tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5819887179240749300..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Externalism about prudential reasonsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-6342300159436850092010-02-22T10:15:37.636-06:002010-02-22T10:15:37.636-06:00Sociologically, few philosophers (and almost no no...Sociologically, few philosophers (and almost no non-theist philosophers--that's an odd sociological fact) are going to accept either Molinism or presentism. I agree that either one of the two will get one out of the difficulty.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-65331952839957682762010-02-22T09:24:51.768-06:002010-02-22T09:24:51.768-06:00...although I wonder whether the prima facie contr......although I wonder whether the <i>prima facie</i> contradiction between 1 and 2 (which might be resolved by distinguishing more clearly between our actions and what randomly happens to us) would rather make the consequence externalist suppose that generalized standard Molinism is true.Martin Cookehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11425491938517935179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5988792608319631652010-02-22T09:02:58.306-06:002010-02-22T09:02:58.306-06:00I do find myself more convinced by your second exa...I do find myself more convinced by your second example; I would agree that then one did the right thing, which happened to turn out badly. But could the consequence externalist not also say that one did what was the right thing to do <i>at the time</i>? The actual consequence would have to remain important, but I still don't see why that could not enter into things as the effect of hindsight.<br /><br />Could the consequence externalist not say that while it was the wrong thing to do as it happened, it was the right thing to do at the time? There may be a <i>prima facie</i> contradiction there, but under Presentism (which is a nice way to think of such non-Molinistic indeterminism) the actual consequence did not exist <i>at the time</i>. I think that to be a consequence externalist one only has to allow for such consequences as exist; and if there is such indeterminism then the consequences change, from lots of objective possibilities to actual outcomes.<br /><br />Then the consequence externalist could say:<br />1. You did the wrong thing (as it happened). But:<br />2. It was the right thing to do (at the time). And:<br />3. Had you not done this, then that would have been the wrong thing to do (at the time). Although of course:<br />4. That might have turned out to have been the right thing to have done, given the ubiquity of the indeterministic physics; so there is something such that had you done it, it would have been right.Martin Cookehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11425491938517935179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-50686294464124321752010-02-20T09:18:38.331-06:002010-02-20T09:18:38.331-06:00Surely it can't both be the case at t1 that p,...Surely it can't both be the case at t1 that p, and at t2 that it was not the case that p at t1.<br /><br />My suspicion is that consequence externalists haven't thought enough about the truth grounds of counterfactuals in an indeterministic world.<br /><br />Maybe a slightly better way of running the case is this. You're wounded and in your car. There is no bomb in your car--in fact, your car is perfectly fine. What should you do? Intuitively: you should try to drive to the hospital, right? So, you turn the ignition, and the spark quantum tunnels from the spark plug to the gas tank, and, boom, you're dead.<br /><br />If the counterfactuals are defined by probabilities, you should say that you did the right thing though it turned out bad. But that is a betrayal of what consequence externalists stand for. The other option is this weirdness:<br /> 1. You did the wrong thing. But:<br /> 2. Had you not done this, it would have been the wrong thing to do!<br /><br />So, there is no thing such that had you done it, it would have been right.<br /><br />You did the wrong thing by turning the ignition instead of self-treating. The right thing to do was to self-treat. But had you done the right thing, it would have been wrong!Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1094218941178868882010-02-20T04:33:57.002-06:002010-02-20T04:33:57.002-06:00I like this case, it's weird but simple; but I...I like this case, it's weird but simple; but I wonder if the externalist is left with a result that is <i>too</i> odd. The world being indeterministic, in a non-Molinistic way, the externalist should think that what is objectively best changes, as the indetermined becomes determined.<br /><br />This makes things more complicated than in the deterministic case, but no more paradoxical than indeterminism is anyway (e.g. via talk of what is true). And since what is objectively for the best is changing, it makes sense that doing what is objectively the wrong thing at the time can turn out to have been the objectively right thing.<br /><br />And there are common intuitions that such is how things are, e.g. people who take risks do feel justified when (and just because) things work out well. Although I don't think that they should then pride themselves on having taken a risk, there can seem to be objective rewards for such behaviour (e.g. evolution).Martin Cookehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11425491938517935179noreply@blogger.com