Alexander Pruss's Blog

Each of Alice and Seabiscuit is a human or a horse. But Alice is a human or a horse “on other grounds” than Seabiscuit is a human or a horse...

All grace received is given through Christ’s work of salvation. Christ’s work of salvation happened in the first centuries AD and BC. One...

I think it would be useful to apply more Bayesian analyses to textual scholarship. In Romans 16:7, Junia or Junias is described as “famous ...

Every so often, someone claims to me that there is a difficulty in reconciling the Aristotelian idea of the actualization of potential with ...

It is sometimes said that: One can have p explain q and q explain p when the types of explanation are different. I think (1) is mist...

There is an interesting sense in which standard polygamy (i.e., polygyny or polyandry) presupposes the binarity of marriage. In standard pol...

According to Aquinas, whenever we correctly say something non-negative of God, we speak analogically. It is correct to say that Socrates is...

If we think parts are explanatorily prior to wholes, then gunky objects—objects which have parts but no smallest parts—involve a vicious exp...

Leibniz famously thinks that ordinary material objects like trees and cats have parts, and these parts have parts, and so on ad infinitum . ...

It is plausible that genuine relations have to bottom out in fundamental relations. E.g., being a blood relative bottoms out in immediate bl...

After visiting the British Museum yesterday, I find it rather hard to take seriously the argument for the relativity of beauty from the dive...

The Fine-Tuning Argument claims that the life-permitting ranges of various parameters are so narrow that, absent theism, we should be surpri...

Let’s say that we want prior probabilities for data that can be encoded as a countably infinite binary sequence. Generalized Solomonoff pri...

One of the ways to clinch a too-many-thinkers argument (say, Merricks’ argument against perdurantism, or Olson’s argument for animalism) is ...

It is widely held that consciousness is a maximal property—a property F such that, “roughly, … large parts of an F are not themselves F .”...