tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post3856829262486623817..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Marriage in heavenAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger80125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-77947856449482875432016-12-08T11:32:12.132-06:002016-12-08T11:32:12.132-06:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.İslamda.orghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18277626801586520638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-52031239511385250652015-12-28T12:14:54.881-06:002015-12-28T12:14:54.881-06:00Hey Dr. Pruss, The website "The Browser"...Hey Dr. Pruss, The website "The Browser" linked to this blog post today. Check it out: https://thebrowser.com/#Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03130260063364459636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-58376902697563595472015-12-18T11:00:23.271-06:002015-12-18T11:00:23.271-06:00This discussion, while interesting, is drifting fa...This discussion, while interesting, is drifting far off topic. Please desist.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-78558071128856208802015-12-18T10:57:21.079-06:002015-12-18T10:57:21.079-06:00Richard:
In re: disagreement.
"Do you thi...Richard: <br /><br />In re: disagreement. <br /><br />"Do you think this sort of peer-deference move is rational when judging questions of intrinsic goodness? Or do you think each agent should stick nearly only to his own intuitions, not those of others?"<br />I don't have a general theory, and there is the question is what counts as a peer. For example, there are people who are intelligent, knowledgeable about philosophy, thoughtful, etc., but with widely varied moral views. I think some views may be dismissed immediately (e.g., the view that it's morally good to execute heretics, apostates, adulterers, etc.), but others are more difficult. If possible, one can test the matter by asking them about their views, and see whether their prima facie intuitions endure. <br />For example, in the case of the intuition that uniqueness is intrinsically good, one may raise the example of identical twins against the view that having a unique DNA is intrinsically good. Most people I suppose will no longer insist on the uniqueness claim (some perhaps will, but perhaps you'll find a much higher rate among people supporting bans on abortion (since those "unique DNA" arguments are common among them)), with regard to DNA. <br />One may also introduce the issue of people who are similarly intelligent or creative (on this or other planets, or in the future or the past, etc.), and ask them whether they think the existence of those people makes a person's creativity, intelligence, etc., less good. And so on. <br />Do those intuitions persist? Are they changed? <br />I'm sorry I can't be of more help, but I have no general procedure. <br /><br /><br />In re: (C), the argument that foreknowledge led to the same future isn't affected by timebackward causation, for the following reason: <br /><br />Let's say that in world W, the truthmaker for [At t', P] is such as to deterministically cause it to be the case that at t, God knows that at t’, P. <br />It remains the case that at t, God knows that at t', P. Than entails that God is in a certain state of mind at t, namely he believes* that at t', P (here, "belief*" stands for whatever that state of mind is, whether properly a belief, an intuitive apprehension, or whatever it is). God's belief* that at t', P, was caused by a future event, but nevertheless, it's there. <br />Now, if W' is a possible world with the same past as W up to (and including) t, then in W', at t God believes* that at t', P (in W', since that's God's belief* about what <i>will</i> happen). Given essential infallibility of God, it follows that in W', at t', P. <br /><br />That said, I suspect you might not consider that a restriction to freedom because of time-backwards causation. Is that what you're getting at?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-16594462894591658702015-12-18T10:42:46.172-06:002015-12-18T10:42:46.172-06:00entirelyuseless:
"So "God believes tha...entirelyuseless: <br /><br />"So "God believes that I will eat breakfast tomorrow" and "God believes that I will not eat breakfast tomorrow" do not describe different states of affairs, but the same state of affairs, except in a logical relation to two different future events."<br />I disagree with the traditional view, then. Those two states of affairs seem to be clearly distinct. <br /><br />"For comparison, this is a lot like the fact that "I see a man" and "I see an ape", when I see a figure off in the distance, may well describe the same situation of my eyes, just in relation to two different things. You could reply that my seeing is imperfect in this case, so it seems that God's knowledge is also imperfect, but after all every statement about God is said to be an analogy, so what follows in my case may not follow in God's case."<br />But then the case is not relevantly analogous. <br />Moreover, while "I see an ape" and "I see a man" may be used to describe the same image in your mind, a more precise description is simply that you see a figure that has two arms, two legs, one head, etc., and you can give more details if you were looking at the object. On the other hand, if God "sees" that I will write "A" (in a world where I will) and God sees that I will write "¬A", he's seeing different things (i.e., his mental state is different). <br /><br />If the traditional view is that all of God's mental states are exactly the same in all possible worlds, I don't think that's compatible with omniscience.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61472238853085847532015-12-18T10:36:37.536-06:002015-12-18T10:36:37.536-06:00Mark:
If a being mentally identical to me in the...Mark: <br /><br />If a being mentally identical to me in the past wasn't free, then I'd say I wasn't free, either, but that's not what I was trying to argue. I'm not sure what he (or I) wouldn't have freedom.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-60622357722864994962015-12-18T10:31:14.768-06:002015-12-18T10:31:14.768-06:00Angra, regarding God's foreknowledge, the trad...Angra, regarding God's foreknowledge, the traditional idea of God argues that God is not only unchangeable, but that he could not have been different from what he is in any way. So "God believes that I will eat breakfast tomorrow" and "God believes that I will not eat breakfast tomorrow" do not describe different states of affairs, but the same state of affairs, except in a logical relation to two different future events. So it is not true that for every world with this past, I do the same thing in the future, because this past is compatible with both of those statements.<br /><br />For comparison, this is a lot like the fact that "I see a man" and "I see an ape", when I see a figure off in the distance, may well describe the same situation of my eyes, just in relation to two different things. You could reply that my seeing is imperfect in this case, so it seems that God's knowledge is also imperfect, but after all every statement about God is said to be an analogy, so what follows in my case may not follow in God's case.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-52706696414702334652015-12-18T07:40:24.628-06:002015-12-18T07:40:24.628-06:00Hey Angra!
