tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5244640139814207750..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Very large multiverses and trans-world depravityAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-20484218436914435502019-01-22T12:21:33.570-06:002019-01-22T12:21:33.570-06:00Plantinga is clear that his definition is stipulat...Plantinga is clear that his definition is stipulative. Yes, God doesn't even consider the wrong an option, and hence doesn't choose between right and wrong. <br /><br />The philosophical question then is whether significant freedom, defined as Plantinga defines it, has significant value in creatures. The fact that God lacks significant freedom is evidence to the contrary. But there is a bunch of papers arguing that there are relevant differences between God and creatures such that it's not valuable in God but is valuable in creatures. That's an interesting debate, but not one I am addressing in this post.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-72844017548802911542019-01-22T10:32:47.515-06:002019-01-22T10:32:47.515-06:00Alex
"A significantly free choice is a choic...Alex<br /><br />"A significantly free choice is a choice between the right and the wrong" is a question-begging definition. Of course if God wants people to choose between the right and the wrong, then the significant feedom He creates should entail the choice between right and wrong.<br />But the question is why would a God who is supposed to be perfectly good even "contemplate" "the wrong"?<br />If God truly is Existence, this kind of anthropomorphism has no place.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-77895694056985452012019-01-22T10:18:03.206-06:002019-01-22T10:18:03.206-06:00I am not sure Plantinga would say that God is sign...I am not sure Plantinga would say that God is significantly free in Plantinga's sense of the phrase "significantly free". A significantly free choice is a choice between the right and the wrong. I don't think God chooses between the right and the wrong. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-54746132554431635942019-01-22T00:18:02.787-06:002019-01-22T00:18:02.787-06:00Alex
An uncreated rabbit is, given theism, imposs...Alex<br /><br />An uncreated rabbit is, given theism, impossible. A significantly free creature who never sins isn't. Unless significantly free entails the possibility to make evil choices, of course, but it clearly doesn't because God is said to be significantly free yet cannot make evil choices. <br />Making evil choices is due to a defect. Non-defective creatures do not make evil choices.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-88403253639408910372019-01-21T13:04:01.923-06:002019-01-21T13:04:01.923-06:00Well, if one is an incompatibilist, it doesn't...Well, if one is an incompatibilist, it doesn't seem a limitation on omnipotence. To an incompatibilist like me, it seems nearly obvious that no one else can guarantee a particular outcome of a free choice, by the very nature of "free choice". The alleged limit on omnipotence, then, is not very different from that imposed by the fact that God cannot make an uncreated rabbit.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-82094492602142112272019-01-20T04:03:20.502-06:002019-01-20T04:03:20.502-06:00Alex
"TWDℵ1: In every feasible world contain...Alex<br /><br />"TWDℵ1: In every feasible world containing uncountably infinitely many significantly free choices, at least one of these choices is wrong."<br /><br />All of these TWDs make the same basic mistake. They assume that God, who is omnipotent, cannot create significantly free creatures who will never sin.<br />Sure, that is also "logically possible", but given the claim that this God is capable of even absurd things like creating stuff ex nihilo while being immutable, this is extremely unlikely.<br />What TWD proponents are actually claiming is not just that God would probably want to create uncountably infinitely many significantly free people, perhaps in a multiverse, but that God wants to create free people <i>who can sin</i> and no free people <i>who can't sin</i>.<br />And the question is: can such a God be called 'good'?<br /><br /><br />Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-48035814530092878462019-01-18T13:15:04.860-06:002019-01-18T13:15:04.860-06:00Very cool argument.Very cool argument.scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17709377505803597851noreply@blogger.com