tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3725518341120132917..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Empty rooms and modal imaginationAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39542691024148876952008-05-02T14:44:00.000-05:002008-05-02T14:44:00.000-05:00I had never thought of a Humean as having to confl...I had never thought of a Humean as having to conflate 'cause' and 'reason', but now that you point it out, it seems right.<BR/><BR/>Your account also seems spot on, especially since the Humean claim rests so squarely on the ability to imagine. You've shown fairly well that the ability is hindered considerably - like someone trying to imagine "infinity".<BR/><BR/>You're right in mentioning there is a lot of work there to fill out the Theist's details, but I'd say the burden of imagination and modality is on the naturalist to explain. Something I quietly lament on a daily basis.Beancan Tatterpantshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01616266849263742388noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-9323458855881927082008-05-02T11:29:00.000-05:002008-05-02T11:29:00.000-05:00I didn't provide context. The context is this.1. ...I didn't provide context. The context is this.<BR/><BR/>1. Theist offers a cosmological argument based on the principle of sufficient reason. (Everything must have a reason; the universe's existence must have a reason; only God could be such a reason; etc. Obviously there is a lot of work to be done to fill out the details.)<BR/><BR/>2. Humean critic says: "The principle of sufficient reason is false, or at least not necessarily true. For I can imagine a brick coming into existence for no cause."<BR/><BR/>The Humean critic does assume that if there is no cause, then there is no reason. But in the case of the brick that seems right, no?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-56977423056619566072008-05-02T09:44:00.000-05:002008-05-02T09:44:00.000-05:00I'm a little slow on this so I may need you to lea...I'm a little slow on this so I may need you to lead me further down the path.<BR/><BR/>Are you saying that 1) there is a consequence of our failure to imagine properly a non-existing object without imagining a cause? and that 2)this consequence is directly related to the plausibility of a naturalist view of modality?<BR/><BR/>I'm also assuming that you're equating "cause" with "reason", correct?<BR/><BR/>How does the existence of cause contradict a naturalist notion of possibility?Beancan Tatterpantshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01616266849263742388noreply@blogger.com