You said
"in every world with the ...Hey Angra!<br />You said<br />"in every world with the same past as this world, you freely chose exactly the same things you chose in this world - and moreover, in such a world, every world with the same past as our world also has the same future."<br /><br />It just made me think that if there were such a possible world identical to ours with the same mind states etc. the you in that world would be identical to you in this world and would not behave otherwise than you. If this creature can not behave otherwise and you are identical to a creature that can't behave otherwise you can not have freedom either.Mark Rogershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12691324025964108341noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32858295680745977702015-12-18T00:08:52.504-06:002015-12-18T00:08:52.504-06:00Richard:
Thanks for your thorough reply. I'm...Richard: <br /><br />Thanks for your thorough reply. I'm afraid it will take me a while to address your epistemic questions, and most of your points. <br /><br />For now, I'll address two of your points/questions/objections. <br /><br />"(i) On your view, can a choice itself be something with respect to which you are free? I ask because I am concerned that on your definition of freedom, being free to do X seems to be a fact about doing X if one chooses to do X; so then being free to <i>choose</i> X is a fact about doing X if one chooses to choose X. This seems odd to me, since I would have thought that when we choose X, we don't ordinarily choose to choose X --- we simply choose X, without choosing to choose it."<br />I don't have a definition intended to capture the meaning of the term to any arbitrary degree of accuracy. I was just giving what I think is a good approximation of the truth conditions, but I think I may have been unclear, though I'm not sure how - I'm not sure I understand your question/objection. <br /><br />For example, I freely choose to write this post. Had I chosen not to write it I would not have wrote it. Had I chosen to take a walk instead, I would have done so. And so on. I'm not sure how this ties to having to choose to choose X. Perhaps, I'm not explaining my view properly? If so, please clarify. <br /><br />"(ii) What makes something count as a malfunction? Do you think there's some sort of natural teleology to the brain, for instance, which objectively determines what's a malfunction and what is not? "<br />I'm not sure what "objective" means in this context, or "natural teleology". <br />But perhaps the following will help clarify my take on the matter: I do think that we - humans - have an instinctive apprehensions of states that our language about health and sickness, proper function and malfunction of organs, and so on, [fallibly] tracks. But this is similar to the way we have color sense that tracks some stuff too - or similar to a point. After all, there are different colors in different languages, whereas the basic terms about health, sickness, etc., are not changed in that manner. I think that's because we care about those states considerably, whereas there is not a similar emotional attachment to colors, so there is more room for variation in the way human language develops in relation to color perception. <br />Even so, color perception - with some variation - is very similar across humans. Roughly, I think a similar story applies to health, proper function, etc. <br />Speculatively, I'd say if smart, talking aliens evolved in different conditions, still I think they'd probably have (barring genetic engineering) something akin to our apprehension of health, sickness, etc., even though not quite the same. Even more speculatively, I would probably expect a greater overlap between the referent of their alien-health terms and our health terms than in the case of alien-color terms (if they have something akin to color vision too) and color terms.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-63503712769738956512015-12-17T23:12:24.510-06:002015-12-17T23:12:24.510-06:00Mark:
Thanks, but I'm not sure I understand ...Mark: <br /><br />Thanks, but I'm not sure I understand what works just as well if God does not exist. Could you clarify, please?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-62200343124614851792015-12-17T22:48:05.654-06:002015-12-17T22:48:05.654-06:00I ought to include one more disjunct:
(E) I take ...I ought to include one more disjunct:<br /><br />(E) I take the concept of superpositions very seriously, in metaphysics and not only physics. Now, ordinarily, I accept the view that if x in a superposition which yields a sufficiently high probability of collapse into state phi, then x is (simpliciter) in state phi. Call this the Thesis. Suppose I step away from Thesis. Then we could have the following view: There is always a precise future which God infallibly foreknows in virtue of his own intrinsic state. However, God is in a superposition of thusly infallibly foreknowing each of the many different possible futures. I need to examine this response more carefully, but I think it would resolve the difficulty with predeterminism. Also, I might <i>have</i> to drop Thesis anyway, to avoid the mere ordinarily truths about the future (God's foreknowledge aside) from predetermining the future, at least unless we binge for option D.