tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post1999803843551731950..comments2024-03-18T20:24:18.935-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: ArtifactsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger140125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1517572770164882932013-06-20T10:29:03.187-05:002013-06-20T10:29:03.187-05:00This reminds me of Dennet's "two-bitser&q...This reminds me of Dennet's "two-bitser" argument. Sort of throws a wrench into materialist explanations of intrinsic intentionality.ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-81846742804179846852013-05-06T22:02:17.110-05:002013-05-06T22:02:17.110-05:00If artifacts don't exist and guns get outlawed...If artifacts don't exist and guns get outlawed ... then I would pay a lot of a nonexistent money for a really good nonexistent blowgun.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-52364622185207923632013-05-06T20:07:12.441-05:002013-05-06T20:07:12.441-05:00A serious problem with a variable diameter blowgun...A serious problem with a variable diameter blowgun is that the dart skirt won't seal in the wider sections or else there will be too much friction in the narrower sections.<br />An expanding skirt might help, but there might be friction issues. Though I think some blowguns are ptfe coated inside, which no doubt helps.<br />I think the place to concentrate the engineering would be dart design.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-44207768023624767312013-05-06T19:48:52.980-05:002013-05-06T19:48:52.980-05:00Guys:
Let's enter this dead horse in the Prea...Guys:<br /><br />Let's enter this dead horse in the Preakness so we can beat it some more. I think it has a chance. :-)<br /><br />By the way, as soon as our new gun laws take effect in Maryland, I know where I can get a really good blowgun. And no, it's not just a piece of pipe, I think that the interior is something of a converging diverging nozzle instead of a straight pipe. And then there are boundary layer issues and differences between laminar and turbulent air flows. Do you have an Aerospace Department at Baylor to run this by? :-)<br /><br />PS: When blowguns are outlawed, only outlaws will have blowguns.Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69899974619276680232013-05-06T19:01:08.773-05:002013-05-06T19:01:08.773-05:00Well, a blowgun is a particularly nice case of an ...Well, a blowgun is a particularly nice case of an artifact, because it can be just an ordinary piece of pipe that's used for a particular purpose.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-37804462753160980672013-05-04T19:02:08.909-05:002013-05-04T19:02:08.909-05:00All this started over what constitutes a blowgun!!...All this started over what constitutes a blowgun!! It's a good thing you guys don't write gun laws! By the way, your dead horse just won the Kentucky Derby so you can stop beating it now, or are we going all the way to the Triple Crown? :-) Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-58436980017686611892013-05-04T01:08:15.135-05:002013-05-04T01:08:15.135-05:00Richard,
I would say that the case of the term ‘...Richard, <br /><br />I would say that the case of the term ‘elephant’ is relevantly similar to the previous one, though slightly different. For instance, some people are recognized as experts (say, biologists, or a subset), and most people might be willing to defer to their usage to some extent. But even then, there are issues like who counts as a relevant expert, how the different person’s usages are weighed, etc., and of course the issue of vagueness in the usage <i>by a single person</i> is there as well. <br />So, it seems to me that the issues I mentioned, in one way or another, are present too. <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41491022236638465702013-05-04T01:07:04.038-05:002013-05-04T01:07:04.038-05:00Richard,
I will more or less briefly address the...Richard, <br /><br />I will more or less briefly address the second option that you offer, namely that the sentence "If m grains of sand don't make a heap, then m + 1 grains of sand don't make a heap". More precisely, I will address the hypothesis that “for all natural numbers m if m grains of sand don't make a heap, then m + 1 grains of sand don't make a heap” (at least, that’s what I meant in that context), is meaningful but false, that would entail that there is a certain number m(heap, sand) such that m(heap, sand) grains of sand do not make a heap, but m(heap, sand)+1 do. <br />That, however, does not seem plausible (and similar considerations apply to elephants by the way), for a number of reasons. I will address some of them. <br />1. Before I address the term ‘heap’, there is the question of what counts as a ‘grain’ of sand, and the same even goes for ‘sand’. Vagueness is ubiquitous. But let’s leave those issues aside, at least for now. <br />2. The term ‘heap’ is a term in the English language, and its meaning is determined by usage. For instance, people might as well start using ‘heap’ to mean ‘two or more items of a certain kind’, and even though that too would have its own degree of vagueness, it’s clear that three grains of sand would make up a heap, but that