Alexander Pruss's Blog

Here is an interesting fine-tuning issue, inspired by a talk I heard from Brian Cutter at the 2023 ACPA meeting. It seems likely that physi...

For a while I’ve speculated that making ontological sense of quantum mechanics requires introducing a global entity into our ontology to gro...

Much (but not all) contemporary philosophy of mind is written as if microphysics were fundamental physics. But as far as I know, only on tho...

A perdurantist who believes that particles are fundamental will typically think that the truly fundamental physical entities are instantaneo...

Monism holds there is only one (or at least one fundamental) thing in reality: the universe. Pluralism, as normally taken, holds there are m...

Too much of the contemporary ontological imagination is guided by the idea that the fundamental physical stuff in the world is discrete part...

I’ve toyed with identifying materiality with spatiality (much as Descartes did). But here’s another very different reductive idea. Maybe to ...

In Aristotelian ontology the matter and parts of a substance get their being from their substance. But now we have a problem: we consta...

Isn't it interesting that we are currently don't know whether the fundamental physical entities are the tiniest of things...

Let us suppose that I am playing a nice game of Xiangqi with my daughter. The pieces are wooden, with painted red or black characte...

This is just a progress report, a promissory note without much argument. I've been thinking a lot about naturalism and person...

The best physics tells us that material reality consists of one or more non-local fields. (Premise) Therefore, material reality ...