tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post7522612162228480279..comments2024-03-18T20:24:18.935-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Two presentist ways of seeing worldsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-52675169030114000342012-03-19T11:07:40.646-05:002012-03-19T11:07:40.646-05:00There are two kinds of changes in what is possible...There are two kinds of changes in what is possible. One kind of change is due to a change in what propositions exist. A non-haecceitist presentist will have to allow for such change. Another kind of change is where a proposition exists at two times, but at one it is metaphysically impossible and at the other it is metaphysically possible. That's the kind that bothers me.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-50327610328496839152012-03-19T09:48:20.094-05:002012-03-19T09:48:20.094-05:00The presentist who takes this route also has to sa...The presentist who takes this route also has to say, implausibly, "It is impossible for time to come to an end in 2011" or "It is impossible for time to be discrete" (if, as is plausible, a world where time is discrete has no times in common with our world).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-24519139644806432822012-03-19T09:45:27.818-05:002012-03-19T09:45:27.818-05:00"Was possible, is possible or will be possibl..."Was possible, is possible or will be possible" sounds like a non-arbitrary, or not very arbitrary, form of possibility.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69724207367650897162012-03-19T09:23:29.746-05:002012-03-19T09:23:29.746-05:00But the presentist won't think that the widest...But the presentist won't think that the widest and most non-arbitrary kind of possibility is possibility-at-some-time-or-other, since she thinks there's only one time. So she will think that her possibility *is* the widest non-arbitrary kind.<br /><br />What am I missing?Jonathan D. Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02913077212736834794noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41140497176388271582012-03-19T08:21:47.188-05:002012-03-19T08:21:47.188-05:00Jon:
I think metaphysical possibility is the wide...Jon:<br /><br />I think metaphysical possibility is the widest non-arbitrary kind of possibility (strictly logical possibility is arbitrary, as it depends on which rules of inference and axioms you include). If the metaphysically possible changes, then there is a wider non-arbitrary kind of possibility: possibility-at-some-time-or-other.<br /><br />Yeah, the present problem requires possible worlds to make sense.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1608049836263685862012-03-18T21:16:30.382-05:002012-03-18T21:16:30.382-05:00Why is it implausible that what is possible change...Why is it implausible that what is possible changes?<br /><br />And if the presentist is also a dispositionalist about possibility, then she might think, as I'm inclined to, that there are no possible worlds, and hence a problem that rests on possible worlds talk is a pseudo-problem. Does the present problem require possible worlds to even make sense?Jonathan D. Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02913077212736834794noreply@blogger.com