tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5683062789271788584..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Attempts at wrongdoingAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-59007190350735599362017-11-07T10:57:57.075-06:002017-11-07T10:57:57.075-06:00On infinite sins, see: http://alexanderpruss.blogs...On infinite sins, see: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2017/11/adding-infinite-guilt.htmlAlexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-38075175087959751472017-11-07T10:31:45.818-06:002017-11-07T10:31:45.818-06:00Daniel:
I was thinking of "the completion&qu...Daniel:<br /><br />I was thinking of "the completion" as not just the last part of the course of action, but as the whole course of action. In that case, if two sins are worse than one, and the completion involves two sins (the attempt and the finish) while the attempt only one, the completion is worse.<br /><br />I suppose one could think that two sins isn't worse than one as they are all infinitely bad. That just seems wrong. It means that someone who has sinned once loses nothing morally by sinning again. Either one shouldn't say all sins are infinitely bad or one should allow for comparisons between infinities. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-92104242356518319972017-11-06T16:50:08.202-06:002017-11-06T16:50:08.202-06:00Thanks for another fascinating post, Alex.
There ...Thanks for another fascinating post, Alex.<br /><br />There are three different questions here, it seems to me:<br />(i) whether it's the case that 'attempts at immoral actions are just as bad as the completion of the actions';<br />(ii) the question of the comparative wickedness of the person that merely attempted an immoral action over against that of the person that completed an immoral action (cf. 'Samantha’s moral state in case 1 is less bad in than in case 3' and 'one is not better off in terms of one’s moral guilt state');<br />(iii) the question of 'counting counts of sin' (cf. 'when we count wrongs, we don’t count like that. We count the number of murders, the number of adulteries or the number of thefts—not the number of times that one could have stopped along the way').<br /><br />These questions seem to me to be independent. Suppose one takes Matthew 5:28 ('anyone who even looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart') to show, with respect to (i), that attempts at immoral actions are just as bad as the completion of the actions. One can still say that one is worse off for having done two equally bad sins (adultery in one's heart and adultery in physical reality) than for having done just one. Or one could say that every sin is infinitely bad, since committed against an infinite God, and so one isn't worse off. Similarly, one could say that there are two sins here, when adultery is completed, or that there is only one.<br /><br />Likewise, if one thinks that attempts at immoral actions are <b>not</b> just as bad as the completion of the actions, one can still say (implausibly to my mind) that the subjective guilt isn't determined by the objective badness of the actions done. And, again, one could say that there are two sins here, when adultery is completed, or that there is only one.Daniel Hillhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12454992644552904079noreply@blogger.com