would be because the meaning of the word ‘heap’ would change. For that matter, they might use ‘heap’ to mean ‘elephant’. <br />So, the meaning of ‘heap’, and thus also the number m(heap, sand), is the result of usage among English speakers. <br />But here’s a difficulty. When a person learns how to use the word ‘heap’, they usually do so by watching others use it. And they see some examples of heaps, and some examples of things that are not heaps. In particular, a person may have encountered some examples of heaps of sand, or they might apply the word 'heap’ in the case of sand, by similarity. <br />Yet, each person has encountered different cases, not exactly the same. Given that, and given also that different people have slightly different minds, it seems almost certain that there will be some interpersonal differences in their dispositions to use the words. So, it seems that even if each person P determined by her usage a single m(heap, sand, <i>P</i>), the number would vary for different P. I don’t see a way around that. One may try majorities, etc., but then a question is how the majority is computed, and then what determines <i>that</i>, as well as the relative weighs of the views of each person, etc. (i.e., by whose concept is the relative weight determined?). <br />But there is a another difficulty, namely that even each individual person probably does not have a concept that is sufficiently fine-grained to establish a single m(heap, sand, P). She might even have several very similar concepts of ‘heap’ that she’s willing to use in different contexts, and <i>none</i> of them establish a single such m (so, there might not even be a set of such numbers relative to each person, let alone a general one). <br />But regardless of whether she has one or several vague concepts, it seems plausible to me that the usage of the word ‘heap’ by person P is not precise enough to determine a number m(heap, sand, P). <br />As I see it, it’s very probable that there are certain amounts of sand that would be deemed ‘heap’ or not depending on factors like what other amounts of sand surround them. For instance, if it’s 1 grain here, one grain there, and some greater amount X, then P might be inclined to call X a heap, whereas she might call it ‘not a heap’ if surrounded by much greater amounts. Or maybe it’s the other way around, for some P. It’s hard to tell. But there may even be other factors, like how people surrounding P may appear to be using ‘heap’ at that particular time, etc. <br />If that is not so, how do you think that a single, arbitrarily precise concept of heap (or, for that matter, ‘elephant’) is formed, not only for each individual but for a community? (and how are the boundaries of ‘community’ determined?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-7274704309845942542013-05-04T01:04:22.556-05:002013-05-04T01:04:22.556-05:00Richard,
‘Square’ seems to mean that it has four...Richard, <br /><br />‘Square’ seems to mean that it has four sides; ‘round’ seems to mean that the distance to the center is constant. In non-Euclidean geometries, there are round squares, and so clearly that’s meaningful. And in Euclidean geometry, to say that a figure is a round square is to say that it has the properties I mentioned above. It’s false, as it can be established within an Euclidean framework. <br /><br />You ask why I think that those sentences are meaningful, beyond the fact that they seem so. But that they seem so <i>clearly</i> is <i>decisively</i> strong. I can intuitively tell I understand the words in question, and I can communicate those words to others. I can see how other people successfully communicate using those sentences. <br />Moreover, when I claim that those sentences are meaningful, it seems very clear that I’m saying something meaningful, and that you understand what I’m saying. But the theory in question seems to entail that the claim that such theory is false, is a meaningless claim (at least in the sense that it’s neither true nor false). That claim seems clearly false to me, though I don’t know what other kind of evidence of meaningfulness you may be asking about, or what might be stronger than that. What kind of evidence would you be looking for? (I will try a moral example below, just in case). <br /><br />That aside, the theory in question seems to imply that the negations of necessarily true sentences are not false sentences. Would you agree with that? <br /><br />As for the suggestion that that would explain our difficulty for conceiving some hypothetical situations, I think the term ‘conceive’ is unclear in this context, but in any case, I think the cost of the theory that are meaningless (which is the cost of rejecting something that seems obviously true) is simply far too heavy. For that matter, one may explain things by means of assortments of error theories, even Matrix-like scenarios, etc., but those hypotheses would be just too implausible. (additionally, that would seem to be ontologically committed to propositions, a view I don’t agree with, but leaving that aside). <br /><br />I’m not an expert on the Mentalese hypothesis, but <i>if</i> it renders such sentences meaningless, I would say that it’s false, since it’s too