tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3771398414070467512..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Death and resurrectionAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61089252725022199042008-12-29T15:04:00.000-06:002008-12-29T15:04:00.000-06:00I'm not too sure what I'm meant to conclude from y...I'm not too sure what I'm meant to conclude from your comment Alex. For wouldn't your misgivings concerning the intrinsic badness of Fred's decision not to enjoy the years 1910-19 also undercut any afterlifeless account of why it's intrinsically bad to murder innocent persons? If so, what's your preferred account of why murder is bad in an afterlifeless world (assuming the question is a sensible one, which I guess it may not be if an afterlifeless world isn't a possible world)?James Bejonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05842862598659108841noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-14963988413008275262008-12-28T12:49:00.000-06:002008-12-28T12:49:00.000-06:00Suppose George is an immortal being born in 1940. ...Suppose George is an immortal being born in 1940. George enters a time machine in 2009, and then jumps to 2020. And after that he just lives on, forever, without a time machine. Has he imposed a great evil on himself by entering the time machine? After all, he's deprived himself of living in the years 2010-2019. <BR/><BR/>My intuitions are mixed here. But I am inclined to say this: What happened to George in 2009 wasn't as bad as dying in 2009 would be (even if the dying were followed by a resurrection in 2020).<BR/><BR/>If this is right, and if death followed by nonexistence followed by resurrection is just like jumping forward in the time machine, then an account of resurrection that involves nonexistence between death and resurrection is unsatisfactory, and one would do better to opt for an account of resurrection on which one continues to exist between death and resurrection (but in truncated fashion--thence the badness of the death).<BR/><BR/>Suppose we say that what happened to George was as bad as death, because he did totally miss out on the years 2010-2019 (in external time). Then consider the following case. Fred, another immortal born in 1940, has a plan to go via time machine to the year 1910, and living until 1919, and then coming back to the present. But then he changes his mind. By changing his mind, he is acquiescing to missing out on years 1910-1919 in external time. So he is acquiscing in something as bad as death, it seems.<BR/><BR/>Now, one might distinguish: It is natural for an immortal to live through all the external years in his future, but not natural to live through the external years prior to his beginning. But I am not sure that's enough to dissuage the tension here.<BR/><BR/>Sorry, I'm a bit disjointed here.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69412447378979449542008-12-27T17:26:00.000-06:002008-12-27T17:26:00.000-06:00Fair point. How about putting it this way then? ...Fair point. How about putting it this way then? Suppose there's no afterlife. What in this case makes it intrinsically bad to kill an innocent person? Presumably the fact that it deprives them of <I>x</I> years of existence. But what makes this answer unsatisfactory in the case where there <I>is</I> an afterlife? Because the years which someone is deprived of are outweighed by the eternity they'll later experience? If so, then why can't the pain they're caused by torture be outweighed by the bliss they'll later experience?James Bejonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05842862598659108841noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-74994375709792018252008-12-27T14:42:00.000-06:002008-12-27T14:42:00.000-06:00Being tortured is still a bad thing even if follow...Being tortured is still a bad thing even if followed by eternal bliss. We want to be able to say the same thing about being killed. Otherwise, it's hard to explain why murder is wrong.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8626921712909551562008-12-27T12:35:00.000-06:002008-12-27T12:35:00.000-06:00I'm perhaps being thick. But supposing, as I do, ...I'm perhaps being thick. But supposing, as I do, that the afterlife is an existence where "all our tears our wiped away" and where our momentary suffering is "outweighed by an eternal weight of glory", I don't see why an account of resurrection would need to explain why it is that it is very bad to die any more than it would need to explain why it is that it is very bad to, say, be raped or assaulted or tortured.James Bejonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05842862598659108841noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-41749578171094956922008-12-24T08:09:00.000-06:002008-12-24T08:09:00.000-06:00But in the time travel case, it's really unclear w...But in the time travel case, it's really unclear why it's worse to have a gap in one's future, while it's not bad to have a really long gap before one's beginning.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-57305782052742293702008-12-24T00:33:00.000-06:002008-12-24T00:33:00.000-06:00If we are the sort of Aristotelian for whom existe...If we are the sort of Aristotelian for whom existence is a perfection, nonexistence is certainly an evil.<BR/><BR/>One's death, even if we understand it as time-travel to the moment of resurrection, still would be understood as an evil, since those times at which I am nonexistent are worse than if I had perdured. (The Christian can strengthen this argument, and say that for all times at which I am nonexistent a state has come about contrary to the will of God, which for the Christian is either the definition of evil or a strong indicator thereof.)<BR/><BR/>Despite this, the "time-travel" objection has plenty of merit. <I>Christiane dicendo,</I> there is a sense in which "death is gain," or is at the very least stingless.Kevinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04644525459910973391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76761873154091827102008-12-23T11:33:00.000-06:002008-12-23T11:33:00.000-06:00I'm not sure why one would think that ceasing to e...I'm not sure why one would think that ceasing to exist "does not seem a bad." I'd take gappy existence over none, but, all else being equal, I'd really rather not cease to exist.<BR/><BR/>Also, the causal power need not be *new*. It may be a power that we all have but one that is manifested only in those rare cases where we die, perhaps also only with the coordinating activity of God. (Essentialists won't be too comfortable with the idea that a power can just be added at any given moment.)Jonathan D. Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02913077212736834794noreply@blogger.com