tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post2569574347274773784..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Relativity and an argument for incompatibilismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-50863924257527258052020-08-15T11:18:35.565-05:002020-08-15T11:18:35.565-05:00I am not a physicist, but my understanding is the ...I am not a physicist, but my understanding is the light cones are invariant w.r.t. different observers. And only events in a time-like relation can be causally related. So despite relativity there is no ambiguity about whether events can be causally related.Andrew Dabrowskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14194210589133048249noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-14490604393350390812020-08-15T08:57:38.471-05:002020-08-15T08:57:38.471-05:00It is worth noting that in my hierarchy of five pr...It is worth noting that in my hierarchy of five principles, Law's is something like my Strongest. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-72987657332593766902020-08-15T08:52:42.690-05:002020-08-15T08:52:42.690-05:00David:
One potential worry with switching from ca...David:<br /><br />One potential worry with switching from causation to explanation is that some people think final explanation runs in the opposite direction to causal explanation. Another worry is that on Humean views, the laws of nature are non-causally explained by the sum total of all physical events, including S's behavior, so the principle wouldn't require that w' have the same laws, since the laws aren't distinct from and explanatorily independent of S's behavior. We get out of both worries if we restrict to causal explanation. (We also get out of both worries if we have the right views of final explanation and of laws, but it would be better not to have to rely on that.) Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-27535895687695000892020-08-14T18:32:15.649-05:002020-08-14T18:32:15.649-05:00Hi Alex,
I think a number of folks who write abou...Hi Alex,<br /><br />I think a number of folks who write about this are starting to recognize a number of difficulties with fixity of the past principles. I am working on a few papers that attempt to poke some holes as well, and one that tries to show that Ockhamists should seriously consider some of the moves that Thomists (and others who hold to divine simplicity) need to make. <br /><br />Andrew Law has a really nice paper coming out in Phil Studies, where one of the arguments he gives is almost exactly what you give above. He prefers the following to the standard Fixity of the Past Principle.<br /><br />Fixity of the Independent: Agent S can perform action X at time t (in world w) only if there is a world, w’, such that all of the facts in w that are distinct from and explanatorily independent of the facts constituting S’s behavior at t hold in w’ and S performs X at t.<br /><br />If I am understanding it correctly, I think this is very close to what you offer at the end of your post. David Alexanderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16364944845062377934noreply@blogger.com