Alexander Pruss's Blog

Here is a test case for explanationist stories about initial priors, on which a more explanatory theory has a higher initial prior. Consider...

One promising way to define priors is with algorithmic probability , such as Solomonoff priors. The idea is that we have a language L (say,...

We tend to imagine a Bayesian agent as starting with some credences, “the ur-priors”, and then updating the credences as the observations co...

Suppose I learned that all my original priors were consistent and regular but produced by an evil demon bent upon misleading me. The subjec...

Here is a hypothesis: It is epistemically better for the human community if human beings do not all have the same (ur-) priors. This cou...

Suppose I observe some piece of evidence, attempt a Bayesian update of my credences, but make a mistake in my calculations and update incorr...

Let’s say that we want prior probabilities for data that can be encoded as a countably infinite binary sequence. Generalized Solomonoff pri...

Suppose we have a group of perfect Bayesian agents with the same evidence who nonetheless disagree. By definition of “perfect Bayesian agent...

Here’s a problem for Bayesianism and/or our rationality that I am not sure what exactly to do about. Take a proposition that we are now pre...

Bayesian reasoning starts with prior probabilities and gathers evidence that leads to posterior probabilities. It is occasionally said that ...

Visual and auditory perception are not subject to rational evaluation. Nobody perceives visually or auditorily in a rational or irrational w...

Maybe a Bayesian should be a hybrid of an internalist and an externalist about justification. The internalist aspect would come from correct...

Counterfactuals about scientific practice reveal some curious facts about our prior probabilities. Our handling of experimental suggests an ...

I. J. Good is said to have said that we can know someone’s priors by their posteriors. Suppose that Alice has the following disposition with...

I wonder if virtue epistemology isn't particularly well-poised to solve the problem of prior probabilities. To a first approximation, yo...

Carnap's objective prior probability measure was designed to make induction possible. Almost nobody uses Carnap's probability ...