clear that they’re meaningful. With regard to the sub-2 sense, I’m not sure that distinction is a natural English sense of ‘meaningful’; that seems to assume that the Mentalese hypothesis is correct. <br /><br />About the Jesus sentences, I’m not familiar enough with your descriptivist view, but how about the following sentence? <br />The person the term ‘Jesus’, as usually used in religious contexts, <i>refers to</i>, never had any superhuman powers or knowledge. <br /><br />Also, what about moral disputes? <br />The case you brought up earlier (i.e., abortion) may illustrate the point: <br />Let’s say that I claim that in most cases, having an abortion in order not to reproduce because one does not want children is not immoral. I take it you disagree. But do you believe that that moral claim is neither true nor false? <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66836506566879170342013-05-04T00:12:58.862-05:002013-05-04T00:12:58.862-05:00Hi Angra,
Certainly all those examples seem meani...Hi Angra,<br /><br />Certainly all those examples seem meaningful. So does "There is a round square." The concern would be that this seeming is illusory --- the sentences seem meaningful but are not.<br /><br />I do take the mere fact that something seems meaningful to provide some rational grounding for the belief that the thing in question really is meaningful. But in most cases such grounding is defeasible. So my concern is that there might be more evidence/grounding for the contrary view (i.e., the view that such sentences are not meaningful) than their mere seeming of meaningfulness provides for the view that they are meaningful. In that case, it would be rational to disbelieve that they are meaningful.<br /><br />Do you know of any reason to think those impossible sentences are meaningful, besides the fact that they seem so?<br /><br />One way to cash out the theory that they are not meaningful: to be meaningful, a natural-language sentence must express some sentence in Mentalese. But no metaphysically impossible sentences exist in Mentalese. That is why --- for a certain sense of 'conceive' --- metaphysical impossibilities are inconceivable. We cannot conceive of them because such conceiving involves consciously entertaining Mentalese sentences that correspond to the states of affairs we are trying to conceive of, and in the case of metaphysical impossibilities, the requisite Mentalese sentences just aren't there. I think this theory has some plausibility because: (A) it explains why we have trouble conceiving of certain hypothetical situations, even when we seem to understand the sentences describing those situations, (B) it explains the observed and intuited links between conceivability and possibility, and (C) it permits a simple theory of modality according to which every proposition P is a Mentalese sentence & (possibly P) iff (P exists).<br /><br />We could also say this: There are at least two natural-English senses of the word "meaningful". A sentence is meaningful-sub1 just in case each word in the sentence is meaningful and the words are arranged with acceptable syntax. A sentence is meaningful-sub2 if it expresses some sentence in Mentalese. So impossible sentences are meaningful-sub1, and when they seem meaningful, they are seeming meaningful-sub1. But they do not seem (and in fact are not) meaningful-sub2. But meaning-sub2 is what is required for truth and falsity. So when we have the intuition that impossible sentences are meaningful, this intuition is correct: such sentences are meaningful. Nevertheless, they are not meaningful --- not in the sense required in order to be true or false.<br /><br />(About the Jesus sentence: I'm a descriptivist about proper names, so such claims don't come out as necessarily false on my view. I'd say that for such sentences, there <i>is</i> a Mentalese sentence expressed by the claim.)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-3626609502918390232013-05-04T00:10:13.563-05:002013-05-04T00:10:13.563-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-59673586217382938542013-05-03T14:45:08.035-05:002013-05-03T14:45:08.035-05:00Hi, Richard,
You’re welcome, and thank you as we...Hi, Richard, <br /><br />You’re welcome, and thank you as well. <br />I’m afraid I have limited time at the moment, but briefly, on the background theory you mention, I would argue that it’s false, on the following grounds (among others): <br />1. The sentence ‘Humans exist, or humans do not exist’ seems to be true. If you put it in terms of propositions, it expresses a true proposition (though I think there is vagueness, but that aside). But then, it seems its negation is false, not meaningless. But the negation seems to express an impossible state of affairs. <br />2. If there is any problem with the example in 1., let’s consider instead the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 4 or it is not the case that 2 + 2 = 4‘. <br />3. The sentence ‘A moral error theory is true’ seems to be meaningful. At least, I seem to have no difficulty understanding it. But if it’s false, it’s necessarily false (or expresses a necessarily false proposition, etc.). And if the sentence is true, then the sentence ‘It’s immoral to