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28138673400902928382015-12-17T21:50:57.092-06:002015-12-17T21:50:57.092-06:00Finally, I admit I reserve some credence for the f...Finally, I admit I reserve some credence for the following view (one on which God <i>does</i> always have infallible foreknowledge of everything that will ever be the case, and this foreknowledge <i>is</i> at each time an intrinsic state of God):<br /><br />(D) There's an oft-overlooked distinction between [In the future, ~P] and [~(In the future, P)]. The propositions [In the future, P] and [In the future, ~P] are consistent. To the extent this seems not so, it is largely because we mistake the proposition [~(In the future, P)] for the proposition [In the future, ~P]. In fact, there is necessarily a forward-branching multiverse, such that for any time t before any time t', if the world is open P-at-t'-wise at t, then the state of the world at t determines both that at t', P and also that at t', ~P. This does <i>not</i> entail that at t’, P & ~P. Rather, there will be two different parts of t', in one of which P and in one of which ~P --- two different branches of the future, standing temporally side-by-side --- and this is sufficient for the truth of both [At t', P] and [At t', ~P]. Consequently, God <i>can</i> possess at t an internal state which determines all the facts about the future. The trick is, God’s state literally determines <i>all</i> the facts about the future: every possible fact about the future. This is an infinitely branching multiverse theory on which every possible future necessarily obtains. So God infallibly foreknows all of them.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-65426983541592665872015-12-17T21:50:21.863-06:002015-12-17T21:50:21.863-06:00About God's foreknowledge:
I mostly think tha...About God's foreknowledge:<br /><br />I mostly think that at any time t which precedes time t', where [At t', P] and [At t', ~P] are each compossible with the facts at t, it is not the case that there is some intrinsic state S such that at t, God has S and [At t, God has S] entails either of [At t', P] and [At t', ~P].<br /><br />So I think one of three accounts is correct:<br /><br />(A) 'Omniscient' means 'Knows every truth.' So "At every time t, God is omniscient" means "At every time t, God knows every truth." If the future is not determined P-at-t'-wise at t, then at t, neither [At t', P] nor [At t, P] is a truth. So God doesn't know either one of those two propositions --- hence, at t, God doesn't know whether at t', P --- but this is no skin off God’s omniscience. God always knows all the truths there are, and that is what it means for God to be omniscient. He just never knows all the truths there ever are. The thought of his doing so is, according to this picture, like asking him to make a rock which omnipotence cannot lift, or to create a round square. It is not even a coherent thought.<br /><br />(B) Talk about God's foreknowledge is properly construed as talk about what, in eternity, God knows. Eternity is the sum of all reality: past, present, future and otherwise. For any time t, if there is a truth as to whether P at t, then in eternity, either God knows [At t’, P] or else God knows [At t', ~P]. So in eternity, God knows all the truths there ever are. However, [In eternity, God knows [At t’, P]] does not commit us to [In the past, God knows [At t’, P]], and it is only the latter of those two propositions which would raise the problem you outlined. There are things which are true of God in eternity which are not true of God in the past.<br /><br />On this view, we describe God’s knowledge in eternity of what happens at t’ this as <i>foreknowledge</i> about t’ for at least one of two reasons:<br /><br />(i) 'Knowing things before they happen' is a helpful and illumining model for the more difficult and exact concept of 'Knowing things in eternity'. In speaking of God’s knowing things before they happen, the tradition is giving us this helpful model rather than stating an exact metaphysical truth which (for most people at most times) so difficult to grok as not to be helpful to them;<br /><br />(ii) It is always the case (i.e., it is the case at every time t) that in eternity, God knows everything there ever is to know. But although <i>knowing [At t', P]</i> would at t be an intrinsic state of anyone who possessed that state at t, <i>knowing [At t', P] in eternity</i> is not at t an intrinsic state of anyone who possesses it at t. In much the same way, my being going to eat a sandwich tomorrow is not a state which today is intrinsic to me. So when we say God always has foreknowledge about everything that will ever be true, we are saying that God is always such that in eternity he knows everything that will ever be true; and we are not thereby attributing to him any state which is intrinsic to God at a given time (much less a state which is intrinsic to God at t and determines what happens at a later time t’). On this view, speech about God’s foreknowledge is strictly and exactly true, but it doesn’t generate the problem.<br /><br />(C) Most weirdly, there is deterministic timebackward causation. If at t, there is nothing which determines whether or not at t', P, then either in fact at t', P or else in fact at t', ~P. In such a case, if at t', P, then the truthmaker for [At t', P] is such as to deterministically cause it to be the case that at t, God knows that at’, P. Mutatis mutandi if at t', ~P. This is timebackwards causation because in the sort of case we have in mind, the truthmaker for at t', P is something that doesn't exist until t'.