tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5484513638305325018..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Culpably mistaken conscienceAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-35849408491842369492015-09-09T20:08:51.851-05:002015-09-09T20:08:51.851-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23328000850809604292015-09-09T20:08:50.933-05:002015-09-09T20:08:50.933-05:00In reference to Fred and Sally, there is a Latvian...In reference to Fred and Sally, there is a Latvian expression which translated verbatim into English is "With which end are they thinking?" Therefore, instead of going to a neurologist, Fred and Sally will be most likely better served by a proctologist. :-)Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64394813255210604752015-09-07T12:16:54.873-05:002015-09-07T12:16:54.873-05:00Peter:
I don't know if one can form one's...Peter:<br /><br />I don't know if one can form one's character through ordinary actions under ordinary predictable circumstances in such a way that one is guaranteed to lie. But if one could, then one would only have effect-responsibility for the lie. And, yes, this may limit the culpability insofar as one may not have foreseen that one's character would be thus formed. <br /><br />But is this a problem? Consider two pairs of cases:<br /> Liar 1a forms his character through ordinary vicious actions in such a way that he is determined to lie under circumstances C, and he knew that his actions were forming a vicious character.<br /> Liar 1b forms his character through ordinary vicious actions in such a way that he is determined to lie under circumstances C, but he nonculpably didn't know that his actions were forming a vicious character.<br /> Liar 2a performs some ordinary vicious actions that in result in a neuroscientist brainwashing him to be determined to lie in C, and he foresaw that the actions would lead to a vicious character.<br /> Liar 2b performs some ordinary vicious actions that result in a neuroscientist brainwashing him to be determined lie in C, but he nonculpably didn't know that his actions would lead to a vicious character.<br /><br />I don't see any moral difference between Liars 1a and 2a relevant to culpability. Both have effect-culpability for their subsequent lies in C. But I also don't see any moral difference between Liar 1b and 2b, assuming that they are equally nonculpable for their ignorance of the effects of their vicious actions.<br /><br />I think we're misled into thinking there is a difference between 1b and 2b by the fact that we ordinarily expect people will know that vicious actions breed a vicious character, but we don't expect them to know that, say, they will be kidnapped by a brainwasher. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76362800760956431912015-09-06T19:57:52.037-05:002015-09-06T19:57:52.037-05:00Certainly the neurologists are unethical and they ...Certainly the neurologists are unethical and they have spotted a great way to make good money off of two chumps. Wonder how much they charged for their services? Must have needed money for that vacation home, the trophy wife and alimony for the previous wife who helped them get through med school. :-)Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4321507328542481092015-09-04T08:52:35.456-05:002015-09-04T08:52:35.456-05:00You write "What about Fred? He is certainly r...You write "What about Fred? He is certainly responsible for the embezzlement: it was intentionally caused by his immoral action of hiring the neurologist. But I am inclined to think that this is an effect-responsibility ("liability" is a good word) rather than action-culpability. Fred is responsible for the embezzlement in the way that one is responsible for the intended effects of one's culpable actions, in this case the action of hiring a brainwasher, but he isn't culpable for it in the central sense of culpability."<br /><br />This seems plausible, since it seems that, once brain-washed, Fred lacks certain features of agency central to being morally responsible (in a non-derivative way) for his actions. How do you think about other issues of tracing? Suppose I have freely formed my character through ordinary means in such a way that if I find myself in certain circumstances--let us say, being offered $1,000,000 to tell a relatively harmless lie--I am determined to lie. Further suppose that all conditions of agency necessary for non-derivative responsibility for action remain (only alternative possibilities are absent). Are you inclined to treat my responsibility for lying in such cases as effect- or action-responsibility? If the former, doesn't that severely limit our culpability for such actions (since the epistemic conditions on effect-culpability seem pretty high)? If the latter, what is the relevant difference between Fred and myself? Is it something to do with the etiology of Fred's motivations or is there an important history-insensitive difference?Peterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07634508463121572915noreply@blogger.com