tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post2916806777866396707..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The memory theory of personal identity and the IncarnationAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-65942024232362606812021-06-21T13:11:44.869-05:002021-06-21T13:11:44.869-05:00But the Father, Son and Holy Spirit each have the ...But the Father, Son and Holy Spirit each have the numerically same divine mind. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-15364536623719949802021-06-21T12:39:46.230-05:002021-06-21T12:39:46.230-05:00Dr. Pruss:
The meta-tagging feature of human memo...Dr. Pruss:<br /><br />The meta-tagging feature of human memories is what prevents some of the problems you raise. If<br /><br />a. the human Jesus has a small finite subset of the previous memories, but tagged as his own<br /><br />b. the God-nature version would have the human Jesus memories, partial as they would have been, yet, I suppose, tagged as self<br /><br />c. Other, omniscient-enough entities would know the memories but tag them as not-self memoriesWilliamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09292602256213936359noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32357045581546283692021-06-21T10:48:54.148-05:002021-06-21T10:48:54.148-05:00William:
Yes, there is a kind of from-the-inside ...William:<br /><br />Yes, there is a kind of from-the-inside first-personish quality to the memories that are relevant to the theories of personal identity. I don't know, though, whether one has this kind of from-the-inside quality when one has two minds, and is talking about what one mind knows of the other mind's activity, as is the case on an orthodox view of the Incarnation.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-45211968522601064752021-06-20T20:33:09.881-05:002021-06-20T20:33:09.881-05:00I think that Locke's memory identity theory co...I think that Locke's memory identity theory could be modified: my identity as a person A needs to be based not just on having the memories of experience of person A but having the memory of _actually being person A_ (during those remembered experiences). So if our perfect telepath G comes to know the memories of A they would normally be tagged, so to speak, as being A's memories when they are part of G's memory. <br /><br />There is I believe some evidence in humans that we 'tag' our memories of dreams differently than memories of actual events.<br /><br />Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09292602256213936359noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8139800893568746362021-06-20T16:56:05.843-05:002021-06-20T16:56:05.843-05:00Wes:
I don't think it's right to say that...Wes:<br /><br />I don't think it's right to say that the divine mind of Christ *remembers* what happened to Christ in his humanity. But if it does, it seems so does the divine mind of the Father, since there is only one divine mind in the Trinity, which by the memory theory would lead to the heretical conclusion that the Father is the same person as the Son.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-63813868674699824642021-06-19T18:02:45.727-05:002021-06-19T18:02:45.727-05:00Though I suppose I may be showing my ignorance of ...Though I suppose I may be showing my ignorance of the memory theory of personal identity in the above comment, as I'm putting the personal identity before the memory, rather than basing the personal identity on the memory. I'm guessing that may be my issue.Weshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18180818318869000804noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-55076659531878479242021-06-19T17:52:47.240-05:002021-06-19T17:52:47.240-05:00I am not well read on theories of personal identit...I am not well read on theories of personal identity or the memory theory in particular, and I'm writing just as a lay Christian and self-studied Thomist interested in the topic... Still, it seems to me that since Christ is a Divine Person, and that the divine nature and human nature are united in one suppositum, the "memory" (If we can call it that) of the person of the Son is sufficient for the personal identity of Christ in the Incarnation (as the Divine Person of the Son). Even if we suppose for the sake of argument that the human memory is lost through amnesia, that would only be through the human nature and not the Divine Nature. The Divine Nature would still know all of the lost human knowledge, and this would not be in the same way he knows the knowledge of other people, insofar as the human knowledge of Christ personally belongs to the Divine Person, rather than is just something known by the Divine Person.Weshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18180818318869000804noreply@blogger.com