<br /><br />This disjunct --- (C) --- is the epistemic possibility which garners the smallest fraction of my credence, since nature does not normally seem to work this way and the whole view strikes me as ad hoc.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-52406571407310313042015-12-17T21:39:52.999-06:002015-12-17T21:39:52.999-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23052477048584495502015-12-17T21:39:33.067-06:002015-12-17T21:39:33.067-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69304442699645681512015-12-17T21:38:54.650-06:002015-12-17T21:38:54.650-06:00Hi Angra:
When people have conflicting intuitions...Hi Angra:<br /><br />When people have conflicting intuitions about whether a certain thing is good, what do you take to be the appropriate method for settling the conflict? I have the intuition that original up-to-selfness with respect to heavenly bliss is good: to me, on the assumption that I do eventually enter heaven, the original up-to-meness of this fact (hence, the existence of the genuine risk that I might not have been there) intuitively increases the degree to which it is both dire and amazing that I actually end up enjoying such joy. This direness and amazingness seem to add to the glory of the event, and such glory seems good. I take this intuition to provide evidence that original up-to-selfness with respect to heavenly bliss is, in fact, a good thing. But of course, some people have the positive intuition (as I take it you do) that original up-to-selfness is of no intrinsic value --- that having it neither intrinsically improves nor disimproves a situation. I could imagine the analogous intuition, namely, that either original up-to-selfness (with consequent risk) does not increase the direness or amazingness of the good outcome, or else the direness and amazingness do not increase its glory, or else that its glory is not good.<br /><br />I'm interested in discussing the particular arguments as to whether original up to selfness is good, but I'd be interested in first taking a look at the groundwork for how an examination of that sort of topic (giving conflicting intuitions about goodness) is supposed to go. For instance: As someone who puts an embarrassingly high credence in the existence of a very vast and densely populated multiverse, I am constitutionally inclined to disregard, or perhaps even not possess in the first place, the intuition that there is something intrinsically good about a person's being unique. However, as I've repeatedly encountered said intuition (very strongly felt) in intelligent people of diverse mentalities whom I personally respect, it's begun to seem to me that there is likely something to it. That is, in a certain other case where there were conflicting intuitions about whether something was intrinsically good (viz., diverse intelligent people I respected intuit that uniqueness is an important intrinsic good, whereas I tend to intuit that it is not), I judged that it was rational to favor their intuition over my own --- especially once I realized that there was what I took to be a plausible way that qualitative uniqueness of persons could be maintained even in a maximally dense multiverse. Put another way, preponderance of diverse and credible peers who intuit P --- combined with a plausible hypothetical explanation as to how P might be true --- make it rational to give credence to P, even for those of us who naturally intuit ~P. Do you think this sort of peer-deference move is rational when judging questions of intrinsic goodness? Or do you think each agent should stick nearly only to his own intuitions, not those of others?<br /><br />Thank you for your continued discussion about compatibilism. As I mentioned, this topic is largely new to me, and there's much room for me to grow here. A couple questions come to mind about your account:<br /><br />(i) On your view, can a choice itself be something with respect to which you are free? I ask because I am concerned that on your definition of freedom, being free to do X seems to be a fact about doing X if one chooses to do X; so then being free to <i>choose</i> X is a fact about doing X if one chooses to choose X. This seems odd to me, since I would have thought that when we choose X, we don't ordinarily choose to choose X --- we simply choose X, without choosing to choose it.<br /><br />(ii) What makes something count as a malfunction? Do you think there's some sort of natural teleology to the brain, for instance, which objectively determines what's a malfunction and what is not?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5058933228773718302015-12-17T19:40:57.771-06:002015-12-17T19:40:57.771-06:00Very nice Ingra! And it seems to work just as well...Very nice Ingra! And it seems to work just as well if God does not exist.Mark Rogershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12691324025964108341noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-44806074871126069822015-12-16T22:27:01.442-06:002015-12-16T22:27:01.442-06:00Richard:
