tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5718469229969140666..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: From unrestricted composition to unrestricted caninityAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-43736187140306277902015-02-10T21:00:06.730-06:002015-02-10T21:00:06.730-06:00Unrestricted composition, unrestricted caninity. ...Unrestricted composition, unrestricted caninity. What comprises caninity? I know caninity when I see it.<br /><br />Is this robo-dog caninity?<br /><br />http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2946682/Here-Spot-Google-reveals-smaller-version-robo-dog-walk-trot-climb-steps-KICKED.html<br /><br />The particles are arranged like a dog. But caninity? Does it have the true essence of dog?<br /><br />"There is Rex … Rex… Rex… Rex… then the same set of particles, but not-Rex. If sharp cut-offs are a problem, that is a problem." If Rex is either a Boxer, Doberman or Schnauzer and we dock Rex's tail and crop his ears, does Rex still have the same caninity? Is it Rex or not Rex. If it is still Rex, how much of Rex's caninity has been diminished? Yet the essence of Rex is not diminished.Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-67985578728748933342015-02-10T20:26:26.853-06:002015-02-10T20:26:26.853-06:00Heath:
"Slowly we alter the arrangement of p...Heath:<br /><br />"Slowly we alter the arrangement of particles in Rex, by pulling them apart." - If you tried to alter the arrangement of the particles of any of the dogs I've had, you would be the one whose arrangement of particles would be altered. :-)<br /><br />Alex:<br /><br />"There could be zombie dogs that are nothing but heaps of particles looking like a dog." They do make zombie dog targets. You can get them at most stores that sell firearms. I'm sure these zombie dog targets would make good archery targets too. :-)Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32161892263395477632015-02-10T14:52:59.804-06:002015-02-10T14:52:59.804-06:00Actually, on the view Sider was defending at the t...Actually, on the view Sider was defending at the time, the fundamental beings in the world you describe would be something like particle stages--beings that exist at only one time, and the persisting particles would be made out of finitely or infinitely many of the stages (depending on whether time is infinite). Any four-dimensional arrangement of them will compose an entity. Some of these four-dimensional arrangements then cease to exist and others come into existence. For instance, there is an entity consisting of all and only yesterday's particle stages in you. This entity (which is a proper part of you) came into existence at midnight and ceased to exist next midnight. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76919724515615161032015-02-10T14:03:30.816-06:002015-02-10T14:03:30.816-06:00If we assume no vagueness, then as we move down th...If we assume no vagueness, then as we move down the continuum of worlds, one of three things happens at each step:<br /><br />1. The set of entities (which things exist) in the worlds remain constant. A fortiori, the number of entities remains constant.<br />2. The set of entities changes, but the number remains constant.<br />3. The set of entities changes, perhaps by gaining or losing a member. Therefore the number of entities does not remain constant.<br /><br />Suppose fundamental particles are never created or destroyed, and the number of them is finite. Then UC rules out 3. If we try to argue for 2, then we have the same sort of sharp cut-off issue. To illustrate: suppose we have a dog, composed of particles, named Rex. Slowly we alter the arrangement of particles in Rex, by pulling them apart. There is Rex … Rex… Rex… Rex… then the same set of particles, but not-Rex. If sharp cut-offs are a problem, that is a problem. So 2 has the same problems 3 does. That leaves 1, which is really strange.<br /><br />You could embrace 1 in two different ways. Either (1a) Every set of particles is a whole, irrespective of how the arrangement of the particles changes. Now bombs don’t destroy anything. Or (1b) Every set of particles <i>plus its arrangement</i> is a whole. Now change (at least intrinsic change in the arrangement of parts) is impossible. <br /><br />On the linguistic argument: I would think quantifiers would be vague terms iff the objects they quantified over vaguely existed. Saying things don’t vaguely exist because quantifiers are not vague seems circular to me. Same thing, probably, for identity.<br />Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-12051231786017999432015-02-10T11:37:23.199-06:002015-02-10T11:37:23.199-06:00Heath:
I don't think Sider needs that premise...Heath:<br /><br />I don't think Sider needs that premise. In the continuum of worlds, the arrangement is what varies--the particles can stay constant. And the point is that if UC is false, there will be a sharp cut-off: the worlds to the left of the cut-off will have one fewer entity (the whole) than the worlds to the right of the cut-off. That's absurd. So best to suppose, he thinks, that they are composing something everywhere in the sequence.<br /><br />He does need the assumption that what wholes are composed by particles supervenes on the arrangement of the particles.<br /><br />And, yes, he does assume that there is no vagueness here. His point is that vagueness is introduced by vague terms. Quantifiers, negation, conjunction and identity are not vague terms, he thinks.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61344450264033306942015-02-10T10:04:45.485-06:002015-02-10T10:04:45.485-06:00Sider needs the at-best-question-begging premise, ...Sider needs the at-best-question-begging premise, “If a set of particles compose something in one arrangement, then they compose something in any arrangement.” In fact he seems to need the even more ridiculous premise “If a set of particles compose something in one arrangement, they compose the same thing in any arrangement,” since if it is absurd to think that at some point the particles begin to compose a dog, then it is equally absurd to think that, upon small changes of arrangement, they transition immediately from composing one thing to composing another. This premise has the very odd consequence that, say, bombs in wartime do not destroy anything.<br /><br />Both Sider and Pruss seem committed to the claim that existence claims cannot have vague truth values. But if we run the simulation backwards, where a dog gradually transitions into a bunch of books, clearly there is a dog on one end of the transition and no dog on the other end. Most people would say, I think, that there is a small region—the region of “partially dissolved dog”—where it is unclear whether we have a dog or not. <br />Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com