tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post1738635506896713152..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The context problem for Lewisian functionalismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66845161571264933772018-11-02T14:19:42.417-05:002018-11-02T14:19:42.417-05:00"Perhaps there is no problem. Pain is not in ..."Perhaps there is no problem. Pain is not in fact C-fiber firing. Perhaps enough of the brain needs to be involved in conscious states that one cannot plausibly remove the states from their normal functional context? Still, this is worth thinking about."<br /><br />I think this is still going to be a problem even if human pain is not merely c-fibers firing. One of the draws of functionalism is supposed to be that it captures our intuitions about pain in weird creatures that are built very differently than we are. Lewis talks about martians and the relevant functional role being realized by hydraulics.<br /><br />Since we are trying to capture intuitions about merely possible creatures, since there are merely possible creatures in which the relevant functional state is realized by the firing of c-fibers, and since such possible creatures are much less weird than Lewis' Martians, I think your example may be something Lewis' theory needs to address.scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17709377505803597851noreply@blogger.com