Alexander Pruss's Blog

On the Aristotelian account of abstraction, we abstract the forms of things via perception. But here is a problem. First of all, we sometime...

If naturalism about our minds is true, then the correct account of intentionality is causal. On a causal account of intentionality, our po...

The following cute argument is valid. If physicalism is true, all reality is effable (because it can all be expressed in the language of com...

According to Spinoza, all of reality—namely, deus sive natura and its modes—can be independently understood under each of (at least) two at...

If non-Aristotelian naturalism about mind is true, a causal theory of reference is true. If non-Aristotelian naturalism about mind is true...

Some people think that self-consciousness is a big deal, that it’s the sort of thing that might be hard for an artificial intelligence syste...

Spinoza's main theory of intentionality is simple. What is the relationship between an idea and what it represents? Identity . ...

A standard solution to general sceptical problems is to move to an externalist account of content. Grossly oversimplifying, if what makes a...

Consider the following BASIC computer program: input a input b print a+b I run the program, and it pauses for input. I press...