tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3466255130564428268..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Another way out of the metaphysical problem of evilAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-45934763867716982082021-11-15T09:28:10.953-06:002021-11-15T09:28:10.953-06:00Daryl:
Nah, that's a fair point, albeit one t...Daryl:<br /><br />Nah, that's a fair point, albeit one that rejects double effect reasoning at its core by conflating the known and the intended.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-43581702967820077382021-11-15T09:26:49.445-06:002021-11-15T09:26:49.445-06:00Ryan:
"But most truth theories I know of giv...Ryan:<br /><br />"But most truth theories I know of give a positive account of truth--correspondence, coherence, even deflationary ones like disquotation"<br /><br />It's not clear that correspondence or coherence are ENTITIES. The privation theory says that there is SOMETHING missing. When three of my beliefs are consistent, there isn't a new entity that comes into being, "the consistency of these beliefs". Similarly, when I believe the sky is blue, there isn't a new entity that comes into being, "the truth of this belief."<br /><br />At least as regards completed action, the "malum in se" in many if not all cases depends on something like circumstances as well. The difference is that in this case the circumstances are specifiable in ways that do not involve the weighing of other goods and bads, but rather specify relevant qualities of the object of the action. For instance, to a first approximation, murder is the intentional killing of someone _who is relevantly innocent_, theft is the taking of something _that belongs to another_, rape is sexual activity with someone _who has not consented_, and blasphemy is the predication of predicates unfitting to the divine to someone _who is in fact divine_. (Note that it is a mistake to push these qualities into the object of intention, e.g., by saying that a murder is an intentional killing-of-an-innocent. For a typical murderer has an intention to kill someone, but does not have an intention to kill-an-innocent--the typical murderer does not care that the victim is innocent, the innocence of the victim in no way contributing to the murderer's ends, though there are even more vicious atypical cases where the innocence of the victim is part of the intention.)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-89754136109863542292021-11-14T14:24:37.766-06:002021-11-14T14:24:37.766-06:00Daryl seems mad.
Better ban him/her/them.Daryl seems mad.<br /><br />Better ban him/her/them.swaggerswaggmannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16452871878835259394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-33322367963262931972021-11-14T10:31:24.701-06:002021-11-14T10:31:24.701-06:00^^ This one is in need of deletion as well. I thin...^^ This one is in need of deletion as well. I think it's time for the ban hammer.Darylhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10561338257052733830noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69989973552722329182021-11-13T13:33:19.216-06:002021-11-13T13:33:19.216-06:00I indeed make you notice that you treat your god a...I indeed make you notice that you treat your god as a blind child. Sorry, not sorry.swaggerswaggmannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16452871878835259394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-34895201377836579732021-11-13T13:31:28.947-06:002021-11-13T13:31:28.947-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.swaggerswaggmannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16452871878835259394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76256476557297084722021-11-13T13:23:50.802-06:002021-11-13T13:23:50.802-06:00Alex:
I guess I don't see how dropping the re...Alex:<br /><br />I guess I don't see how dropping the relationships part really changes the story. Neither truth nor falsity is *constitutive* of Shaw's belief--if they were, it seems like there would be a fundamental evil. So however you want to construe it, falsity is an accidental predication (in the broad sense of accident--if the belief were about a mathematical theorem, it might be a necessary accident). But most truth theories I know of give a positive account of truth--correspondence, coherence, even deflationary ones like disquotation. Falsity is whatever lacks that. <br /><br />Or look at moral evils. For malum in se acts, you're also going to have to give a complicated story about how they're really privations, because to be malum in se is to be wrong in a way that doesn't depend on circumstance (ie, combination with other realities). But for acts that are wrong in virtue of the circumstances, the privation theorist can obviously say that what they lack are the correct circumstances (if there were no possible correct circumstances, then they would be malum in se).Ryan Millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05175625979264185229noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-87111313987666705062021-11-13T12:59:04.738-06:002021-11-13T12:59:04.738-06:00Brian:
I do have serious reservations about theod...Brian:<br /><br />I do have serious reservations about theodicies where the evil is a means to a good. But sometimes in the vicinity there is a theodicy that can use triple effect.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-54169092521887631602021-11-13T12:57:26.055-06:002021-11-13T12:57:26.055-06:00[One comment has been deleted due to falling short...[One comment has been deleted due to falling short of academic standards of civility, due to sarcasm.]Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-18131944473140014952021-11-13T12:56:18.455-06:002021-11-13T12:56:18.455-06:00Ryan:
That solution requires an ontology that inc...Ryan:<br /><br />That solution requires an ontology that includes "relationships" between beliefs and reality. And such relationships are rather fishy ontologically. First, some beliefs are about absences. If I believe there are no unicorns, does my belief stand in a relationship with the absence of unicorns? Second, there are time issues: when does that relationship exist? At the time of the belief or at the time of the reality? If at the time of the belief, then in the case of beliefs about the future, you can create a past entity--namely, the relationship. If at the time of the reality, then by coming to have a belief about a past reality, you can create a past entity.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-53202934726338622612021-11-13T03:17:17.998-06:002021-11-13T03:17:17.998-06:00I don't understand how this is substantively d...I don't understand how this is substantively different from the Augustinian view. In your example, the evil is that Shaw's belief is untrue, but that's just the privation of correct relationship between belief and reality. At least if you're a Thomist, every thing that exists has a single form which gives it being, so accidents can never be constitutive, so every accidental failure can be interpreted as a privation.Ryan Millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05175625979264185229noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76470658097398930962021-11-12T20:19:56.633-06:002021-11-12T20:19:56.633-06:00This is a neat alternative to Augustinian-style so...This is a neat alternative to Augustinian-style solutions. I wonder, though, if it runs into special problems when we turn to the standard (non-metaphysical) problem of evil, about how God could be justified in allowing/causing evil. Suppose that God's justification for causing some evil is, at least on some occasions, that it allows for some greater good (like in your platypus case, it might allow for others to exercise virtue in teaching Shaw the truth). Then it looks like the evil is used by God as a means to that greater good, in which case it's intended, not merely foreseen. If we can never say that evils are intended by God as a means to some good, that seems like a very severe constraint on answering the justificatory problem of evil.Brian Cutterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17059155559949747916noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39166828825382681332021-11-12T19:15:54.964-06:002021-11-12T19:15:54.964-06:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.swaggerswaggmannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16452871878835259394noreply@blogger.com