torture cats for fun’ is false, and necessarily so, or in terms of propositions if you like, it expresses a false proposition (and necessarily false), etc. <br />4. Given that most philosophical theories are incompatible with other theories, generally speaking, this theory would render most philosophical theories not false, but meaningless. But that does not appear to be the case. <br />5. The sentence ‘The background theory that all meaningful sentences express possibilities’ seems meaningful. But, then, it seems that so is the denial of that sentence. <br /><br />So, it seems that there are meaningful sentences that express impossibilities. <br /><br />Side note: while I hold that this one is not a counterexample, the sentence ‘Jesus was a human preacher, with no superhuman powers or knowledge.’ is clearly meaningful. I hold it’s true, whereas Christians and Jesus mythicists consider it false. But if you hold that Christianity is necessarily true and the background theory in question is true, then based on that you ought to conclude that the sentence is meaningless, rather than false (the sentence and/or the proposition, etc.). <br /><br />I will try to address the other points when I have more time. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-67685896209185491722013-05-03T14:17:39.289-05:002013-05-03T14:17:39.289-05:00Hi Angra,
Continued thanks for the fascinating di...Hi Angra,<br /><br />Continued thanks for the fascinating discussion. This is starting to shed some light for me on how one's theories of propositions and sentences might affect one's views on vagueness.<br /><br />What I took to be the conclusion to your elephant argument, as referenced in my (C) in my last post, was Q1' from my post before that:<br /><br />Q1' = "Not: (There is no entity E in the history of Earth such that E is an elephant and was alive at some time t0, but there were no elephants on Earth 1 second before t0)."<br /><br />I was recommending that we accept P1 through P6 from my last post, and so accept Q1'. The easiest way I see to accept Q1' is to say that yes, there is some entity which is the first elephant in the history of the Earth; but there is no fact of the matter as to precisely which entity E is.<br /><br />You're taking a different approach: rather than accepting P1 through P6 (in the context of the argument in which they occur), you refrain from accepting P1 and P3 (at least in that context). My question was: Why do that (refrain from accepting P1 and P3) rather than do what I propose (accept Q1')?<br /><br />In response, you asked,<br /><br />"Can propositions be vague? ... [I]f propositions can be vague, and in some context, there are different degrees of precision in the assertions in a way that making assertions would result in absurdities not resulting from anything but the imprecision of the terms, are propositions still being expressed?"<br /><br />I can always tell you what I think the answers to these questions are, but of course, what the <i>right</i> answers are depends on the right answer to the question of what is the correct theory of what vagueness is and what propositions are and how truth (correspondence of propositions to reality) works. Oh deary. I doubt we'll manage to delve through all that here!<br /><br />But in brief, my own opined answers: Yes, propositions can be vague. However, there is never a case where genuine absurdities result merely from differences in the degrees of the precision of various terms that are used in the assertions that are taken as premises in some argument. So in the elephant argument, we accept Q1'. It is not an absurdity. As for the heap sentence "If m grains of sand don't make a heap, then m + 1 grains of sand don't make a heap", I think that if the heap sentence is not meaningful, then that is because the heap sentence (precisely) expresses a metaphysically impossible state of affairs rather than because of any imprecision in the heap sentence's terms. The background theory for this take on the issue would be that all meaningful sentences express possibilities. I'm not sure whether that background theory is true. If that background theory is not true, then the heap sentence is meaningful but false.<br /><br />Thoughts? I feel like I've got a long way to go to really understand all this. The present conversation is helping me better understand what the questions are whose answers I cannot give.<br /><br />Regards,<br />RichardAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-2376324611941324042013-05-03T14:07:08.582-05:002013-05-03T14:07:08.582-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-45886801173981507602013-04-26T22:08:40.205-05:002013-04-26T22:08:40.205-05:00Richard,
