tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post29666727330690434..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The Liar Paradox and conjunction introductionAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23585522191871473732012-12-09T08:20:05.557-06:002012-12-09T08:20:05.557-06:00Yes, that's interesting.
One can get around...Yes, that's interesting. <br /><br />One can get around this by making F be a property that a sequence of symbols has if and only if it expresses the conjunction of the two conjuncts of (1). But that's tricky--expresses *in what language*?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-54714755284547270962012-12-09T03:52:43.493-06:002012-12-09T03:52:43.493-06:00Hmm. Curious. The propositions expressed by (2) an...Hmm. Curious. The propositions expressed by (2) and (3) can still be conjoined--just write (2) in French or write (3) with Roman numerals. What apparently won't work is mechanically conjoining the *strings of symbols* in (2) and (3) and expecting the conjunction-string to express in English a proposition. This makes some sense, since property F was defined as a property of a string of symbols. But if there can be such a property F, it would seem to play havoc with the principle that exactly translated sentences express the same propositions.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04063377668865676195noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-51646738177134065232011-02-11T14:05:47.754-06:002011-02-11T14:05:47.754-06:00That might work, but I at least want to keep this ...That might work, but I at least want to keep this claim:<br /> If (1) expresses a proposition, the proposition it expresses is a conjunction of (2) and (3).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-67496014544186430482011-02-11T12:13:49.244-06:002011-02-11T12:13:49.244-06:00This argument works even if we'd rather say &q...This argument works even if we'd rather say "some propositions have no truth value" than "propositions have truth values essentially and sentences with no truth values are nonsense." For we can modify the first steps of the argument to <br /><br />"Then, (1) [expresses a proposition which] has no truth value. For if it did..."<br /><br />Strawson's view of "meaningful" was something like "having the capacity to have a truth value" and he assumed that this capacity was not always exercised. I sometimes think this would not be a bad way to go.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com