tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post2535736951286685155..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Pursuing as an end and pursuing as a meansAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-72316352108583046192009-03-04T12:38:00.000-06:002009-03-04T12:38:00.000-06:00This is a very interesting take on the subject. I...This is a very interesting take on the subject. It is a theme I've found particularly important (and controversial) in loci of theological aesthetics and practical theology of the arts.Adamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10682585331782239902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-55669068844203441912009-03-03T09:29:00.000-06:002009-03-03T09:29:00.000-06:00I still don't see that that would make any differe...I still don't see that that would make any difference. If the being tells you that it will be better, you are still doing it as a means in the pursuit of what is better. I do think one needs to recognize constitutive means, but since in neither this version nor the original do you actually have any notion of how it would be constitutive, or even that it would be constitutive, you can't be pursuing it as a constitutive means. But that doesn't rule out that it is still a means, with the question of whether it will turn out to be constitutive or not left open.<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that both in the post and in the comments you are conflating two different things: objective means-end relations (or perhaps more accurately how we ideally <I>should</I> order things as means and ends) and subjective use of things as means and pursuit of things as ends. Your cases set up situations where we don't know the former and still can pursue things; but that doesn't actually tell us whether or not we pursue things only as ends or as means. Am I just missing some turn in your argument?Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-79198602611437119302009-03-03T08:41:00.001-06:002009-03-03T08:41:00.001-06:00When something is an aspect of well-being, as frie...When something is an aspect of well-being, as friendship, esthetic goods, etc., and it is pursued because it is an aspect of well-being, then it is being pursued for its own sake. Then, well-being isn't some further thing, for which this is a means.<BR/><BR/>If I don't know whether something is an aspect of well-being or a means to an aspect of well-being, then I neither pursue it as a means nor as an end.<BR/><BR/>Maybe, though, one can introduce the notion of constitutive, rather than causal, means, and then one may be able to say that one can pursue something as a constitutive means. If so, then I need to modify the symmetrical patterns case. The being tells you simply that it will be better if there are large symmetrical patterns on your walls. the being doesn't tell you if it'll be better for you or for others. The being doesn't tell you if the symmetrical patterns are that which constitutes the value, or if they are merely means to something else (maybe the symmetrical patterns will scare off invading aliens, thereby making the aliens better off morally and the earthlings better off materially).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-44034863005694958922009-03-03T08:30:00.000-06:002009-03-03T08:30:00.000-06:00I'm skeptical; in the symmetry case you are obviou...I'm skeptical; in the symmetry case you are obviously ensuring the existence of large symmetrical patterns on your walls for the sake of being better off. That you don't know why or how you'll be better off for it doesn't change anything; it's still obviously a means, because being better off is obviously valuable. Likewise, with your friends case, we don't know whether it <I>should</I> be pursued as a means or an end, but it doesn't change the fact that we are pursuing it as a means -- if you are pursuing good reputation without knowing whether it is intrinsically or instrumentally worth having, you are still pursuing it as an end. What you are doing is pursuing it as an end but leaving open the possibility of subordinating it to a greater end somewhere down the road. And this makes plenty of sense: something can be both an end and a means (e.g., by being the end of this particular action, but chosen because it is a means to a larger project).<BR/><BR/>I do agree, though, that the dichotomy between moral and non-moral reasons is a false one.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-75888853995380916832009-03-03T07:57:00.000-06:002009-03-03T07:57:00.000-06:00A related point in the practical realm is that the...A related point in the practical realm is that the alleged dichotomy between being moved by moral and by non-moral reasons (or by moral and by prudential ones) will not be exhaustive. For to act all one needs is the belief that one has a reason--one does not need to know what sort of a reason one has. (Think of an expert who tells one that one has a reason to do A, but who fails to specify if the reason is moral or non-moral.) <BR/><BR/>Similarly, the dichotomy between believing something for pragmatic reasons and believing it for epistemic reasons can fail. (Think of an expert who says in a given situation: "Be optimistic! Assume it'll all work out." You don't know if that's pragmatically or epistemically justified, but you do it anyway, trusting the expert.) <BR/><BR/>All this is grist for the mill of someone like me who thinks the realm of reasons is unified (I often put the point by saying that all reasons are moral reasons). But the point is somewhat independent of that.<BR/><BR/>Though, I think, there is probably a bit of a feeling of alienation when one acts on a reason proferred by an expert and has no idea what the expert's reason actually is.<BR/><BR/>I am not sure about intrinsic vs. final. I think of knowledge as an "intrinsic good". But knowledge is relational. (x knows p only if p, after all) I'll need to think some more on this, thanks!Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-14366145791757136762009-03-03T07:23:00.000-06:002009-03-03T07:23:00.000-06:00This is a great point. It corresponds to the idea...This is a great point. It corresponds to the idea in the theoretical realm that we can believe or know, without understanding the reasons for it. I've never seen the point made for the practical but it works.<BR/><BR/>On a different note: don't mix up 'final' and 'intrinsic' goods. All instrumental goods are (probably) extrinsic, i.e. valuable because of their relation to something else, but it doesn't follow that a final good is intrinsic. Something might be valuable because it is rare or unique, for example, and this is an extrinsic but non-instrumental good.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com