tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post191897628894917612..comments2024-03-18T20:24:18.935-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Presentist countingAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-70924996035980782182012-01-21T14:35:27.287-06:002012-01-21T14:35:27.287-06:00Maybe.
But here's one worry. Let's say t...Maybe.<br /><br />But here's one worry. Let's say that there is eternal recurrence. Let IC be Ice Capades, considered as a temporally extended event from 1940 to 1995. Then clones of IC will recur eternally. (The character played by Woody Allen in <em>Hannah and Her Sisters</em> is so horrified at the recurrence of IC that he considers this sufficient to reject eternal recurrence.) But these clones will be numerically distinct from IC.<br /><br />So, in 1950, the proposition that IC is occurring is true. But if things recur on a million year schedule, then in 1001950, the proposition that IC is occurring isn't true. What is true is that an event just like IC is occurring.<br /><br />One might wonder what distinguishes IC from its clones if it's not times? But that's a line of thought that will only be impressive to those who accept some version of the identity of indiscernibles, while those who do accept the identity of indiscernibles may simply reject the possibility of eternal recurrence.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-48267756685109567302012-01-21T01:20:22.890-06:002012-01-21T01:20:22.890-06:00A general objection to the first construction is t...A general objection to the first construction is that something like Nietzsche's eternal recurrence might have been true. I.e. it is a contingent fact that it is not the case that there are multiple times defined by the same set of propositions. Whereas it is a necessary fact that it is not the case that there are multiple sets defined by the same set of propositions.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-68057806720959373952012-01-19T13:40:12.391-06:002012-01-19T13:40:12.391-06:00Sure, the times are abstracta.
One standard const...Sure, the times are abstracta.<br /><br />One standard construction is to identify a time t with a maximal set of compossible propositions whose conjunction was, is or will be true. Then "p was, is or will be true at t" just means "p is a member of t".<br /><br />Another construction is just to identify a time t with a real number. Then "p was, is or will be true at t" means: "if t<0, then p was true |t| seconds ago; if t=0, then p is true; if t>0, then p will be true in t seconds."<br /><br />This is why we shouldn't say that presentism holds that only the present time is real. Times might be abstracta (a point independent of presentism) and hence past and future times will exist presently, though of course many of their "contents" won't.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-37385384115794214602012-01-19T13:13:48.490-06:002012-01-19T13:13:48.490-06:00Can the presentist help herself to a set of times?...Can the presentist help herself to a set of times? I might have thought that, given presentism, there was only one time, the present, and necessarily so.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com