Incidentally, this might or might not b...Richard: <br /><br />Incidentally, this might or might not be a problem for your view (I don't know what your take on foreknowledge is), but it seems your take on this is incompatible with the view that God has (non-probabilistic) foreknowledge, and we have free will - a common view among Christians, though not universal of course. <br /><br />Let's say that God knows in the distant past what you will do X in the future. Whether God's state of mind regarding that you'll do X may or may not be properly called a belief, but whatever that is (e.g., a belief if God's has beliefs, or some sort of intuitive apprehension of truths, or whatever it is), it's some concrete past state of the world - let's say God believes* that you'll do X, to capture that state of mind, where "belief*" may or may not be the same as belief. <br /><br />Then, in any other world with the same past as ours, you will do X. <br />I don't think that's the same as a fatalistic argument: there is a subtle but I think crucial difference. <br />For example, let's say that determinism is false, and the universe works more or less as an indeterministic interpretation of QM holds (with some adjustment, but roughly).<br />It's true that Obama is not going to quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016, and I know it's true. <br />There is a possible world W2 with the same initial segment up to today as our world in which he will do so.<br />So, I know today that Obama is not going to quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016, but in W2, I (or my counterpart) falsely believes today (rather than knowing) that Obama isn't going to quantum tunnel, etc.<br /><br />In my assessment, that shows that when we say that two worlds have the same initial segment (or more informally, that the past is the same up to some point, etc.), we don't mean to include truths about the future, or the epistemic status of our beliefs. Otherwise, we would be assuming determinism whenever we do that. <br /><br />On the other hand, it seems clear to me that we do include any concrete states of the world, like the state of mind of an agent, so God's belief*. But given that it's impossible that God be mistaken, the argument above follows<br /><br />In short, if God has foreknowledge and is essentially infallible, in every world with the same past as this world, you freely chose exactly the same things you chose in this world - and moreover, in such a world, every world with the same past as our world also has the same future.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-87646522482779384382015-12-16T22:24:29.942-06:002015-12-16T22:24:29.942-06:00As for maximizing freedom, that's not the case...As for maximizing freedom, that's not the case from my compatibilist perspective (in my view, causal determinism does not reduce freedom), or other compatibilist perspectives I'm familiar with.<br /><br />"I was gathering from your (clear and helpful) discussion of Jack and Justin that when a malfunction in subject S is caused by some source external from S, and that malfunction results in S doing X, whereas absent the malfunction, S would not have done X, this in many cases results in S not being free in his doing of X. "<br />Even if the malfunction is internal, the result is often the same (e.g., brain tumor, or some other mental illness, unless you count that as "external"). <br />In any case, the problem on a compatibilist view (at least on mine) is the malfunction of the cognitive faculties, not their being caused by an external source, deterministic or otherwise. <br /><br />"So it seems plausible to me that in a causally predeterministic universe where S does X, the only way in which it could be brought about that the past is what it is and yet S does not do X is for S to malfunction through a local exception to the prevailing causal laws. But since malfunctioning often (perhaps not always) impedes freedom, it seems that in a universe where (the past being what it is) S cannot not-do-X without malfunction, S likely therefore cannot freely not-do-X."<br />I agree that in such a universe, if a subject S in fact does X, then it would not have been possible <i>for the past to have been what it was</i> and for S to freely not have done X. But I believe S could freely choose whether to do X, she would have freely not done X <i>if she had chosen not to</i>, and so on. <br />In other words, I don't think fixing the past is what matters when it comes to free choice and power, but what would have happened if she had chosen this or that; also, I don't think in this context, she "could" freely choose whether to X means or entails there is a possible world with the same past at which she does X, and one at which she does not. <br /><br />" A subject like that still has a degree of real freedom --- she really is free, in the full and robust sense, to do all the things which, in fact, she does --- but there are considerably fewer actions she is free to do than there would be if she were free both to do all the actions which in fact she does and also free to do very many other actions --- ones she <i>doesn't</i> in fact do --- as well."<br />That's not my compatibilist view, and I don't think that view is common among compatibilists.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-70684542777955993152015-12-16T22:05:30.943-06:002015-12-16T22:05:30.943-06:00Hi Richard:
