Alexander Pruss's Blog

It is well-known—a feature and not a bug—that Tarski’s definition of truth needs to be given in a metalanguage rather than the object langua...

The most common argument that mathematical truth is not provability uses Tarski’s indefinability of truth theorem or Goedel’s first incomple...

For years in my logic classes I’ve been giving a rough but fairly accessible sketch of the fact that there are unprovable arithmetical truth...

Is there a set of all set-theoretic truths? This would be the set of sentences (in some encoding scheme, such as Goedel numbers) in the lang...

Tarski's Undefinability of Truth theorem says that given a language that contains enough material cannot have a truth predicate, i.e., a...

Tarski's T-schema says that for any sentence " s ": " s " is true if and only if s . Suppose that " s ...

This is going to be a pretty technically involved post and it will be written very badly, as it's really just notes for self. Start wi...

Tarski's definition is often noted—typically critically—as being applicable only to the languages he gave it in. Thus, he defined...

Here is a good reason to think that Tarski-style attempts at a definition of truth that do not make use of semantic concepts are ...

Tarski's definition of truth depends on a portion which is, essentially, a disjunctive definition of application. As Field has no...

It would be a pity to have to drop the T-schema. But if I had to do that, I'd justify myself as follows. Sometimes sentences...

According to Tarski, Schema (T), of which instances have the form: "..." is true if and only if ..., where the same text i...

Tarski's (T) schema says that: X is true if, and only if, p in every case in which X is a "name" for the senten...

I am reading Tarski's "The Semantic Conception of Truth" and came across this paragraph which I just had to blog: It...