tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3153574927848695469..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Musings on personal qualitative identityAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23877452451810626272021-10-01T19:22:32.814-05:002021-10-01T19:22:32.814-05:00Do you have any thoughts on the risks of self-dece...Do you have any thoughts on the risks of self-deception? Equally, how might we come to know that we are deceiving ourselves? Does the possibility of knowing this imply we must have regard to external standards of virtuous and rational behavior? For example, I take myself to be a brave person - indeed, this is part of my self-identity. Yet when the chips are down, I run from the person who is threatening my neighbor. "You are cowardly" my neighbor later tells me. "Under the circumstances", I retort, "it would have been foolhardy of me to try to defend you - I am brave but not a fool." Perhaps my definition of bravery is not what a rational person would use. Yet I do not see myself as a (Western) rational person - i.e. "being Western rational" is not part of my self-definition. Also, I am entirely comfortable with cognitive dissonance (i.e. I don't mind holding contradictory views). Can it be said that the content of my personal qualitative identity is somehow defective, or even that I am somehow defective?James Reveleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00990288681553022206noreply@blogger.com