then works as follows:<br /> 1. an idea is about a body<br /> 2. a body is described by an idea<br />Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-50993284911196578512018-04-20T11:24:22.085-05:002018-04-20T11:24:22.085-05:00Where does the aboutness relation come in at all? ...Where does the aboutness relation come in at all? You say there is identity between the order and connection of ideas and that of bodies, but what makes identity aboutness? If one is going to talk about aboutness, then given Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism (2p7), one is going to have to say that, just as each idea is about a body, then each body is about an idea (without, moreover, suggesting that aboutness implies any kind of causal link between bodies and ideas). But that sounds weird.<br /><br />Does aboutness imply formal causality? Is the body about which I have an idea the cause of that idea? If so, Spinoza will reject aboutness, given 2p7.<br />Adam Myershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17997327783895670991noreply@blogger.com