tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post8812541826868169523..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Stochastic substitutions, rationality and consentAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-55418248307975976942017-01-19T10:42:12.615-06:002017-01-19T10:42:12.615-06:00I think such stochastic stories may undercut some ...I think such stochastic stories may undercut some of the plausibility of social-contract pictures of justice. Take an extreme case. A rational agent is likely to be willing to risk a one in a billion chance of death to save $20. So, suppose that instead of a $20 fine, we kill one in a billion parking violators. If the system is world-wide, we'll end up killing someone pretty soon. But to kill someone for a parking violation is clearly unjust. Yet one could get rational agreement to this system.<br /><br />(In line with an earlier post, it may matter if the system is automated or human-operated. But I am assuming a human-operated system here.)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-54248114826027036082017-01-18T08:07:13.484-06:002017-01-18T08:07:13.484-06:00My thought is that this is related to contractuali...My thought is that this is related to contractualist vs. consequentialist ethics.<br /><br />The aggregate utility of parking-violators is higher under the stochastic system. And since fines are handed out randomly, the expected utility of individual parking-violators is higher under the stochastic system. So what could the objection to this system be? None, from a consequentialist standpoint.<br /><br />But now consider it from a social-contract point of view. Here it gets tricky, because it matters how you describe the contractors. If the contract is literally made before knowing who the violators are (say, the townspeople vote for the new stochastic system in a referendum) then there seems to be no issue about justice. On the other hand, when the contract is between those who get fortunate dice rolls and those who get unfortunate dice rolls (“tell that to the person who gets the $200 fine”) then there does seem to be a justice issue. Because THAT person (who gets the $200 fine) would never accept the contract, under that description of herself. <br /><br />What if the new law is passed well before it begins to be enforced, it is widely promulgated, and everyone understands its virtues and regards it as an improvement? Then I am inclined to say you have widespread consent to a hypothetical contract, and the justice issue doesn’t seem pressing. <br /><br />I’m not sure this nails down the whole problem. But the problem seems to arise when the fine-payer thinks of herself as “person who has to pay $200 instead of $40” rather than “person participating in a stochastic system allocating 1/20th chances of a $200 fine instead of a certain $40 fine”. <br />Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com