tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post7624156917248619338..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Causation and ThomismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger59125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-21203292857220444462020-08-02T14:10:14.478-05:002020-08-02T14:10:14.478-05:00Sorry! I said Miguel again!Sorry! I said Miguel again!Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-7417631623048725462020-08-02T13:56:24.945-05:002020-08-02T13:56:24.945-05:00Miguel
I can see how God is creating the arrow f...Miguel <br /><br />I can see how God is creating the arrow for immanent causative forces ( specifically humans) in that he “holds back” and allows for humans to have free will and to be there own cause ( not for existence but for function). I think maybe that is why humans have an incorporeal aspect, namely intellect, that can take on different forms through determinate thinking (something non-human animals can’t do). Yes, things have essences, but maybe they only exist in the intellect. I wouldn’t necessarily say though that a things essence is what lays the foundation for its function. Why can’t it be rather that its essence is what it is and at the same time God directly causes every causal chain in a non-arbitrary way (for a reason we don’t understand)? When we conceptualize something’s essence we are conceptualizing its behavior but not necessarily its causal source. Thoughts?Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-79613665888639126422020-08-02T13:11:45.044-05:002020-08-02T13:11:45.044-05:00David
It's okay, I imagined you were talking ...David<br /><br />It's okay, I imagined you were talking to me since there was no Miguel here at the combox :D<br /><br /><br />And relax, I'm no expert either, just a mate trying to figure things out as you are. <br /><br />So, on concurrentism, it's not that anything has causal power in themselves, they always depend on the source (namely, God). But here's the deal: although God has to <i>cooperate</i> (that's the key word) for things to have their effects, as Alex pointed out a few comments back, it's like God causes the arrow A -> B, not that he causes B when there's an A.<br /><br />In that sense, there's a real connection between the cause A and the effect by, by virtue of it's essence. That's not the case on occasionalism, however, since it's only God who causes anything (and the connection between A and B is arbitrary).<br /><br />In respect to the intellect and will, I'd say the same thing I said in my last comment, namely: God giving something causal power does not mean it will operate in a deterministic manner, only that it will operate. The human intellect and will have ends or goals in the most radical way, so that our thoughts are <i>about</i> things. That means that it needs causal power in order to be directed towards an specific end.Igor Gavianohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17256399806297339495noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-31185573488723193892020-08-02T12:41:19.674-05:002020-08-02T12:41:19.674-05:00I wasn’t clear in my response to your second point...I wasn’t clear in my response to your second point. The human intellect and will is more understandable to me as something with its own causal power since it’s more coherent as an incorporeal entity than essences being IN physical objects. That’s probably just my flawed way of thinking about it though.Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5320705423739514512020-08-02T12:34:34.696-05:002020-08-02T12:34:34.696-05:00Igor
For some reason I called you Miguel sorry. I ...Igor<br />For some reason I called you Miguel sorry. I don’t exactly know how to get around your first point, mainly because I’m having trouble understanding how something can have secondary causal power in itself detached from the source. I think I need a good analogy for that. As to my second point I don’t think it’s an arbitrary distinction since humans (it seems) are the only beings with free will. Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41124812318928690032020-08-02T11:48:22.674-05:002020-08-02T11:48:22.674-05:00David
I think that occasionalism has that consequ...David<br /><br />I think that occasionalism has that consequence because what a thing does reflects what it is, or follows from its essence. Now, if only God does anything, then there's no such things as essences, or even such things as <i>things</i>.<br /><br />Since there's no causal connection in the world, occasionalism would do away with act/potency distinction, which was fundamental to get to God in the first place (at least from Feser's proofs).<br /><br />As to your second point, I don't see any conceptual problem with that, though I could be wrong. However, that seems a little <i>ad hoc</i>, I mean, how wouldn't it commit the Taxi Cab fallacy of stopping where you want to stop in your explanations? If you say that you exist and has derivative causal power, why not everything else?Igor Gavianohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17256399806297339495noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-27109223857171785112020-08-02T10:58:28.310-05:002020-08-02T10:58:28.310-05:00Miguel
I don’t understand why something needs caus...Miguel<br />I don’t understand why something needs causal efficacy to exist. I’m not denying that to be true. I just don’t understand. Also it seems that in the Feser passage above he says that proposing an occasionalistic view would undermine the original basis for getting to God in the first place. But why can’t we have a model where humans are the only beings with causal efficacy (free will) and even if nothing else exists you can still make any of the same arguments based on change towards God?Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41579480599913032652020-08-02T10:15:45.078-05:002020-08-02T10:15:45.078-05:00Walter
I don't think that follows even if occ...Walter<br /><br />I don't think that follows even if occasionalism were true. God causing something to exist does not mean he causes it to act in a deterministic manner, so that there's no conflict with free will. <br /><br />The real problem, which Feser pointed out in the quotation I put forward a few comments back, is that if occasionalism <i>were</i> true, nothing would be real, including yourself. But you cannot deny your own existence without being inconsistent. Therefore, occasionalism is false.<br /><br />But again, the occasionalist view <i>presuposes</i> the possibility of non-occasionalist views, so that there's no inconsistency in positing the veracity of such views.Igor Gavianohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17256399806297339495noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-9011328134777028862020-08-02T08:42:25.722-05:002020-08-02T08:42:25.722-05:00Walter