You ask: "why isn't origina...Hi Richard: <br /><br />You ask: "why isn't original up-to-selfness a good thing to have? I don't mean 'morally good,' just good simpliciter, in the same way that it's good (but not morally good) to have intelligence and creativity?"<br />That makes a parallel between original up to selfness and intelligence or creativity. But I don't see why those things would be similar. In other words, I would be inclined to ask: "why is original up-to-selfness a good thing to have?" <br />In yet other words, I'm not inclined to think why it <i>isn't</i> a good thing calls for an explanation, but rather, why it is so. <br />At any rate, since you ask me and you made that comparison, I'll give it a try. <br />I would say that original up-to-selfness - unlike creativity or intelligence - is not a mental trait, and it's not so much something that the agent has in that sense, but rather, something that happened to the agent, or didn't happen, but which wasn't good or bad (i.e., about how the agent came to be, or events in the distant past). <br /><br />"If nothing else, S's original up-to-selfness with respect to event X gives S a degree of uniqueness, since it seems that X can at most be originally up to one person. Thus, if X is originally up to S, S is unique in that S is the only person X is originally up to."<br />It's unclear to me the uniqueness claim is correct. For example, if whether to bring about Y is up to A, and A decides not to bring it about, it seems to me it can later be originally up to B whether to bring about Y. <br />But maybe there is a way in which you can avoid this problem. The second one is that even if there were uniqueness. <br /><br />"I've often encountered the intuition that each human being's uniqueness or individuality --- her being differentiated in non-trivial ways from all other beings in reality --- is an important feature of that human being."<br />I don't have that intuition, but I too often encountered that claim. I think it's false. <br /><br />To go with your examples, consider, for instance, intelligence or creativity. I don't think that if we learned tomorrow that the universe is so big that almost certainly there are people like us, with our mental traits, even a person with the same intelligence and creativity as each of us, then those traits would be any less good. <br />In fact, even if we learned that the universe is so big that there very probably are people with internalistically-same past mental experiences, I don't think we should reckon our good memories would be any less good because of it. <br />So, generally speaking, I don't see uniqueness as a positive or negative, but neutral. <br />Granted, having a unique trait compared to a certain population might be instrumentally good. For example, if I'm the only person on the planet qualified to do some job, maybe I'll get paid very well, so uniqueness pays off. But that's merely instrumental, and even then, that's not even global uniqueness, but just uniqueness on Earth (or in a country, etc.), since I'm not getting paid any less just because, on distant planets, other people are equally qualified.<br /><br />"Besides that, resemblance to God is a good thing in itself, and since God has lots of original up-to-selfness, it seems to follow that (given God's existence) it is a good thing for creatures to have original up-to-selfness, even if this is so only because having original up-to-selfness causes those creatures to resemble God."<br />I don't see why resembling God on matters that are not good but neutral would be a good thing in itself. <br />However, if you assume that all traits of God are good - none neutral -, then sure, it would be good to have original up-to-selfness, because original up-to-selfness is good. <br />Alternatively, if you assume that even if some traits of God are neutral, it's good to resemble him in those regards, also that works. <br />If either assumption is also shared by a Christian compatibilist, then maybe from that perspective your theodicy looks good. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-19952440908087606512015-12-16T17:11:20.237-06:002015-12-16T17:11:20.237-06:00My concern is that in such a universe, if a subjec...My concern is that in such a universe, if a subject S in fact does X, then it would not have been possible for the past to have been what it was and for S to freely <i>not</i> have done X, because the only way that could have happened is if the laws of causation connecting the past to S's doing X were to have somehow changed in that local instance so as make that past <i>not</i> causally determine that S does X. But it seems to me that if the laws of causation were to change locally so as not to predetermine that S does X, this would likely entail that in not doing X, S had somehow malfunctioned. For since she is a subject in a universe which is ordinarily causally predeterministic, S is therefore the sort of being who ordinarily behaves according to the causal laws which have to be locally suspended in order for S to not do X.<br /><br />So it seems plausible to me that in a causally predeterministic universe where S does X, the only way in which it could be brought about that the past is what it is and yet S does not do X is for S to malfunction through a local exception to the prevailing causal laws. But since malfunctioning often (perhaps not always) impedes freedom, it seems that in a universe where (the past being what it is) S cannot not-do-X without malfunction, S likely therefore cannot freely not-do-X.