Regarding the elephant argument, I’m no...Richard, <br /><br />Regarding the elephant argument, I’m not sure if I’ve been unclear (and if so, how to make my position more clear), but I would still take issue with (among others) P3, and say it’s improper to use the word ‘elephant’ in the context of an argument containing premises like R3&R4.<br /><br />In other words, I don’t think the word ‘elephant’ is precise enough as a description of features of an environment described to the precision of seconds and over billions of years of Earth’s history. <br /><br />If you like, there is a mismatch between the precision in the description required to in order to use some of the premises, and the (lack of) precision some of the other premises have. <br /><br />I’m not entirely sure ‘not meaningful’ is the right term but rather not sufficiently precise, so I would reject P3 without denying it (i.e., I would refrain from accepting it; there is some vagueness here in ‘meaningful’, so I’m not sure whether it applies). <br /><br />The same applies goes for claim P1, and ‘proposition’. I do not know that in that context, all of the expressions involving elephants required to make the argument express some proposition. Can propositions be vague? <br />If not, then that would be a problem for the view that sentences express propositions, so I would say that they can. <br />But if propositions can be vague, and in some context, there are different degrees of precision in the assertions in a way that making assertions would result in absurdities not resulting from anything but the imprecision of the terms, are propositions still being expressed? <br /><br />For instance, we may as well consider the usual ‘heap’ argument. One grain of sand is not a heap. But some number M make up a heap. However, when people make ‘heap’ assertions, they’re (normally, in the usual senses of the word) not making assertions with sufficient precision to distinguish between the classes ‘heap’ and ‘things that are not heaps’ to the precision of one grain of sand. <br /><br />In that context, would the claim ‘If m grains of sand are not a heap, neither are m+1‘ express a proposition? <br />I would say it’s improper to assert that, so I’m inclined to say probably not, but if one has a theory of propositions so that there are improper propositions, then I don’t know. Regardless, I would still say it’s improper to use the vague concept ‘heap’ in such a context (independently of whether they express propositions). <br /><br />Similarly, when people make ‘elephant’ assertions, they’re not making assertions with sufficient precision to distinguish between the classes ‘elephants’ and ‘things that are not elephants’ when the variables (i.e., the objects to be classified) range over the last billion years, in steps lasting no more than one second. <br /><br />I’m afraid I don’t know how to explain my take on this matter better. <br />As for the alternative conclusion you propose, I’m not sure which one is it. Could you clarify that, please?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-51034108928240477992013-04-26T22:06:53.312-05:002013-04-26T22:06:53.312-05:00Richard,
While I’m not familiar with the theory,...Richard, <br /><br />While I’m not familiar with the theory, as far as I can tell your points (2), (3), (8) seem to clearly indicate that you’re talking about the ordinary concept of ‘exists’, in English (not sure about (9), though; our thoughts are real (i.e., there is an actual entity thinking); and there are other potential issues with )(9)). The same goes for some of your previous points. <br /><br />So, (I think) I get that. <br /><br />But it seems to me that there is agreement here in that the usual sense of ‘exists’, mountains, cars, planets, stars, oceans, exist. <br /><br />On the other hand, there may be a disagreement on whether the usual sense (explained in (2), (3) and (8)) is the same as the meaning used in philosophy, and then on whether in <i>that</i> sense, mountains, planets, etc., exist. <br /><br />So, maybe there is disagreement on whether two different meanings are at play, or only one. <br /><br />Even so, my impression would be that the usual, intuitive grasp of ‘exists’ is similar in different competent English speakers (that is somewhat tentative, though), and if so, I don’t see any significant differences (with regard to existence) in the picture of the portion of the world around us that you have and that he has, at least with regard what exists in the usual sense of the expression when asserting existence of planets, stars, pipes, etc. (though this might be because my knowledge of your respective pictures is very limited; but based on the exchange so far, I don't see that difference). <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-37019750461218745782013-04-26T18:45:16.196-05:002013-04-26T18:45:16.196-05:00Hi Angra,
Have you ever, by chance, encountered D...Hi Angra,<br /><br />Have you ever, by chance, encountered David Lewis's essay "New Work for a Theory of Universals"? In it he gives cases that motivate a concept of 'being natural' in the metaphysical sense of 'natural'. I'd say that probably what Pruss and I mean (though, of course, I'm more confident to speak for myself than for Pruss) is that there is a certain "... is something" predicate which is the most, or even only, metaphysically natural one.