tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post4003001787086124076..comments2024-03-18T20:24:18.935-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Act and rule utilitarianismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-31934517354368773822015-06-13T23:40:49.295-05:002015-06-13T23:40:49.295-05:00Act Utilitarianism
Act utilitarianism is the beli...Act Utilitarianism<br /><br />Act utilitarianism is the belief that it is the right action that brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. It is a concept that believes that the morality (ethics) of an action is determined by its usefulness to most of the people that this act is in accordance with the moral rules since it brings greater good or happiness.<br /><br />Rule Utilitarianism<br /><br />Rule utilitarianism on the other hand is the belief that an action can be morally right if it conforms to the rules that will lead to the greatest good or happiness. It adheres to the belief that the correctness of an action is determined by the correctness of its rules and that if the correct rule is followed, the greatest good or happiness is achieved.<br /><br />For more details visit click on the given link http://sh.st/l3LTWHassnain Jamilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05638443401596663704noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41356601697323626292015-06-13T23:38:29.363-05:002015-06-13T23:38:29.363-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Hassnain Jamilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05638443401596663704noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-59988563793899784652015-01-27T16:34:03.221-06:002015-01-27T16:34:03.221-06:00If everybody goes, then (i) and (ii) aren't tr...<i>If everybody goes, then (i) and (ii) aren't true.</i><br /><br />That's not quite right. (i) and (ii) are true. If everyone were to do what AU prescribes, then neither would be true. But there's nothing new or surprising in that, certainly.<br /><br /><i>I deny that it's true that if one more person overfishes, no matter how many others are doing it, it makes no difference.</i><br /><br />That's a position that some people take, but it is not a typical utilitarian position. It's a position that commits you to there being imperceptible decrements in value. I, and most utilitarians, deny that there are such imperceptible decrements. So I deny that every additional increase in overfishing makes a moral (i.e., utilitarian) difference. It is a difference that is below the level of perception. (For what it's worth, in many cases, there is literally no difference at all, as in voting cases, where any difference there is to what you do individually comes after some distant threshold is met).Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-47139812835945130572015-01-27T15:40:33.216-06:002015-01-27T15:40:33.216-06:00If everybody goes, then (i) and (ii) aren't tr...If everybody goes, then (i) and (ii) aren't true.<br /><br />As for overfishing kinds of cases, I deny that it's true that if one more person overfishes, no matter how many others are doing it, it makes no difference. By transitivity of "it makes no difference" one can then derive that it makes no difference if everyone overfishes.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-40158159822051018672015-01-27T15:36:46.644-06:002015-01-27T15:36:46.644-06:00The ice case is pretty simple, actually. Assume th...The ice case is pretty simple, actually. Assume the following is true for each person: (i) if you were not to go onto the ice to save the child, no one else would and (ii) if you were to go onto the ice, no one else would. It follows from (i) and (ii) that each person should go onto the ice to save the child. But if everyone does go, no one would fulfill his obligations.<br /><br />Your case is of course different. In your case each person ought to push the button, but if everyone does, then an infinite number would not fulfill his obligations. Your case has a structure similar to generalized quasi-PD's. Take the case of over-fishing. If one more person over-fishes, no matter how many others are doing it, it makes no difference to the badness of the outcome, and it benefits him. He should over-fish. But if everyone over-fishes the outcome is much worse than if a small number do (in which case it is better). In your case, if everyone pushes the button it is much worse than if a finite number do.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-75949571896347787062015-01-27T14:38:46.475-06:002015-01-27T14:38:46.475-06:00The ice case is pretty complicated. It depends on ...The ice case is pretty complicated. It depends on what one's expectations are about others going on the ice. If the probability that a close to or above critical mass of people is going to be on the ice is high enough, then AU will recommend that I not go on the ice.<br /><br />But in my case, the individual recommendation is to press the button no matter what you think or know others will do.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-11788825746959723702015-01-27T13:08:23.185-06:002015-01-27T13:08:23.185-06:00All is everyone, all utilitarian agents as a group...All is everyone, all utilitarian agents as a group. It's a common phenomenon for AU, that its collective recommendation (what the group ought to do) conflict with its recommendations individually, what each member of the group ought to do. For instance, it might recommend that each of us goes onto the ice to save the drowning child. But if we all go onto the ice--following our AU recommendation--we will all violate our AU recommendation, since we should not all go out onto the ice (it will collapse and many more will drown). <br /><br />Incidentally, totally off the point, but your captcha is asking for verification three and four times in a row.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-45736778942230281552015-01-27T11:11:38.309-06:002015-01-27T11:11:38.309-06:00Mike:
Who is All? :-)Mike:<br /><br />Who is All? :-)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-36276442055077126682015-01-27T08:29:29.965-06:002015-01-27T08:29:29.965-06:00So from the point of view of act utilitarianism, i...<i>So from the point of view of act utilitarianism, in this scenario there is a clear answer as to what each person should do, and it's a rather unfortunate answer—it leads to a poor result for Jane.</i><br /><br />Actually, AU offers a prescription to All that is inconsistent with its prescription to Each. Each ought to push the button, but it is not true that All should. And there is no way, in the case you describe, for all to fulfill their obligations. If everyone pushes, then infintiely many have failed to fulfill their obligations (despite everyone doing what she ought). If finitely many push the button, then again infinitely many fail to fulfill their obligations. And that is on the act utilitarian principle alone. No matter what anyone does, infinitely many fail to fulfill their obligations. It's a utilitarian moral dilemma.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.com