tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post1610896597262110722..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Pain and waterAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-3626063094354130062020-11-03T09:37:53.376-06:002020-11-03T09:37:53.376-06:00Is flight a "physical state"? And is it ...Is flight a "<i>physical</i> state"? And is it a state <i>of the airplane</i>, in the same sense that the Physicalist is supposed to take pain to be a "physical state of" something? Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-34926136843893781992020-11-03T09:01:57.687-06:002020-11-03T09:01:57.687-06:00I do not think that the difference between substan...I do not think that the difference between substances and states is relevant to this argument. I could have--and perhaps should have--replaced the substance water/H2O example with a state example like heat / molecular-motion. <br /><br />Flight is not a state of the engine, but it is a state of the airplane.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28208284692766023572020-11-03T07:40:38.644-06:002020-11-03T07:40:38.644-06:00What does it mean for pain to be a "physical ...What does it mean for pain to be a "physical state"? Pain is not a substance of any kind, so the comparison to water (which is a substance) being identified with a certain chemical construction seems out of place. If we assemble hydrogen and oxygen atoms in a certain way, these assemblages themselves start to flow and behave as water is known to do. They just are small pieces of water. But, even if assembling a brain or nervous system in such a way that the being is immediately in pain were possible, neither the brain nor the nervous system would exhibit the behavioral criteria for ascribing pain to a creature. The living animal might, but that is a further fact. And the nervous tissue we put together can certainly not being called "pieces of pains". That's nonsense.<br /><br />To me, this question of whether pains are identical with brain states is similar to asking if flight is identical with engine states. Perhaps you couldn't have one without the other, but the question is still conceptually muddled beyond comprehension.<br /><br />Also, I have to object to statements like "we see our own pain by internal observation". We cannot see inside our bodies, and we wouldn't find "pains" there if we could. We feel pains on our sensitive bodies, and we can say when we are in pain, but that doesn't require us to "see" or or to know by introspection. It is not a matter of knowing or perceiving.Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.com