<br /><br />Summary of B-existence:<br /><br />(1) Most natural sense of "exists," for David Lewis's sense of 'natural'<br />(2) Equivalent to [is real]<br />(3) Content of simplest [existence] concept humans possess<br />(4) Sense of "exists" that expresses the mereologically simplest 'existence' property<br />(5) Only sense of "exists" expressed by any syntactically simple predicate in The Best Theory<br />(6) The thinnest, least rich of all qualities<br />(7) The most determinable determinable<br />(8) Equivalent to [existing and not fictional]<br />(9) Roughly equivalent to [is a feature of the world, independently of our thoughts and speech]<br />(10) The property most epistemically likely to satisfy all or most of (1) through (9)<br /><br />That's probably the best I can do right now at spelling this out.<br /><br />Perhaps if either you think there is no such sense of "exists" or else you are unsure whether or not there is such a sense, then you could interpret disagreements (like mine and Pruss's) about what really exists as conflicts between the views [There is a sense of "exist" that satisfies (10) and on it, F's 'exist'] and [There is a sense of "exist" that satisfies (10) and on it, no F's 'exist']? <br /><br />About arguments and elephants:<br /><br />P1. Each sentence, on each meaningful use, expresses some proposition.<br />P2. In a given context, each proposition is either true or false.<br />P3. Each premise in your elephant argument has a meaningful use, even in the context of the elephant argument.<br />L1. So for each premise in your elephant argument, there is --- in the context of the argument --- a meaningful use on which it expresses a proposition.<br />P4. None of these propositions is false in the context of the elephant argument.<br />L2. So all of them are true in the context of the elephant argument.<br />P5. The conclusion of the elephant argument follows from its premises by valid inferences.<br />P6. Any conclusion that follows by valid inferences from premises that are true in a given context is itself true in that context.<br />C. So the conclusion of your elephant argument is true in the context of the elephant argument.<br /><br />I'm referring to the version of the elephant argument you alluded to in your last post --- the one with all the premises spelled out. I'd be curious to know at what point you get off-board with the argument I've just given.<br /><br />Maybe you'll say that it's not proper to assert each of my just-stated premises P1 through P6 in the context of the same argument? Well, maybe. But isn't it simpler to say that it is proper to assert them, and so any conclusion they entail is true?<br /><br />Regards,<br />RichardAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-24175766382207402612013-04-25T21:59:01.352-05:002013-04-25T21:59:01.352-05:00Richard,
Don’t worry, I’m not offended at all. I...Richard, <br /><br />Don’t worry, I’m not offended at all. I’ve been brief in my previous reply to your comprehensive analysis as well, due to a lack of time. :)<br /><br />That aside, as I see it, it may well be that for every model of physics (for instance) comprehensible by humans given enough time to study it, and perhaps with the aide of some set of computers C, there is one that makes slightly better predictions, even if comprehending it might need more time and/or the aid of better computers. If so, plausibly there is no best theory (since every theory would have to have a model like that, or entail it, but a better model is nomologically possible). <br /><br />That’s only one alternative under which there is no best theory. There are other reasons. So, I’m not convinced that there is a best or a class or set of best theories. <br /><br />But let’s say for the sake of the argument that there is a best theory, or set of theories, etc. That assumption isn’t helping me see a disagreement that is not about the meaning of the words (even about the word ‘fictional’ perhaps). Maybe it’s just that I do not have enough information about your respective views to see it, so I’ll leave it at that. <br /><br />On the elephants issue, you mention that the inference is valid. It seems it would need additional premises about time, or connecting ‘history of Earth’ with the statements about time, etc., to be a valid inference. <br />Usually, many such premises are left implicit, and that’s no problem. I left all other premises implicit too in my example as well, but I was arguing <i>against</i> that kind of argument, and I didn’t need to make any of the other assumptions explicit in order to explain my take on the matter. On the other hand, in the case of your reverse argument, it seems to me that it’s improper to assert all of the premises together, one one factors in some of the implicit premises. <br /><br />For instance, some of the premises one might use in an argument similar to the reverse argument would be (there are alternatives, but they seem to have the same difficulty): <br /><br />R1: There were no elephants at any time prior to 1 billion years ago, and t0 is a time prior to 1 billion years ago. <br />R2: There are elephants at any time from t1 to the present day, which is later than t1. <br />R3: There is some natural number n, such that t0 + n seconds is later than t1. <br />R4: For every natural number m between 1 and n, there is some time t0 + m seconds. <br /><br />...and so on. But I don’t need to go on in this context, since I think that it’s improper to assert R1,R2, R3 and R4 in the context of the same argument; the word ‘elephant’ does not have enough precision to be used in combination with something like R3&R4, in the same argument (they might be proper separately). <br /><br />As I said, I recognize that it’s an uncommon view. