tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post4229433321794370344..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Existence, eternalism, continuous creation and concurrenceAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-21867260213190937872015-05-07T04:46:41.072-05:002015-05-07T04:46:41.072-05:00If we adopt a timeless view of God’s operations, t...If we adopt a timeless view of God’s operations, there is no need to weaken concurrentism in order to save secondary causality. Natural powers are not inconsistent with God’s absolute sovereignty. Rather, they presuppose it. The Maker of the world does not preclude created things to make differences by their powers and liabilities… On the contrary, He makes them make their proper causal contributions. But of course, there are two different meanings of making: a supernatural which is existence and power conferral, and a natural one, which consists in exerting the powers and liabilities thereby received.Dieu sans barbehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11762770063833645274noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-25203612568432950242014-12-26T14:27:53.924-06:002014-12-26T14:27:53.924-06:00Like the problem of idealism, scepticism of the ex...Like the problem of idealism, scepticism of the existence of an external world, etc.?Pedro Lopeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02094986031743134019noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-43706115310356151392014-12-26T14:19:37.110-06:002014-12-26T14:19:37.110-06:00So, the problem of the (non)existence of change wo...So, the problem of the (non)existence of change would concern epistemological realism more than anything else?Pedro Lopeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02094986031743134019noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-63032118551035831042014-12-26T14:03:42.967-06:002014-12-26T14:03:42.967-06:00I mean: like other sceptical views.I mean: like other sceptical views.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-56283193970922263502014-12-26T14:03:05.166-06:002014-12-26T14:03:05.166-06:00This is a view one refutes much like other views. ...This is a view one refutes much like other views. Wave your hand. What's more likely? That it was an illusion that you waved your hand or that at least one of M's premises is false? Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-29699091405393777422014-12-26T13:55:07.643-06:002014-12-26T13:55:07.643-06:00If I'm not mistaken, Malebranche proposes an a...If I'm not mistaken, Malebranche proposes an account of continuous creation that turns God into some sort of film projector, that continuously creates anew and ex nihilo the universe, like in a movie in which static frames projected one after another provide an illusion of change. If such an account was true, there would be no change in the universe and the only existent efficient causality would be God's creation ex nihilo.<br /><br />Can this view be refuted philosophically?Pedro Lopeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02094986031743134019noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-77993995778329272052014-12-19T17:06:08.977-06:002014-12-19T17:06:08.977-06:00Thanks so much Alex.Thanks so much Alex.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4427415599855440562014-12-19T11:50:22.765-06:002014-12-19T11:50:22.765-06:00You might also look at this.You might also look at <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2010/11/consequence-argument-against-calvinism.html" rel="nofollow">this</a>.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-72349736726483992312014-12-19T11:47:40.617-06:002014-12-19T11:47:40.617-06:00Chris:
I don't think Cyrille was raising issu...Chris:<br /><br />I don't think Cyrille was raising issues about *foreknowledge* and free will, but about *divine decrees* and free will. It is much easier to defend the compatibility of God's foreknowing I will do something with my doing it being free than the compatibility of God's decreeing I will do it with my doing it.<br /><br />Cyrille's argument was basically the consequence argument re-purposed to be against divine decrees of free actions:<br /><br />1. Principle beta 2: If p entails q, and Np, then Nq.<br />2. N(God has decreed I will do A)<br />3. That God has decreed I will do A entails that I will do A.<br />4. So: N(I will do A).<br /><br />Here, Np is van Inwagen's operator: Np iff (p and nobody (i.e., no human) ever has a choice about whether p).<br /><br />The most controversial part of the argument is the beta 2 "transfer" principle. <br /><br />If one uses counterfactuals to define what it means to have a choice about whether p, then beta 2 can actually be proved from very plausible axioms about counterfactuals. <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/2014/06/the-consequence-argument-exciting-news.html" rel="nofollow">Here's Widerker's writeup</a> of my proof of it, and a discussion.<br /><br />Anyway, the discussion of Widerker's blog post is a good starting point for looking at the consequence argument.<br /><br />I think one difference between the divine decree case and the more common version of the consequence argument against determinism, is that N(God has decreed that I will do A) seems to me much less controversial than N(laws and initial conditions), which is the premise needed in the consequence argument against determinism.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66506835657703729012014-12-19T10:09:37.034-06:002014-12-19T10:09:37.034-06:00Hey Dr. Pruss!
I strongly disagree with (2) so so...Hey Dr. Pruss!<br />I strongly disagree with (2) so something must be wrong with (1).<br /><br />You say:<br />(1) For all x and t, if x is a creature and x exists at t, then x is created or preserved by God at t.<br /><br />I say:<br />If x is a creature and x exists at t, then x is not necessarily preserved by God at t. It may be the case that x is permitted to exist at t as the time for x's destruction has not yet come. <br /><br /><br /><br />Mark Rogershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12691324025964108341noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-25137913152273891012014-12-18T17:07:14.856-06:002014-12-18T17:07:14.856-06:00Once God has brought the effect into being, isn...Once God has brought the effect into being, isn't his work then just conservation - God's work being to preserve the new essence whose powers then cause other effects (though he causes the coming into being of each new effect)? <br />No - I suppose as the activity of a thing is continuous (its causing effects / actualising potencies / having potencies actualised) so the "conservation" is continuous, but there is also, simultaneously, continuous creating / bringing into being of each new effect / change.<br />This would be a "continuous conservation plus concurrence" view?<br /><br />Yes, I was there for most of the Paris workshop, lurking! I really enjoyed the first day's talks; the historical stuff on day 2 was harder, though I liked especially the talk on Leibniz. I came away thinking that pushing any one of the three positions too far tends to make it collapse into one of the others.<br /><br />Sorry to veer from your post, but do you have any tips for reading up on the foreknowledge / freedom problem Cyrille Michon was raising at the end?<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-26182268690469649762014-12-18T15:43:47.019-06:002014-12-18T15:43:47.019-06:00The post is inspired by a workshop on continual cr...The post is inspired by a workshop on continual creation that I went to in Paris. Anyway, someone--I think Paul Clavier--there suggested the following fascinating model of concurrence. Creatures can cause what something something is (including what an accident is like), but they cannot cause being. So in concurrence, the creature is the cause of the kind of the thing the effect is, while God is the cause of the being of the effect.<br /><br />This would, I think, work great for the free will case.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39887508416012430572014-12-18T15:41:12.623-06:002014-12-18T15:41:12.623-06:00It's great to have a demonstration of "wh...It's great to have a demonstration of "why mere conservation is not enough"!<br />How, out of interest, would you spell out the exact details of concurrence? Specifically, how do you reconcile "strong" concurrence with free will?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com