tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post4280801741634938972..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: A secondary brain and computational theories of consciousnessAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-13486314550364827332016-02-02T12:07:45.245-06:002016-02-02T12:07:45.245-06:00I think a computational-theory-of-consciousness de...I think a computational-theory-of-consciousness defender should begin this way: what we call a “self” is a center of consciousness, typically instantiated by a brain, bound up with a material body, in the sense that (i) the consciousness receives data from the body and (ii) the consciousness can control the body. The boundaries of awareness, control, and body are somewhat vague and, for contingent biological reasons, roughly overlapping, though in principle they can come apart. What a “self” is not, however, is some kind of simple or fundamental entity. <br /><br />From that perspective, your initial thought experiment is one where there are two selves sharing a common body. This is going to scramble our intuitions a bit, but one could say that the selves are the centers of consciousness plus the parts of the body they control, or receive data from, or something along those lines. One need not say that the self is the brain.<br /><br />And that perspective on selves also would defuse the second argument, from parthood.<br /><br />I think what is really at issue here is a theory of personal identity, rather than a theory of consciousness per se. <br /><br />P.S. Does the argument boil down to this?<br /><br />Possibly, I have (or: one person has) two brains.<br />Not possibly, I (or: one person) have/contain/am two selves.<br />Therefore, my self is not my brain.<br />Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-25878842064045943892016-02-02T11:24:59.981-06:002016-02-02T11:24:59.981-06:00Heath:
Agreed about 1. My contention, however, is...Heath:<br /><br />Agreed about 1. My contention, however, is that it is <i>possible</i> for me to be unaware of the stuff in this secondary brain. This intuition is akin to the kinds of thought experiments people give for dualism, like that it's possible to have a zombie, but I happen to have a stronger intuition here than I do about zombies. A second brain that happens to be a part of me just need not be something I am aware of.<br /><br />Regarding 2, I am definitely thinking of conscious awareness. <br /><br />Regarding 3, I don't think parthood can *reduce* to things like processing of data. It seems to me that either parthood is primitive or pretty close to being primitive (the latter is a bit vague). But processing data from X is *evidence* of X's being a part from you.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69392164477135163472016-02-02T09:47:02.965-06:002016-02-02T09:47:02.965-06:00Upon further reflection, I think there is a lot mo...Upon further reflection, I think there is a lot more to reflect on.<br /><br />1) It seems possible that one body could have multiple centers of consciousness (closely conjoined Siamese twins? split brain patients?). <br /><br />2) What is being "aware of data"? There could be conscious awareness, and unconscious information processing; is the latter being aware? For there is all sorts of data from our bodies that our brains process, without us being consciously aware of it.<br /><br />3) What is the criterion for "X is a part of me"? If it is something like, "I unconsciously process data from X" then there is no particular reason some body part could not be a part of multiple selves. If it is "I am consciously aware of data from X" then maybe (? why not?) that could be true of multiple selves as well. If it is "I can consciously control X" then possibly this could be true of only one self at a time, but then there are lots of parts of our bodies that are not part of ourselves (e.g. our digestive system). Moreover, there is no reason, in principle, that one self could not consciously control one aspect of a body part while another self controlled another aspect of it. Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-14253782709099954762016-02-01T19:54:57.948-06:002016-02-01T19:54:57.948-06:00And what would your students think?And what would your students think?Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-21449416891173328552016-02-01T19:50:23.414-06:002016-02-01T19:50:23.414-06:00I would be the recipient of a lot of chimpanzee or...I would be the recipient of a lot of chimpanzee organs.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86946776337153642532016-02-01T19:48:04.564-06:002016-02-01T19:48:04.564-06:00Alex:
All this makes me wonder that is if you are...Alex:<br /><br />All this makes me wonder that is if you are a brain or not a brain, if we took your brain out of you head and successfully put it into the head of a chimpanzee, and took the chimpanzee's brain out of the chimp's head and successfully put it in your head, what would we have then? Who now is you? :-)Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-29406591355222099722016-02-01T14:20:58.682-06:002016-02-01T14:20:58.682-06:00Your hypothesis may not be so far from reality.
h...Your hypothesis may not be so far from reality.<br /><br />http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gut-feelings-the-second-brain-in-our-gastrointestinal-systems-excerpt/<br /><br />Also, split brain patients may be able to have two centers of consciousness<br /><br />https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_consciousness_%28neuroscience%29Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com