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-82531545566470894572013-04-25T20:27:48.546-05:002013-04-25T20:27:48.546-05:00Why, of course not. That would be wasteful.Why, of course not. That would be wasteful.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-47188619679978263622013-04-25T20:12:38.093-05:002013-04-25T20:12:38.093-05:00Is there going to be anything left of this dead ho...Is there going to be anything left of this dead horse when y'all are done beatin' it?Dagmara Lizlovshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14744785407281199347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39587415678829217332013-04-25T14:10:57.517-05:002013-04-25T14:10:57.517-05:00Angra,
Thanks again for this long discussion. I s...Angra,<br /><br />Thanks again for this long discussion. I sympathize with the feeling that the length and breadth of our dialogue is making it hard to keep keeping up. So I hope you won't be offended if I keep this post very brief ... even at the price of not responding to all the excellent points you made in your last post.<br /><br />The Best Theory wouldn't necessarily make claims about the most basic quantifier. It's just that a certain quantifier would actually be used in stating the theory. I.e., the ideal statement of the theory might contain an axiom like "Ex Fx". The "Ex" quantifier which literally is a part of that axiom would express the 'basic' quantifier.<br /><br />It would be really surprising if there wasn't a family of best theories like this. Why? Well, if each of the best theories there are uses two quantifiers neither of which is defined in terms of the other --- say, a C-quantifier and a D-quantifier --- it seems that theory will have to include at least one additional axiom (not a definition) stating something about the relationship C-existence and D-existence. (Does C-existence entail D-existence? Or vice versa? Or neither? And in virtue of what are they both species of 'existence'?) That extra axiom adds complexity to the theory. So since simplicity is one of the measures of how good a given theory is, it seems that the best theories will not contain such an extra axiom.<br /><br />I think Pruss and I agree that B-existence is the basic sort of existence, for much the same sense of "basic", but we disagree as to how closely "B-exists" matches the most natural English predicate "exists". So I affirm and he denies that pipes B-exist; we both affirm that they exist; and I affirm but he denies that [They exist] entails [They B-exist].<br /><br />I think I'd be happy to say that the B-existing things are all things such that neither are they are fictional nor would we be outright mistaken to believe that they exist. So on my view, Pruss's view entails that mountains are fictional --- i.e., they exist but are fictional. (I don't know whether on Pruss's view, Pruss's view entails that result, because I don't know what Pruss thinks about being-fictional.)<br /><br />About your elephant argument, suppose we reverse it:<br /><br />(C') There are elephants.<br />(Q2) There were no elephants on Earth 1 billion years ago.<br />(Q1') Therefore, not: (There is no entity E in the history of Earth such that E is an elephant and was alive at some time t0, but there were no elephants on Earth 1 second before t0).<br /><br />It seems like it is proper to assert each of C' and Q2, and it seems plausible that the inference from C' and Q2 is logically valid. But if its proper to assert each of some premises, and a certain inference from those premises to a certain conclusion is logically valid, then mustn't it be proper to assert that conclusion?<br /><br />Regards,<br />RichardAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61076481690014145722013-04-25T14:06:43.302-05:002013-04-25T14:06:43.302-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86399189780826512972013-04-25T10:28:27.873-05:002013-04-25T10:28:27.873-05:00By the way, I think the claims about imaginary num...By the way, I think the claims about imaginary numbers, fractions, negative numbers, etc., vs natural numbers are misguided. <br /><br />I think a claim that there is an imaginary number x such that x^2+1=0 is true, but moreover, trying to make a difference there between natural numbers and the others looks like saying numbers are in the territory so to speak, or in other words which numbers would go into an ontology, 'really' exists in some metaphysical sense, etc. (in the examples, the natural numbers),whereas others don't, whereas in all cases we have as our domain of discourse some abstract scenarios; it's true that the natural numbers are abstractions more closely linked to our daily experience (grossly oversimplifying, e.g., there are 3 apples over there...so, let's consider a number 3), whereas others are more or less distant extensions, but that does not justify the claims in my view. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-21509279569812421742013-04-25T10:18:55.421-05:002013-04-25T10:18:55.421-05:00Richard,
Thanks for the conversation as well.
