tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post45179820419623257..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Self-consciousness and AIAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-87968823528076869442017-08-10T09:37:27.970-05:002017-08-10T09:37:27.970-05:00"I" (as used by me) and "Alex Pruss..."I" (as used by me) and "Alex Pruss" have the same reference--they both refer to me--but different sense, to use Aquinas's distinction in (the usual English translation of) Frege's vocabulary.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-43998498001993953252017-08-08T22:12:55.597-05:002017-08-08T22:12:55.597-05:00"Alex Pruss" sure refers to something. B..."Alex Pruss" sure refers to something. But "I am Alex Pruss" refers only if it's an identity statement. If I told someone, "I am not Adam Myers" (a lie), I am not telling them "Adam Myers is not Adam Myers." So "I" and whatever in your view "I" might refer to when I use it, doesn't seem to be coextensive. I shd. try to see if I can convince you of Elizabeth Anscombe's views about 'I' sometime.Adam Myershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17997327783895670991noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-48339067264335426772017-08-08T09:06:47.144-05:002017-08-08T09:06:47.144-05:00Adam,
Well, I am Alex Pruss, Alex Pruss exists, s...Adam,<br /><br />Well, I am Alex Pruss, Alex Pruss exists, so "I" as used by me refers to something that exists. I guess I was assuming that "I" as used by anyone refers to something that exists, but that assumption seems uncontroversial.<br /><br />The suggestion that self-consciousness isn't consciousness of an object at all is an intriguing one. But then I can't see which of my states of mind counts as self-consciousness, and in fact I can't even tell if I have self-consciousness. I was assuming in my thinking about this that self-consciousness, whatever it is, is something that I pretty obviously have. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-88745230545855348382017-08-07T22:13:31.369-05:002017-08-07T22:13:31.369-05:00What if self-consciousness isn't awareness who...What if self-consciousness isn't awareness whose object is expressible in terms of 'I', precisely because self-consciousness isn't consciousness of an object at all, and certainly not some object named 'I'? Could self-consciousness be non-observational and criterionless? Does 'I' need to be a referring expression for your argument to work?Adam Myershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17997327783895670991noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1770544266501726072017-08-01T15:05:25.540-05:002017-08-01T15:05:25.540-05:00Angra:
Being aware of the temperature here as bei...Angra:<br /><br />Being aware of the temperature here as being 300K takes intentionality. I think there is no consciousness without intentionality, so I could have omitted intentionality as it's implied by consciousness, but some probably think that you can have raw intentionality-free consciousness, like a raw itch.<br /><br />Mr Killackey:<br /><br />These are really good questions.<br /><br />No, not necessarily the same computer. The point is something like this one: "If a calculator can multiply together two ten digit numbers, a calculator can multiply together two twenty digit numbers." Of course, the *same* calculator may not be able to do it, but once we see that the former is possible, it's very plausible (though not certain) that the latter is as well.<br /><br />I agree that one might worry about the transition from "unit 546 is at 300K" to "I am at 300K." But the worry is no bigger, I think, than in the case of "here" claims: "It is 300K here" (and not just "at the location of sensor 188"). But now you've got me worried a bit about the "here" claims. Not very worried, though. <br /><br />As for animals and concepts, that's more speculative. I think all consciousness is conceptual, and so I think all conscious animals--even down to worms and like, if these turn out to be conscious, which they might well--*use* concepts. However, although they use concepts, I expect that most conscious animals are unable to think *about* concepts, because they lack the relevant second-order concepts. Some non-human animals, however, seem to have a theory of mind. Those non-human animals thus seem to be thinking about thinking, and there is some sort of second-order conceptualization there, if that's so. But even so, I expect they aren't thinking about concepts in themselves, in abstraction from particular acts of thought that involve these concepts.<br /><br />--<br /><br />I read "from nothing, nothing comes" as meaning that nothing comes into being without an efficient cause. When God creates something in time, the thing comes into being without a material cause, but it has an efficient cause (or a super-efficient cause, maybe?), namely God.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8709569279214428822017-07-31T21:46:27.217-05:002017-07-31T21:46:27.217-05:00Excuse me if none of this makes sense, I’m not eve...Excuse me if none of this makes sense, I’m not even sure if I even have a double-digit IQ!<br /><br />"So, if a computer can have consciousness and intentionality, a computer can have self-consciousness."<br /><br />Do you mean the same computer by virtue of possessing both of these attributes is (or can become without being changed by an external agent) self-aware? If so, I don’t see why this should be the case. I think animals also have consciousness and intentionality. (Though, I hasten to add that I might be misunderstanding what you mean by “intentionality.”) It seems that conscious states are intentional, they are experiences OF something.<br /><br />Now, do merely conscious animals have concepts? (Which would include “here” and “there” as well as “me” – right?) If not, maybe that is at least one reason why they don’t have self-awareness. With the computer, maybe it experiences ‘the temperature of unit 546 is 300k’ but doesn’t recognize that this is convertible with ‘I’m 300k’<br /><br />Do you need to have an intellect to have the ability to understand concepts? If so, do minimally self-aware animals like chimps have intellects? (Or, again, do you need concepts to be self-aware?)<br /><br />Well, hopefully I said something that made some sense. Unrelatedly, how would you explain how God’s being able to create from nothing is consistent with the claim that ‘from nothing, nothing comes?’ I searched through your blog and didn’t see anything that seemed to be addressed to it, though, my search was not exhaustive.Sean Killackeyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08683592785735127212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4527914528312095492017-07-31T14:58:23.384-05:002017-07-31T14:58:23.384-05:00Hi Alex,
Just a question: Do you need intentiona...Hi Alex, <br /><br />Just a question: Do you need intentionality in the argument? <br />I mean, can't you go from consciousness to self-consciousness without including intentionality (not denying it, either)?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com