Of course everything might need a sustainin...Walter<br />Of course everything might need a sustaining cause, including humans, and a non-occasionalistic view of free choice would not deny that. All i’m saying is that it seems that the only beings possessing secondary, innate powers could be people (even though they need to be conserved at every moment by God) while all other things being inanimate more or less would need an occasionalistic explanation.Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1702812152042836022020-08-02T02:38:24.371-05:002020-08-02T02:38:24.371-05:00David
That could be the case, but it contradicts ...David<br /><br />That could be the case, but it contradicts the radical thomistic view, supported by, among others, Edward Feser, that nothing can remain in existence, not even for an instant if it isn't created and actively sustained by God.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-89662125528008670252020-08-01T20:05:41.240-05:002020-08-01T20:05:41.240-05:00Why can’t occasionalism be true for all things tha...Why can’t occasionalism be true for all things that are not rational agents, but not a thing that applies to humans since they are the only rational beings?Davidfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075936144942940284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86411836116932583592020-08-01T04:32:38.406-05:002020-08-01T04:32:38.406-05:00Unknown
It is most certainly not a stupid questio...Unknown<br /><br />It is most certainly not a stupid question.<br />The problem I see is that if occasionalism is true, humans cannot have free will.<br />(Libertarian) free will requires a t least a portion of conservationism.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17062896030012876862020-07-31T15:50:58.448-05:002020-07-31T15:50:58.448-05:00Sorry if that is a stupid question.Sorry if that is a stupid question.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14464670118670557013noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-16272896082220136442020-07-31T15:49:56.614-05:002020-07-31T15:49:56.614-05:00I'm new here and also somewhat new to thomisti...I'm new here and also somewhat new to thomistic philosophy but i have a question. What exactly is the advantage of Aristotelian concept of things having innate powers and tendencies? What is the problem with occasionalism? I feel like occasionalism is not problematic as long as humans have free will. What Im trying to say is that the only thing that it is important for it to achieve goodness in the Aristotelian sense are people mainly since they are the only beings with free will. Is it problematic if inanimate things lack innate powers?Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14464670118670557013noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-54391368836752693902020-07-28T12:05:23.167-05:002020-07-28T12:05:23.167-05:00Alex:
That was my intent with the yellow glow. Th...Alex:<br /><br />That was my intent with the yellow glow. There is probably a better way of showing concurrent causality but I couldn't think of it. I was worried if I used a both a yellow arrow and a black one it would look like there were two separate acts. In any case I'm glad to hear that it seems to be fair.Matthewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10115330639707507016noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-18580735575919349892020-07-28T10:38:17.312-05:002020-07-28T10:38:17.312-05:00But perhaps I am unfair. You have a yellow glow ar...But perhaps I am unfair. You have a yellow glow around the causal arrow. If that means that God is also causing that arrow, then we have no disagreement about concurrentism: your diagram just has the extra conservation arrows that my diagram omits (God conserves the cause and the effect).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-19423078441520680922020-07-28T10:36:57.735-05:002020-07-28T10:36:57.735-05:00Matthew:
Your concurrentism diagram looks to me l...Matthew:<br /><br />Your concurrentism diagram looks to me like a version of mere conservation. God is causing the power. And then the power is a finite cause of the finite effect. So God is causing a finite cause, apparently without cooperating in the cause's causing of the effect. <br /><br />It seems to me that the central thesis of concurrentism is that *no* finite cause can produce an effect on its own. In particular, a finite power can't produce an effect on its own.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-71169726656131425752020-07-28T10:33:58.892-05:002020-07-28T10:33:58.892-05:00Igor:
In both worlds there is a potentiality for ...Igor:<br /><br />In both worlds there is a potentiality for fire. And in exactly one of the worlds this potentiality is actualized. But what makes it be true that it is actualized? Suppose we say that the match is somehow different when the potentiality is actualized. Then the problem comes back when we ask about the connection between the match-with-actualized-potentiality and the fire. They seem to be distinct objects, linked in some causal way. That link requires divine cooperation. So, if God chooses not to cooperate, we will have the match-with-actualized-potentiality and no fire. And the problem comes back.<br /><br />In fact, the standard Aristotelian story is that the *effect* is the actualization of the potentiality, rather than that the actualization is found in the cause. So the actualization of the potentiality is the fire. But if so, then the fire must be different in the world where it actualizes the potentiality of the match and in the world where God directly causes the match to be on fire. So we once again come back to the idea that God cannot cause the same fire the match can.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-88667920272160689412020-07-28T07:58:42.783-05:002020-07-28T07:58:42.783-05:00Matthew