I...Richard, <br /><br />Thanks for the conversation as well. <br />I’m afraid this is getting too long for me to address in the amount of available time. I’ll try to address some of your points now, but I don’t know for how long I can keep up. <br /><br />When I say 'chimpanzees exist', or I say (talking about a set) 'A maximal element with property P exists', it seems I take myself to be talking about different domains, one the world 'out there' (the territory, so to speak), the other one an abstract, ideal category. <br /><br />I don't know what to make of the 'really' exists. If someone asked me whether the maximal element <i>really</i> exists in a metaphysical sense, I would say I don't think I understand the question well enough, though in a common sense of 'really', the claim I made is really true (but then, I would say the same about claims within fictions). <br /><br />Maybe we have different concepts of "exists", or more likely different theories about what we mean by 'exists', but in any case, I'm not closer to getting B-existence I'm afraid. <br /><br />That said, you make the point that B-existence would be the most natural concept in English. But Alexander seems to <i>agree</i> that in the most common concept in English, mountains, etc., exist. Moreover, if there would be an observable difference in terms of the stuff we see (as you suggested), the fact is that Alexander does not deny that there are mountains, etc., in the usual sense, and does not take his claim to have any implications (as far as I can tell) for our ordinary observations. <br /><br />So, I still don’t see that there is a disagreement other than a disagreement about the meaning of some terms. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-72529970420480320442013-04-25T09:55:43.875-05:002013-04-25T09:55:43.875-05:00Richard,
To clarify, I don’t think that ‘enormou...Richard, <br /><br />To clarify, I don’t think that ‘enormously large’ is good enough for <i>that particular kind</i> of mathematical argument. But for instance, someone might say (though the use of ‘enormously’ might be somewhat unusual) that the function x^(0.00000001) grows faster than (log(x+2)^(10^1000)), so even if in any of the cases we can actually compute presently the latter is greater, there is some enormously large x for which the former is greater. Normally, one would say ‘for sufficiently large x’, but I think the above would be understood. <br /><br />That aside, if the term ‘enormously large’ is not precise enough to make assertions in a context in which that level of precision is needed, then it’s also not precise enough to say whether some such assertion, sentence, etc., is true or false. <br /><br />The issue is not limited to mathematics. For instance, one may argue as follows: <br /><br />Q1: There is no entity E in the history of Earth such that E is an elephant and was alive at some time t0, but there were no elephants on Earth 1 second before t0. <br />Q2: There were no elephants on Earth 1 billion years ago. <br />C: There are no elephants. <br /><br />I would say ‘elephant’ is precise enough for describing the world around us, in most cases. It’s not precise enough for a description that involves the history of life on Earth for billions of years and is precise to the level of seconds, so it would be improper to use it in a context requiring that amount of precision. <br />Now, if someone presses the matter and asks me whether Q1 is true or false, I would say that since 'elephant’ is not precise enough for being properly used in that context, the same goes for saying that Q1 is true or false. <br /> <br />Similarly, ‘enormously large’ may be precise enough in some contexts, but not in the context of an argument that addresses the set of all natural numbers, considering them one by one, at least in most common usages of ‘enormously large’. <br /><br />As for (A), I don’t know that there is such ‘complete theory of the world’. Even if it existed in science and/or in ontology (which I don’t know), I would not include a theory about quantifiers in a theory about the territory (i.e., about the world around that, in an ontology, etc.). <br /><br />In any case, we don’t need to settle that, since I don’t see how that would help me assess whether there is a disagreement between your respective positions beyond a disagreement about the meaning of some terms. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com