tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post7343697755733450425..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Explaining the contingent with the necessaryAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-81670409792573653422015-02-18T14:36:51.805-06:002015-02-18T14:36:51.805-06:00Could be that my examples miss the point.Could be that my examples miss the point.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-90576327022532215352015-02-18T13:33:22.798-06:002015-02-18T13:33:22.798-06:00Could you explicate that 'could be' a litt...Could you explicate that 'could be' a little bit more? It's not clear to what you're responding. Nor is it clear what it is you mean.N McNeelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562234372369108928noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-13319687141178599952015-02-18T13:24:58.211-06:002015-02-18T13:24:58.211-06:00Mr. Abdilla:
The W-PSR implies the PSR, so yes.
...Mr. Abdilla:<br /><br />The W-PSR implies the PSR, so yes.<br /><br />ydoaPs:<br /><br />Could be.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64537931649083029252015-02-18T12:24:39.388-06:002015-02-18T12:24:39.388-06:00This post is actually fairly irrelevant to the poi...This post is actually fairly irrelevant to the point Van Inwagen is making. His entire objection is about the case where *all* of the grounding explanans are necessary fact. You can't derive a contingent truth from *only* necessary truths. That's itself a necessary truth.<br /><br />The idea of the objection to PSR can be explicated by a branching reasoning structure.<br /><br />Either the chain of explanation is infinite with every explanans being an explanandum with its own explanans, or the chain has some sort of ending in grounding facts. If the chain of explanation is infinite, then PSR is false.<br /><br />If the chain has an ending in grounding facts, that set of facts is either composed entirely of necessary facts or is composed of a mixture of necessary facts and contingent facts. If it's a mixture, then there are contingent facts without explanation, so PSR is false.<br /><br />If it's all necessary is where this blog post is trying to be relevant. If the set of grounding facts is composed entirely of necessary facts, then we have modal collapse.<br /><br />But, as Pruss points out, all of his examples involve a mixture of contingent and necessary facts to explain the contingent fact. As such, it misses the point.N McNeelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562234372369108928noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-46400936090783324532014-09-19T16:50:40.323-05:002014-09-19T16:50:40.323-05:00Professor Pruss, is it necessary for you to defend...Professor Pruss, is it necessary for you to defend the PSR in order for your (and Gale's) cosmological argument to go through? After all, you only use w-PSR as a premise.<br /><br />Thanks!<br />HassanHassan uz Zamanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17007777906382378603noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-65500809430367397142010-05-08T12:15:01.848-05:002010-05-08T12:15:01.848-05:00None of your examples, as far as I can tell, are e...None of your examples, as far as I can tell, are examples of causal explanation.<br /><br />I'm not sure whether or how that bears on your point, but it seems somehow important.Dan Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04597863188523526649noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64087607781620164622010-05-06T19:55:54.790-05:002010-05-06T19:55:54.790-05:0014 isn't divisible by 3?14 isn't divisible by 3?Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76234608853109597202010-05-06T10:02:19.737-05:002010-05-06T10:02:19.737-05:00In some of your work on the PSR, you observed that...In some of your work on the PSR, you observed that an adequate response to van Inwagen's objection might need to appeal to a necessarily existent agent (like God). It's interesting that your proposed counterexamples to (1) don't rely on such an appeal.<br /><br />What about an objection as follows? <br /><br />With respect to (2), suppose van Inwagen agreed that it's contingent, but argued that it's actually a specific expression of a more general necessary truth in disguise: i.e., "it's impossible to divide 14 by 3" or perhaps "it's not within anyone's power to divide 14 by 3." These two propositions individually explain and entail that, necessarily, any attempt to divide 14 by 3 will fail. So while George's particular case obtained contingently, the precise manner in which it obtained--"George couldn't divide"--is explained and entailed by a more general necessary truth. <br /><br />I don't find myself convinced by such an objection, however.Marc Belcastrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03442654158696515036noreply@blogger.com