tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post300155018200816281..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Two remarks on Thomson's violinist argument for abortionAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-87510029667505382402008-03-25T21:39:00.000-05:002008-03-25T21:39:00.000-05:00‘Moreover, Thomson's argument, if it were sound (a...‘Moreover, Thomson's argument, if it were sound (and I think it is not), would only establish that there is a right to expel the fetus from the womb, not that there is a right to kill the fetus.’ <BR/><BR/>I think you’re right as to the extent of what Thompson’s argument establishes if sound, which I think it is. I presume that removing a foetus intact involves an increased cost to the woman, who undergoes a procedure more invasive than would otherwise be necessary. This could be justified on the grounds of punishment or deterrence, but I doubt that e.g. the medical profession would go along with that any more than with amputating the hands of convicted thieves. Of course, if the technology became available to bring a foetus expelled at any stage of gestation to term, would society be willing to bear the associated costs where the woman who has had an abortion has no legal responsibility thereafter for the foetus? <BR/><BR/>Another interesting question is whether a man would or could (to allow for rape or incest cases) forego having sex in order to avoid being drafted in the army, if there was a law that whoever had been party to a sexual act would have his name entered in a lottery from which the names of recruits would be drawn. <BR/><BR/>Finally, I know of no country where working mums get the sort of tax-breaks you envisage, even over child-care costs, while there are several countries where women get drafted for military service. Many mums drop out of work for considerable lengths of time anyway, so tax breaks seem like a dubious incentive. I think when it comes to having babies, women, like most humans most of the time, behave irrationally.European observerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10204730605059856705noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-48212456686189380182008-03-25T10:30:00.000-05:002008-03-25T10:30:00.000-05:00The parts of her argument about doing what can be ...<I>The parts of her argument about doing what can be reasonably expected to prevent pregnancy seem implausible. To do something which has pregnancy as its natural outcome and then basically to claim one is not responsible for that outcome is problematic.</I><BR/><BR/>Recall that part of her argument (I think, right after the people-seed example) concerning what one must do to prevent becoming pregnant. One of the things you might have to do, since you can foresee that you might become pregnant by rape, is hire your own police force to protect you when you leave your home. Otherwise, you're acting in a way (as you do when opening the windows for fresh air) that you know might lead to pregnancy. So the inviting pregnancy or consenting to pregnancy issue is much more subtle than people think. Acting in ways that you know might get you pregnant does not nicely divide cases of consent/invitation from cases of non-consent. Setting this aside, your larger point is well-taken.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8257985983414926272008-03-25T08:56:00.000-05:002008-03-25T08:56:00.000-05:00Mike,1. Yes, Thomson is explicit that the argument...Mike,<BR/><BR/>1. Yes, Thomson is explicit that the argument does not show that killing the fetus is permissible if it can be removed. I wanted to point out, however, that therefore it shows rather less than is needed to justify most abortions. (Though Thomson herself now thinks intentions are irrelevant to the assessment of rightness/wrongness, so she won't agree with this assessment.)<BR/><BR/>2. The parts of her argument about doing what can be reasonably expected to prevent pregnancy seem implausible. To do something which has pregnancy as its natural outcome and then basically to claim one is not responsible for that outcome is problematic. Anyway, this part of the argument, too, is based on the idea of imposition. She talks of the house that is too small for the woman and child, and all that, and if memory serves it may be in this part of the paper that she makes her remark about such imposition being made in no other case. Take the weird people-seed case. Imagine that people-seeds float around, and even after one has closed all openings, some manage to take root. But suppose that the people seeded are (a) microscopic, (b) cannot live outside the house, and (c) are no inconvenience at all (you don't see them, they don't cause allergies, etc.) Under those circumstances there is, I think, <EM>no</EM> plausibility in thinking that one has the right to expel them to their death. <BR/><BR/>Thomson's argument (by the way, I fixed my spelling; embarrassing!) thus requires that there be a significant imposition, and in order to yield the claim that abortion should be legal, and not just that it is morally permissible, it requires that it be an imposition so great that the state would not be justified in imposing it. If I'm right, the imposition in pregnancy isn't greater than that of the draft, hence it is an imposition that the state, for good reason, can make. And, if the fetus is a person (which she assumes for the sake of argument), then the state does have good reason to make that imposition.<BR/><BR/>Consider the analogy with the draft. Let's say that I'm a young American man in 1941 who had done all he can to avert America's being attacked. I've written letters to the Emperor and the Fuehrer, I have prayed and fasted, I have voted for candidates likely to act diplomatically to avert war, etc. But despite all that, Pearl Harbor happens. The fact that I've done all that was reasonably possible to avert the war does not give me any right to dodge the draft (unless I am a conscientious objector--but that's a different matter).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-57016012604860841562008-03-25T08:07:00.000-05:002008-03-25T08:07:00.000-05:00Alex, a few quick points. First, Thomson is explic...Alex, a few quick points. First, Thomson is explicit that her argument does not show that killing the fetus is permissible, if the fetus can be removed without killing it. Second, her argument is not in general based on the assumption that pregnant women are coerced life-support systems. A central part of her argument considers cases in which women do everything that could reasonably be expected of them--short of hiring a personal army--to prevent themselves from getting pregnant. These are different from the initial kidnapping case, in which we could reasonably say the woman is forced to support the violinist. Finally, all she concludes is that there is no argument against abortion based on the right to life. This is perfectly consistent with there being other moral bases for prohibiting abortion.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.com