tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5385766702774134906..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: PerduranceAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-26915784592302299052019-11-21T11:58:30.539-06:002019-11-21T11:58:30.539-06:00Scott: I'd never thought of it that way before...Scott: I'd never thought of it that way before, but I think you're exactly right. That's a pretty serious problem for B-theorists to deal with.Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-90136920945302729552019-11-21T11:48:04.847-06:002019-11-21T11:48:04.847-06:00I would argue that the possibility of perdurantism...I would argue that the possibility of perdurantism makes any non-presentist theory of time false unless you accept the possibility of an actual infinite collection of objects. <br /><br />Of course God having any collection (finite or otherwise) of temporal (or any other kind of) parts would violate Divine Simplicity, so a fortiori in the case of perdurantism.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-73092164743873783612019-11-20T08:37:48.398-06:002019-11-20T08:37:48.398-06:00I'm curious, Pruss.... Don't 2-4 all cause...I'm curious, Pruss.... Don't 2-4 all cause problems for human beings as well? #2 describes the parts as "other than God"; so, does that mean that the parts of humans on perdurantism are parts "other than the humans"? In line with #3, would our actions, on perdurantism, not be explained by our own will, but by temporal parts? And #4 implies that each temporal part is a separate entity from each other and from God overall (by calling them each all-knowing entities aside from God as an all-knowing entity).Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.com