tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5534525171772425265..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: A third kind of moral argumentAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-60595961099468989762018-03-18T13:35:18.003-05:002018-03-18T13:35:18.003-05:00An interesting moral argument would be the argumen...An interesting moral argument would be the argument from conscience, favored by Cardinal Newman. This is my interpretation of it: the impression I get is that it is somewhat similar to arguments from religious experience, but wrt morality instead. We have an inner "voice of conscience" which absolutely forbids certain acts, or obliges us to do certain things. I think it is plausible to say that this feature -- we may call it an "experience of a moral voice or conscience" -- is best explained by theism and the idea that the natural law is inscribed in our hearts, and harder to satisfactorily explain under naturalism. First, we could have developed moral behavior in different ways, so this experience of a moral voice wouldn't be strictly necessary. Second, how exactly do we explain this experience of a moral voice merely in terms of brain functions and other natural features? It seems like, prima facie, a natural explanation would leave something unexplained about the richness of this moral conscience, and the impression of subjectivity we find in that voice - as if it were someone talking and reacting to us, similar to certain religious experiences. So the specific manner we come to know moral duties in many cases seem similar to religious experiences.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.com