tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post2776164183567206090..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Creation and artifactsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41891347893166375112019-09-12T13:35:38.760-05:002019-09-12T13:35:38.760-05:00Brian,
That sounds plausible, but I am not too cl...Brian,<br /><br />That sounds plausible, but I am not too clear on what "arrangement" is.<br /><br />Another way to sustain the response to objection 1 is to say that we can only directly manipulate material things, and a non-trivial plurality of material things never composes anything. (Trivial = only one member in plurality.) For on a view of composition that seems close to the truth, things compose a whole iff one of them is an immaterial form and the others are all informed by it and anything informed by that form overlaps one of the material things. <br /><br />Note that on this Aristotelian view, if "arrangement" includes the informing relation, then we do get supervenience of composition on arrangement. <br /><br />Maybe we could talk of material composition where the xs materially compose y iff the xs are material and together with a form compose y, and restrict "arrangement" to physical relationships. Then maybe the view does support the claim that material composition is contingent.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-78744250505880719972019-09-12T13:08:13.433-05:002019-09-12T13:08:13.433-05:00Re: your response to objection 1, do you think thi...Re: your response to objection 1, do you think this supports the claim that composition is contingent (i.e., the claim, roughly, that it's contingent matter whether things in a given arrangement compose a further thing)?<br /><br />The basic thought would be something like this. It's within our power, in principle, to put simples into any configuration we may choose. If a certain configuration of simples (say, a catwise configuration) metaphysically necessitated the existence of a living thing, then it would seem to follow that we can create a living thing just by arranging simples into that configuration. It seems that the most natural way to avoid this conclusion would be to say that we only put the simples into the relevant configuration, but they are fused into a composite whole by a free (hence contingent) creative act of God. Brian Cutterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17059155559949747916noreply@blogger.com