tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3825177483270798353..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Robotic persons?Alexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-42132037290632754582008-04-26T12:41:00.000-05:002008-04-26T12:41:00.000-05:00Then my worry was akin very sadly.Then my worry was akin very sadly.Martin Cookehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11425491938517935179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76036784208379754492008-04-26T11:53:00.000-05:002008-04-26T11:53:00.000-05:00I deny that Parfit's story shows any ambiguity in ...I deny that Parfit's story shows any ambiguity in our concept of a person. It can be taken to show that the facts of physics underdetermine identity facts.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66423816708461465502008-04-26T10:52:00.000-05:002008-04-26T10:52:00.000-05:00Robby might exist as a person-of-sort-x, and yet n...Robby might exist as a person-of-sort-x, and yet not exist as a person-of-sort-y. That our everyday concept of a person is ambiguous (if not vague) might be indicated by Parfitt's scenario. Or are you arguing that since Robby does not have a soul, hence he is not a person, which would seem to be to beg the question?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-42121195320552280472008-04-25T23:23:00.000-05:002008-04-25T23:23:00.000-05:00I don't think there is more than one sense of exis...I don't think there is more than one sense of existing.<BR/><BR/>As a dualist, my answer to Parfit's question is this: "I don't know which is happening. It depends on where the soul goes. At least three options are possible. The soul might go with the left half of the brain, or the soul might go with the right half, or the soul might leave the body entirely. The case as given by Parfit is underdescribed, because it only says what happens to the body, and not what happens to the soul." This is actually one of Swinburne's arguments for the existence of the soul: in thought experiments like this, the physical description of the thought experiment is not sufficient to determine how personal identity works. Hence, the physical description of the thought experiment is incomplete, and hence we are not merely physical.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-80084417039655897592008-04-25T21:51:00.000-05:002008-04-25T21:51:00.000-05:00Lovely argument; my only worry is sadly akin to th...Lovely argument; my only worry is sadly akin to this terrible argument, due to Parfitt: a person's brain is split in two, and each half is given its own body, both of which are living human beings. Each of those is functionally identical to someone who derives from the original body more gradually. Are they the same person? Yes (they are each the same as someone who is identical with the original person) and no (they are two people), but they are still people so I'm wondering: Might not Robby exist in one sense and not in another, those two senses being shown to exist by your argument (if we assume that Robby is a person)?Martin Cookehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11425491938517935179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8914003625955556862008-01-27T15:44:00.000-06:002008-01-27T15:44:00.000-06:00I think the robot is like the animal. So, if I'm ...I think the robot is like the animal. So, if I'm not an animal, but am merely constituted by an animal, then likewise Robby is not a robot, but merely constituted by a robot.<BR/><BR/>That said, I think that I'm an animal, so that I came into existence when this organism did (i.e., at fertilization), and likewise if Robby were possible, he'd be a robot, and not merely constituted by a robot.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-58263562181550029282008-01-27T12:18:00.000-06:002008-01-27T12:18:00.000-06:00Alex,Let me start with the preliminary question of...Alex,<BR/><BR/>Let me start with the preliminary question of why you think constitution and identity are distinct for material things like robots? I'm guessing it's a Lumpl worry. I'm actually not entirely sure of your particular reasons for denying that constitution is identity for human beings.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.com