tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3426872822096215195..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: God, love and creationAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-81799505170505564852014-06-01T19:55:09.529-05:002014-06-01T19:55:09.529-05:00I'm sorry, I meant could Plantinga reject (5) ...I'm sorry, I meant could Plantinga reject (5) or do you think similar considerations would apply?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-55668602361839887832014-06-01T19:06:38.870-05:002014-06-01T19:06:38.870-05:00Did I reject (5)?Did I reject (5)?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61375440729064192962014-06-01T17:17:24.903-05:002014-06-01T17:17:24.903-05:00Would an actualist like Plantinga have grounds to ...Would an actualist like Plantinga have grounds to deny your rejection of (5) then or do you think one could simply substitute "instantiate" for "exist" and the argument would still go through?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-6417651352674785562014-06-01T15:04:10.961-05:002014-06-01T15:04:10.961-05:00God can have a strong desire for (i)-(iii) and yet...God can have a strong desire for (i)-(iii) and yet not create Francis. In that case, the desire isn't love for Francis, since a rational agent cannot love someone he knows for sure not to ever exist.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39567164949038439132014-05-31T23:21:06.314-05:002014-05-31T23:21:06.314-05:00Hi Prof. Pruss,
Could you further explain why &q...Hi Prof. Pruss, <br /><br />Could you further explain why "insofar as God is loving Francis, God must have "already" (in the explanatory order) decided to create him, and so he can't be basing his decision to create on his love for Francis"? <br /><br />Can't it be case that God's love for Francis is only that by conceiving the idea of Francis, God has a strong desire(i)to have Francis created, (ii)to have a good relationship with the actual Francis and (iii)the flourishing of Francis? <br /><br />God's love for Francis in this sense seems to explain His decision quite well and this love for Francis is explanatorily prior to His decision. <br />道明https://www.blogger.com/profile/13950339514694726252noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-55252472015359980792014-05-30T11:21:53.972-05:002014-05-30T11:21:53.972-05:00I'm actually wondering if we can reject (5), o...I'm actually wondering if we can reject (5), or perhaps maybe it doesn't mean what we think it means. I haven't really thought this through, but perhaps it is the case that God creates individuals because he has a love for humanity in general, and a dispositional love toward any particular instantiated individual. This might mean that the explanation of God's love can be pushed back to his choosing of some possible world, and the instantiations are dispositionally loved (e.g., "If it were to be the case that Francis is created in world W, then God loves Francis"). I don't know if this is right, but it seems to put me on a path toward my intuitions.Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-29542631519318353542014-05-29T22:27:17.999-05:002014-05-29T22:27:17.999-05:00Dan:
I guess the big difference is that I want to...Dan:<br /><br />I guess the big difference is that I want to try to see what can be done with a single axiological concept, "good for", while you want two, "good for" and "good". Maybe the lesson is going to be that one can't do without "good". <br /><br />But bear in mind that one might have a very broad sense of "good for". I think the existence of a photon is good for it.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64431936397876606062014-05-29T14:12:52.337-05:002014-05-29T14:12:52.337-05:00I just got things a bit clearer in my own head:
I...I just got things a bit clearer in my own head:<br /><br />I agree with your rejection of the Kantian argument for (4). The divine self-sufficiency argument for (4), though, is pretty persuasive to me.<br /><br />So I want to reject (1), and even your modified version of (1), for the reasons I mentioned in my last post.<br /><br />Hope that clarifies things. It did for me.Dan Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02835173769166916525noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-22482332994556739342014-05-29T14:08:57.431-05:002014-05-29T14:08:57.431-05:00Hi Alex,
I'm not sure I'm disagreeing wit...Hi Alex,<br /><br />I'm not sure I'm disagreeing with you, but I think I might be, so here goes:<br /><br />Saying that God does everything out of love (presumably, for a person) strikes me as somewhat reductive of God's motives. Why can't he act simply out of appreciation for objective goodness, where goodness is more than goodness-for-someone? For example, couldn't God just create a remarkably complex star system without intending that any person ever be affected by it, simply because it is good? I suppose you could say that it is good for God (because he appreciates the star system, and it is good for him to do so), but we run into worries about God's self-sufficiency then, I tentatively think.<br /><br />Certainly, everything that God does is compatible with the demands of love, and love features prominently, perhaps most prominently, among his motivations -- but his love (his appreciation of the value of people and desire for their good and union with them) is surely not his only appropriate motive. Other motives include his recognition of the value of things and states of affairs other than people.<br /><br />Applying this to having children and to God creating us: couldn't God create us because beings like us are precious and valuable? And couldn't I decide to have kids because children are precious and valuable? God and I don't need to do this out of love for a particular person or child (because before God decides to create or before the child is conceived, it doesn't really make sense to love them -- your rationale for premise 5 that you mentioned), but we do it out of appreciation for the objective goodness of the outcome.<br />Dan Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02835173769166916525noreply@blogger.com