tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3465036561543165246..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Tigers, snakes, morals and evolutionAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8809685552070868742011-08-28T22:01:51.041-05:002011-08-28T22:01:51.041-05:00Your argument is pre-supposing that morality is no...Your argument is pre-supposing that morality is not identical to the benefits of empathy and cooperation. This is a Hidden Premise Fallacy and your argument is unsound...Nightvidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03320916322586904305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-62272059195476731272011-04-01T15:53:00.150-05:002011-04-01T15:53:00.150-05:00Professor Pruss:
Another fascinating post, I so of...Professor Pruss:<br />Another fascinating post, I so often enjoy your blog. <br />You stated: “Maybe. Moral truth is grounded in natural human inclinations, she can say, and the same inclinations often give rise, noncoincidentally, to correct moral beliefs. I wonder if the only way for a naturalist to be a realist about morality is for her to be an Aristotelian.”<br /><br />Does the idea that “inclinations often give rise … to correct moral beliefs,” assume or rely on an absolute standard of moral beliefs; a standard that defines that which is correct?<br />If so is there a possible escape for the Aristotelian naturalist?proof for godhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16804021329824674064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-42470027312371186692011-03-31T19:50:34.408-05:002011-03-31T19:50:34.408-05:00Let me situate this argument a little. I think th...Let me situate this argument a little. I think the best responses to Plantinga's EAAN were ones that depended on the idea that given naturalism we would expect our senses to evolve in such a way as to be responsive to the physical facts outside of us. We can expect that our visual sense of tigers should be responsive to the presence of tigers. But no parallel move can be made by the non-Aristotelian naturalist in the moral claim--our moral sense cannot then be responsive to the moral facts, because if non-Aristotelian naturalism is true, moral facts do not enter into causal relations.<br /><br /><br />Interestingly, the theist or the Aristotelian can hold that moral facts do enter into causal relations. Our natures enter into causal relations, and so if, as the Aristotelians say, moral facts are grounded in our nature, it is quite possible that moral facts enter into causal relations (maybe that in our nature which grounds the requiredness of gratitude impels us to feel a desire to be grateful). And if moral facts are grounded in the nature of God, well that same nature is causally behind our existence--God, who is identical with his nature (according to divine simplicity; or at least whose actions are informed by his nature), causes us to exist.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.com