tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post7434242958402316942..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Grounding and explanationAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-71749192233435594322013-07-05T14:27:33.439-05:002013-07-05T14:27:33.439-05:00One kind of case where that there are Fs is explai...One kind of case where that there are Fs is explained by some F is where something becomes an F, and so the activity of that F, namely its becoming the F, explains why there are Fs. That's not what happens in the cases here.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-70613594470427827702013-07-05T12:14:36.906-05:002013-07-05T12:14:36.906-05:00The distinction here may be relevant to Maitzen...The distinction here may be relevant to Maitzen's argument that "there are penguins" explains "there are any contingent, concrete things at all" (in The Puzzle of Existence). His article is worth a read. <br /><br />(One thing of interest: Maitzen points out a case where "there are any Fs at all" may be explained by those very Fs, if, for instance, the Fs are also Gs, and the existence of Gs explains the existence of Fs.<br /><br />It seems to me that this can only work if a particular G can explain of some particular F why there is that F. But no particular penguin can explain of any particular contingent thing why there is that contingent thing, because being a penguin *presupposes* being a contingent concrete thing...) Joshua Rasmussenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03271147200091927898noreply@blogger.com