tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post4004911287445888522..comments2021-05-13T12:47:57.847-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: A deontic-ontological argumentAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-15176878416648005822013-06-25T22:36:04.512-05:002013-06-25T22:36:04.512-05:00The second premise of Brian's argument is
2....The second premise of Brian's argument is <br /><br />2. For any p, if(it would be better if p than it would be if ~p) then possibly p. <br /><br />What about this apparent counterexample: <br /><br />It would be better if it is true that I never sin in the actual world than it would be if it is false that I never sin in the actual world. <br /><br />But if (2) is true then it is possible that it is true that I never sin in the actual world. Given that I do sin in the actual world, it is clearly impossible that it be true that I never sin in the actual world. So (2) must be false.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69766322144159370822013-06-25T22:32:48.129-05:002013-06-25T22:32:48.129-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Ex Nihilohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01817738474922476715noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-35489277233712194602013-06-01T13:06:56.331-05:002013-06-01T13:06:56.331-05:00David:
I don't see much reason to accept the ...David:<br /><br />I don't see much reason to accept the principle that if p makes things worse, then p is possible. Contradictions being true makes things worse, arguably, but it's not possible.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66762905077643797092013-06-01T13:06:10.979-05:002013-06-01T13:06:10.979-05:00A perfect being is not limited in its existence. ...A perfect being is not limited in its existence. In particular, it is not temporally limited.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-71949875765756459042013-06-01T02:25:28.729-05:002013-06-01T02:25:28.729-05:00I have a question of my own about this.
Let's...I have a question of my own about this.<br /><br />Let's say the B-theory of time is true. (I'm on shaky ground here, but I think I understand the fundamentals.) Is it possible that this argument can success, but for the perfect being to only exist in some place that isn't the present?Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-46446093124641738702013-05-31T14:51:49.381-05:002013-05-31T14:51:49.381-05:00This is essentially Carl Kordig's argument fro...This is essentially Carl Kordig's argument from his "A Deontic Argument for God's Existence".<br /><br />Here's a problem, for both the original argument and Cutter's:<br /><br />(P1) It would be worse if there were not a perfect being than if there weren't a perfect being.<br />(P2) For any P, if (it would be worse if P than it would be if not-P), then possibly P.<br />(P3) Thus, there is no perfect being. (S5, necessary existence of perfect being)<br /><br />If the world would be worse off without God, then, if ought (ought not) implies can (can not), God doesn't exist.David Balcarrashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04502209482313144658noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-7811307469916520412013-05-29T19:50:11.518-05:002013-05-29T19:50:11.518-05:00A similar argument, which avoids worries about whe...A similar argument, which avoids worries about whether there is a non-agential "ought" (and maybe sort-of avoids worries about whether the non-agential "ought," if such there be, implies "can"):<br /><br />1. It would be better if there were a perfect being than if there weren't a perfect being.<br />2. For any p, if (it would be better if p than it would be if not-p), then Possibly(p).<br />3. Therefore, there is a perfect being (again, given S5 and the assumption that a perfect being would exist necessarily and be essentially perfect).<br /><br />(1) looks very plausible, so I think the key premise is (2). I can't think of any obvious counterexamples to it at the moment, but I wouldn't be surprised if there are some.Brian Cutterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17059155559949747916noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-45157155595620503032013-05-29T13:30:10.808-05:002013-05-29T13:30:10.808-05:00My own worry is about whether there is any non-age...My own worry is about whether there is any non-agential ought.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-44334086376458285922013-05-29T13:12:09.100-05:002013-05-29T13:12:09.100-05:00What Kenny said.What Kenny said.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-65730734940144178582013-05-29T11:10:13.345-05:002013-05-29T11:10:13.345-05:00Does the impersonal ought really imply can? The pr...Does the impersonal ought really imply can? The principle 'if S ought to A, then S can A' is very different from the principle, 'if it ought to be the case that p, then it can be the case that p.'<br /><br />By the way, you may have seen that Klaas Kraay recently got a Templeton grant to figure out whether there really ought to be a perfect being! http://www.ryerson.ca/~kraay/theism.htmlKenny Pearcehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05561248709234656660noreply@blogger.com