Alexander Pruss's Blog

I used to be quite averse to multiplying types of normativity until I realized that in an Aristotelian framework it makes perfect sense to m...

Some actions are are things I can do immediately: for instance, I can immediately raise my hand. Others require that I do something to enabl...

Here is my talk from the Cracow philosophy of religion conference in September:

This test for whether one is intending some effect E of an action is often employed (e.g., by Germain Grisez) in the Double Effect literatu...

Say that a “spinner” is a process whose output is an angle from 0 ∘ (inclusive) to 360 ∘ (exclusive). Take as primitive a notion of unifor...

Wright and Bengson note an apparent intuitive asymmetry in our side-effect judgments. We blame people for not avoiding bad effects, even wh...

Here’s another problem with independence for friends of infinitesimal probabilities. Let ...,  X −2 ,  X −1 ,  X 0 ,  X 1 ,  X 2 , ... be a...

Suppose that a random variable X is uniformly distributed (in some intuitive sense) over some space. Then : P ( X  =  y )= P ( X  =  z ) ...

While writing an earlier post , I came across a curious phenomenon. It is, of course, quite familiar that we have incompatible reasons that ...

I am very much drawn to the objective causal tendency interpretation of chances. What makes a quantum die have chance 1/6 of giving any of i...

Years ago, for my older kids' coding education, I made a Minecraft mod  that lets you program in Python. Now I made a Scratch extension ...

I used to think that it is trivial and uncontroversial that if one intends something, one intends it as an end or as a means. Some people (...

Scanlon argues that intentions do not affect the permissibility of non-expressive actions because our intentions come from our reasons, and ...

Some people, maybe as part of a response to the closeness problem for Double Effect, think: Whenever I intend A while knowing that A ine...

On property dualism, we are wholly made of matter but there are irreducible mental properties. What material object fundamentally has the i...