tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post4667435610180357938..comments2024-03-18T20:24:18.935-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: A sufficient condition for not intendingAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-7013393193760029972011-08-15T09:23:29.056-05:002011-08-15T09:23:29.056-05:00Thanks for this, Alex -- most helpful. Here's ...Thanks for this, Alex -- most helpful. Here's another example that shows the non-necessity of the condition: I am a conscientious PDE-believer and so it's an active reason required by me for acting that the foreseen good outweigh the foreseen evil. Yet, I don't think it's right to say that I *intend* that the foreseen good outweigh the foreseen evil. (Argument for this: suppose I hold a variant of PDE according to which some side-effects are so bad that no action causing them can be permissible. So it's an active reason that the side-effects not be so bad. Yet I don't intend that the side-effects not be so bad.)Daniel Hillhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07823511443088751096noreply@blogger.com