tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post2226785952628981320..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Endurantism and perdurantismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-79238869766326223662008-01-27T22:42:00.000-06:002008-01-27T22:42:00.000-06:00I like the endurantist model, and I would like to ...I like the endurantist model, and I would like to ask something about the objection you raise against it. <BR/>You say that the endurantist model faces the objection that if I am wholly present at any given time, then there seems not to be much to me. I think this objection makes a start at pointing out a difficulty for endurantism, but it doesn't go all the way. Is there some way to suggest that there are (intuitively) essential properties I have which cannot be had by a 3D me at any given time? If there are, this would seem to be a very strong objection against endurantism. If there aren't, then perhaps the endurantist will be okay with saying, "there isn't much to me." Why can't the endurantist just insist that any essential properties of mine are had by a 3D me and that I also acquire interesting accidental properties at different times and during different durations of times?<BR/>In other words, if saying that the 3D me doesn't look like much only means that it doesn't have certain fun accidental properties, then the objection doesn't appear as strong as it might have seemed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-29863735614316662202008-01-27T15:55:00.000-06:002008-01-27T15:55:00.000-06:00No, that doesn't address the worry I had. But I c...No, that doesn't address the worry I had. But I can't fully remember the worry I had...Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-20434198627114944972008-01-27T14:46:00.000-06:002008-01-27T14:46:00.000-06:00If you can have extended partless objects at a tim...If you can have extended partless objects at a time, then there shouldn't be any problem with extended partless objects across time. If you can have bi-located objects at one time, there shouldn't be any problem with objects wholly located at multiple times. A 4D view can handle either way. So I don't think there's a problem for transsubstantiation except in figuring out which way of doing it is correct.<BR/><BR/>It might be worth keeping in mind that there might be some enduring entities and some perduring entities. Some 3Ders think objects endure and events perdure (because, for example, a baseball game has temporal parts). If that's right, then there's no contradiction if some objects perdure and others endure, particularly if you're dealing with miracles involving objects ceasing to exist and being replaced by other objects with almost all the detectable original properties of the no longer existing things. So that may be a third way to handle it.Jeremy Piercehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03441308872350317672noreply@blogger.com