tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post2871669627200743613..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Divine authority over usAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-87873531500898798962018-04-22T11:58:21.734-05:002018-04-22T11:58:21.734-05:00Helen
"Can't we accept the possibility a...Helen<br /><br />"Can't we accept the possibility at least of God intending some non-moral evils, and God failing to prevent some moral evils not because God intends they occur, but because intervening will not improve things overall?"<br /><br />It's not a matter of intervening. God may have good reasons "overall" to actively bring about moral evils. That's not the point. But an evil for good reasosn is still an evil.<br />On classical theism, nothing happens that God doesn't intend. So, if, as Alex says, it would be wrong even for God to intend an evil for the sake of a good, then the occurence of any evil means God was wrong.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-14071095169630142352018-04-22T10:34:04.401-05:002018-04-22T10:34:04.401-05:00Re moral evils as opposed to non-moral evils - don...Re moral evils as opposed to non-moral evils - don't human beings quite often tolerate moral evils in consideration of goods down the line but without positively intending the bad moral choice occur? I am holding a child in my lap who is culpably prone to pull the cat's tail (currently in reach only because the child is on my lap). Yes, I am 'sustaining' that child, and yes, I could prevent the tail-pulling if I push the child off my lap - but that will not provide a better outcome than leaving her where she is, following which she will no doubt grab, get scratched and see the error of her ways. A 'defeater-defeater': preventing the action will not improve things overall. <br /><br />The situation is different I think with non-moral evils which surely both we and God can in principle intend in some cases at least - as when I intend to catch/give someone else the common cold as part of a clinical trial. <br /><br />Of course, there are any number of far more challenging examples, but can't we accept the possibility at least of God intending some non-moral evils, and God failing to prevent some moral evils not because God intends they occur, but because intervening will not improve things overall? Helen Watthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01884258954532435937noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-35139270690024946302018-04-13T04:11:56.570-05:002018-04-13T04:11:56.570-05:00Alex
So care is still needed in theodicy to ensur...Alex<br /><br />So care is still needed in theodicy to ensure that the theodicy doesn’t make God out to be intending evils for the sake of goods.)<br /><br />I don't see any way around that. If evil E is necessary for Good G and God wants G, then God intends E, for good reasons. The God you believe in is, as far as I can tell, the active creator and sustainer of everything that exist apart from Himself. That means that E would not exist, even for an instant, if God did not actively sustain E.<br /><br />So, you might be able to find a theodicy that somehow "excuses" God because He did what he did for good reasons. But you cannot claim that God didn't do what He did.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.com