<br /><br />The result seems to be that in a causally predeterministic universe, subjects are often free to do the things they in fact do, but the things they in fact don't do are frequently for that reason things which they were never free to do in the first place. They could never have done them without malfunction, given that the past was what it was. So in such a universe, most of the things a subject does not in fact do are things she was never free to do. A subject like that still has a degree of real freedom --- she really is free, in the full and robust sense, to do all the things which, in fact, she does --- but there are considerably fewer actions she is free to do than there would be if she were free both to do all the actions which in fact she does and also free to do very many other actions --- ones she <i>doesn't</i> in fact do --- as well. In an indeterministic universe, by contrast, a subject who in fact does X may easily have a way to not-do-X without malfunctioning. So in an indeterministic universe where a subject in fact does X, the subject may be free to do X <i>and also</i> free to not-do-X; whereas in a deterministic universe where the subject does X, it looks like (in many such cases) she was only free to do X, not free to not do X.<br /><br />I mean all this to follow from a compatibilist conception of freedom, on which a subject's freedom to do X is not impeded by her being causally predetermined to do X. It seems to me that even on a compatibilist conception of freedom, we have <i>more</i> freedom (that is, there are more things each of which we are free to do) in an indeterministic universe than in a deterministic one.<br /><br />Now, freedom is a good thing to have, not just a neutral thing (right?). Oughtn't we to expect, then, that a benevolent God would wish to maximize our freedom? If so, then since we have more freedom in an indeterministic universe than a deterministic one even if compatibilism is true, shouldn't we expect that God would create us in an indeterministic universe? That seems to be a universe in which it is not causally predetermined that we do not sin. Hence, if we do sin, then our sinning is originally up to us; and if we don't, then our not-sinning is originally up to us. So it looks like our having original up-to-usness with respect to our sinning or not-sinning (whichever we actually do) is a necessary consequence of God seeking to give us a certain good, not merely neutral, thing: namely, as much freedom as possible.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-57036239194937939342015-12-16T17:04:44.086-06:002015-12-16T17:04:44.086-06:00Hi Angra:
I agree that my theory depends on origi...Hi Angra:<br /><br />I agree that my theory depends on original up-to-selfness being a good thing, not just a neutral thing. But why isn't original up-to-selfness a good thing to have? I don't mean 'morally good,' just good simpliciter, in the same way that it's good (but not morally good) to have intelligence and creativity?<br /><br />If nothing else, S's original up-to-selfness with respect to event X gives S a degree of uniqueness, since it seems that X can at most be originally up to <i>one</i> person. Thus, if X is originally up to S, S is unique in that S is the only person X is originally up to. I've often encountered the intuition that each human being's uniqueness or individuality --- her being differentiated in non-trivial ways from all other beings in reality --- is an important feature of that human being. If so, then X's being originally up to a certain human S may often be important as a way of bringing about S's uniqueness and individuality. For this reason, it would be good, and not just neutral, for S to have original up-to-selfness with respect to X.<br /><br />Besides that, resemblance to God is a good thing in itself, and since God has lots of original up-to-selfness, it seems to follow that (given God's existence) it <i>is</i> a good thing for creatures to have original up-to-selfness, even if this is so <i>only</i> because having original up-to-selfness causes those creatures to resemble God.<br /><br />I also think that even on a compatibilist view of freedom --- one on which my being causally predetermined to do X does not preclude my doing X freely --- my original up-to-mess with respect to X (and not merely my up-to-meness simpliciter with respect to doing X) will be a necessary condition for <i>maximizing</i> my freedom, that is, rendering me free with respect to as many actions as possible. I was gathering from your (clear and helpful) discussion of Jack and Justin that when a malfunction in subject S is caused by some source external from S, and that malfunction results in S doing X, whereas absent the malfunction, S would not have done X, this in many cases results in S not being free in his doing of X. Suppose that's all so. Now consider a universe which is for the most part causally deterministic; i.e., in most cases, whatever a subject in this universe does, he or she was causally predetermined to do it.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-91192889560315465902015-12-15T18:12:19.189-06:002015-12-15T18:12:19.189-06:00Hi Richard:
Thanks for explaining your views.
