tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post4258246275083665971..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: No one knows that naturalism is trueAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-38695995364187744102011-02-16T09:25:13.948-06:002011-02-16T09:25:13.948-06:00Explanatory power is one of the main ways of compa...Explanatory power is one of the main ways of comparing theories, philosophical and scientific, yes.<br /><br />I am convinced that any plausible reasons for giving up on realism about morality are reasons for giving up on all normativity, including epistemic.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23572431727300450022011-02-16T09:14:08.126-06:002011-02-16T09:14:08.126-06:00I see. I do not hold to ethical or aesthetic reali...I see. I do not hold to ethical or aesthetic realism, so that might account for my having a worry about this that you do not. Also, I can agree that the Plurality of World thesis is not <i>necessitated</i> by these premises and that the thesis has no monopoly on explanatory power. <br /><br />Do I interpret you correctly as saying, albeit indirectly, that explanatory power (whether about mathematical 'truths' or what you call 'problems') is a factor by which someone can deem one possible theory better than another?<br /><br />I promise I am not trying to set the stage for polemics. I am purely curious about the role of explanatory power in philosophy.<br /><br />Thank you for your quick reply! (Nick)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-13289411374490714192011-02-16T08:40:59.915-06:002011-02-16T08:40:59.915-06:00About silly things: Only if you think it is at all...About silly things: Only if you think it is at all plausible that these silly things might ground the mathematical/ethical/aesthetic truths. And that's unlikely.<br /><br />About plurality of worlds, I see nothing wrong with the line of argument that the plurality of worlds solves problems that no other theory does, and hence we don't know it to be false. But I deny that it solves problems that no other theory does.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-38515316970483115732011-02-16T08:00:07.751-06:002011-02-16T08:00:07.751-06:00While I like the door that this opens, does not th...While I like the door that this opens, does not this open the door to granting the possibility of all sorts of silly things (e.g. fairies, unicorns, ghosts, etc.). <br /><br />Also, does this open the conversation to modal realism about the plurality of worlds thesis? If so, I think this might wreak havoc on philosophy more than it helps it.<br /><br />_NickAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com