tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3261015853022628359..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Manipulation, randomness and responsibilityAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-36833659599562646702013-11-19T19:51:07.927-06:002013-11-19T19:51:07.927-06:001: Dean Zimmerman uses this to argue against Molin...1: Dean Zimmerman uses this to argue against Molinism.<br /><br />2: True. But I think that when you choose an option that dominates another option, you don't choose it freely over the other option. Freedom requires incommensurability. So again I welcome the conclusion.<br /><br />3: I think in real life, the control isn't quite as reliable. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8903782436844968652013-11-19T18:42:57.737-06:002013-11-19T18:42:57.737-06:00It seems to me that you are arguing that full resp...It seems to me that you are arguing that full responsibility around the critical point is incompatible with being manipulable, and manipulability is understood in terms of counterfactuals: if there is something that I can do such that if I were to do it, you would do X, then you are manipulable with respect to X. But manipulability in this sense is compatible with indeterminism.<br /><br />First case: Molinism.<br /><br />Second case: suppose you have indeterministic agent causal powers or whatever, but are perfectly rational. Then around some critical point I can “control” whether you accept a certain tradeoff by, say, offering you an extra dollar. But surely that would not impact your responsibility for your action.<br /><br />Third case: there is powerful empirical evidence that (2) obtains for many people much of the time, but we still (rightly) hold people responsible for their actions under such circumstances.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-71603020168659184362013-11-19T16:02:59.399-06:002013-11-19T16:02:59.399-06:00But around the critical point, "through minor...But around the critical point, "through minor changes in your circumstances, changes that at most slightly rationally affect the reasons for your decision and that do not intervene in your mental functioning, I could reliably control whether you chose A or whether you chose B". And hence by my starting principle--which perhaps you deny--there is little responsibility.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-33099955172431218012013-11-19T15:59:31.027-06:002013-11-19T15:59:31.027-06:00I don't follow the reasoning here.
Differen...I don't follow the reasoning here. <br /><br />Different people will have different critical points. Surely praiseworthiness has to do with how high up the scale your critical point is? And then I do not see that it matters whether I am near my critical point or not, only whether I actually do the sacrifice or not.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com