Wi...Hi Richard:<br /><br />Thanks for explaining your views. <br />With respect to the meaning of the English expression "up to you", in my view, if I can bring about X if I choose to, and I can bring about ¬X if I choose to, and my brain, etc., is working normally, then it's up to me whether X happens, regardless of whether there were earlier causes of X. <br />So, we don't have the same view on that. But you raise an interesting question: <br /><br />"I'm strongly beginning to wonder if there are simply two natural readings of all these related terms --- 'up to you,' 'freely done,' 'ability,' 'can,' 'could,' and perhaps even 'guilt.' One family of meanings tied together by the notion of indeterminacy, and another by the notion of causation. I think I can get myself to read them either way without it feeling forced."<br /><br />I'm not convinced, but if you're right, that raises the following issue: which of the two readings is the one that matters in the context of moral judgments? <br />In my assessment, it would be the notion not tied with indeterminacy, so we would still have that matter to settle - or to disagree about; compatibilists and incompatibilists aren't likely to end their disagreements any time soon, in my view. <br /><br />"To respond to this, I'm curious how my theodicy would strike you if the whole thing were recast in terms of 'original up-to-youness,' where something is 'originally up to you' just in case it is up to you and it is not caused by anything outside of you. "<br />"A clarificatory edit: Something is originally up to you just in case it is up to you and it is not caused by anything outside of you which you yourself don't cause."<br /><br />As you know, I'm assuming Christianity, etc., for the sake of the argument, so I'll for now take your question as a question of how your theodicy would strike me if I do assume Christianity, but on the other hand, I keep my compatibilist view, but please let me know if that's not what you meant to ask. <br /><br />"The goal here is to render the argument compatible with compatibilism. (Meta-compatible?)"<br /><br />I'm afraid it wouldn't work for me, because my assessment would be that the concept of original-up-to-ness is not morally relevant, and it's not a good thing to have - just neutral -, so it wouldn't matter whether we resemble God in that regard. <br />Still, one might ask how Christian compatibilists would respond to that. I don't know, but if their compatibilist assessments are similar to mine, I would expect that they wouldn't find it persuasive. Then again, this is very speculative. In fact, I'm not sure I ever met a Christian compatibilist, with the exception of ultraliberal Christians who don't even claim there is an afterlife or that Jesus was anything beyond a good moral teacher (then, there is the issue of what "Christian" means).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-35459050547149130442015-12-15T16:15:53.301-06:002015-12-15T16:15:53.301-06:00A clarificatory edit: Something is originally up t...A clarificatory edit: Something is originally up to you just in case it is up to you and it is not caused by anything outside of you which you yourself don't cause.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-19361154661001341502015-12-15T15:46:04.591-06:002015-12-15T15:46:04.591-06:00Hi Angra:
I think that in theory it could be sett...Hi Angra:<br /><br />I think that in theory it could be settled a priori <i>or</i> a posteriori whether my 'ontological probability' is what English-speakers usually call 'probability.' Ideally, we'd use a mix of a priori and a posteriori evidence to decide the question.<br /><br />Yes, the view you outlined is how things would be, on my view, if it turned out that the semantics of the word 'heaven' prevent a scenario from counting as heaven until the last sin has occurred. However, it's not my view that this is indeed how the word 'heaven' works. I'm ambivalent on that matter. And I do positively think there are <i>some</i> uses of the morpheme 'heaven' which don't rule out sin occurring in heaven; e.g., 'war in heaven' in Revelation.<br /><br />Thank you for the statistics about childbirth. These sorts of facts are, in general, ones I'd like to have a better handle on. However, the statistics (which aren't too far off from what I would have guessed) don't strike me as having much direct impact on my view, which was that marriage is an <i>intended</i> (as in, intended by God) part of childbirth at least for the usual case.<br /><br />I'm not certain about whether no-childbirth-in-heaven implies no-sex-in-heaven. For one thing, I'm not sure how much the nature of sex itself might change in heaven. Or even how much it <i>can</i> change while still counting as 'sex.'<br /><br />Thank you for your discussion about incompatibilism. This is a topic I've only recentishly begun to wade into.<br /><br />I hadn't meant to argue, in the case of Jack and Justin, that Justin's intention to murder was not caused by Justin. It seems to me that it was. Rather, I take the claim "if X happens because Y happens, and Y is not up to you, then X is not up to you either" to basically (in the epistemologically technical sense of 'basically') seem true apriori, given one natural reading of 'up to you.'<br /><br />I'm strongly beginning to wonder if there are simply two natural readings of all these related terms --- 'up to you,' 'freely done,' 'ability,' 'can,' 'could,' and perhaps even 'guilt.' One family of meanings tied together by the notion of indeterminacy, and another by the notion of causation. I think I can get myself to read them either way without it feeling forced.<br /><br />To respond to this, I'm curious how my theodicy would strike you if the whole thing were recast in terms of 'original up-to-youness,' where something is 'originally up to you' just in case it is up to you and it is not caused by anything outside of you. The thought, then, is that in a causally predeterministic universe, nothing would be originally up to any created beings. More specifically, if we were causally determined never to fall, then it would not be originally up to us that we did not fall --- if, in fact, we did not. God has not just up-to-Godness, but original up-to-Godness with respect to God's character and many other (all other?) God-facts, so as images of God it is likely important that we have lots of original up-to-usness about our characters and many other us-facts, too. The goal here is to render the argument compatible with compatibilism. (Meta-compatible?)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06251565524682589544noreply@blogger.com