Your diagram is very informative, congrat...Matthew<br /><br />Your diagram is very informative, congrats!<br /><br />Alex<br /><br />But what I'm not getting is this: isn't potentiality a kind of being? I mean, isn't establishing it as a kind of being the whole purpose of positing the act/potency distinction?<br /><br />Because, If so, wouldn't your original striking of the match example be solved by saying that in one world the potentiality is actualized and, in the other, it is suspended, so that there's a real metaphysical distinction between the two?Igor Gavianohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17256399806297339495noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-74049438694466214882020-07-27T13:17:57.771-05:002020-07-27T13:17:57.771-05:00Alex: that seems right to me and is also, I think,...Alex: that seems right to me and is also, I think, what Aquinas is getting at. His main point is that God can impress on matter directly whatever form a creature can impress on matter, this as opposed to saying that whatever has been impressed into matter cannot be distinguished by its origin. However, I’m not quite as sure about the diagram. To me, it makes it appear that God is causing the arrow to exist itself, such that the relation might exist independently of the substances. I’ve generally taken God’s concurrent action to require God actualizing the being of a substance and the action of its power. This means God's arrow points at the substance's power, not the relation itself (see linked diagram below). So God both holds a human in existence and actualizes his power, say to will, such that an effect occurs (i.e. that which is willed).<br /><br />Walter: This goes to your point about conservationism. The problem isn’t with any kind of conservationism but with mere conservationism. I’ve tried to capture this with the aforementioned chart. On all three forms, concurrentism, occasionalism, and mere conservationism, God conserves the finite substance in being. However, with mere conservation, God’s action is not required for the finite substance to act—so long as God holds a human in existence she can will x or y by herself. According to concurrentism, God must not only conserve the finite substance, He must concur with the acting of the power. E.g. He must act with the person’s will (or intellect, senses, etc.) or else the will does not act, no action occurs, and no effect happens.<br /><br />https://universityofstandrews907-my.sharepoint.com/:b:/g/personal/mj62_st-andrews_ac_uk/EX5FNyVnIRdKiYqSsx3JwWABQii6GeQRuwYGvglhWLigzQ?e=wvXdPaMatthewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10115330639707507016noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86851636413764708202020-07-27T10:14:42.223-05:002020-07-27T10:14:42.223-05:00Actually, thinking about this more shows that ther...Actually, thinking about this more shows that there is a problem here for all theists who accept divine simplicity and the principle that truth supervenes on being, and not just for Thomists. For the principle that God can do whatever a creature can do seems very plausible for theists in general--it seems to be a part of omnipotence. But now take a case where a finite event A indeterministically causes B. Then the following seems logically possible: A occurs but by chance doesn't cause B; however, God miraculously causes B anyway. And we can ask: What differentiates this from the case where A occurs and causes B?<br /><br />Suppose we say that what differentiates the two is the token causal relation C between A and B in the case where A causes B. Then either the correlation between A and C is indeterministic or the correlation between C and B is indeterministic. In both cases, the old question comes back.<br /><br />It seems to me that the theist who accepts that truth supervenes on being just has to accept essentiality of origins and deny that God can cause whatever a creature can. As far as this argument goes, all that's needed is to hold that for any item B a creature can cause, God can cause something that is just like B.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-12114261737868104222020-07-27T10:07:27.627-05:002020-07-27T10:07:27.627-05:00Alex
But that implies conservationism.Alex<br /><br />But that implies conservationism.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61704405697217169402020-07-27T10:07:15.516-05:002020-07-27T10:07:15.516-05:00By the way, there is a somewhat analogous problem ...By the way, there is a somewhat analogous problem for the atheist. A typical contemporary philosophical atheist thinks that it is logically possible for contingent things to come into existence for no cause at all (the universe did that, they are apt to think). Suppose now that A is an indeterministic cause that causes B half the time. Now the following seems logically possible: A doesn't cause B, but B still comes into existence uncaused. <br /><br />So, we have the puzzle: What distinguishes the case where where A causes B from the case where A doesn't cause B but B happens to come into existence uncaused?<br /><br />Note, however, that the atheist can make an essentiality of origins move just as I do: deny that the *same* B can be caused by A in one world and be uncaused in another. And there is less cost to the atheist in making this move. (For there is some cost to the Thomist to hold that God cannot produce the *same* cow ex nihilo as the cow's parents can.)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-19436034977873052352020-07-27T10:00:10.147-05:002020-07-27T10:00:10.147-05:00Matthew:
I wouldn't say that on the Thomistic...Matthew:<br /><br />I wouldn't say that on the Thomistic view, God's causation is sufficient for the effect. That buys into this picture of causation:<br />God → finite effect<br />Finite cause → finite effect.<br /><br />But I think the Thomistic picture instead is: http://alexanderpruss.com/thomisticcausation.png<br />In other words, God does not cause the finite effect, but God causes the causal arrow between the finite cause and its finite effect.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-56996507445572310182020-07-26T09:21:57.237-05:002020-07-26T09:21:57.237-05:00Matthew
And mine is that a real distinction does ...Matthew<br /><br />And mine is that a real distinction does not entail separability, and that saying "God can directly cause anything" presuposes that God can cause anything in a non direct way.Igor Gavianohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17256399806297339495noreply@blogger.com