tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post492933931083121775..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The ontological argument and the semantic paradoxesAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-82422817537255687292009-09-08T13:23:48.660-05:002009-09-08T13:23:48.660-05:00If this predicate denotes a property, then we can ...<i>If this predicate denotes a property, then we can conceive of something that has that property, simply by thinking about that which "is such that nothing greater than it can be conceived.</i><br /><br />No, definitely this is true. The knee-jerk reply that conceivability does not entail possibility is just mistaken in this context. Conceivability does entail possibility for the traditional Anselmian position. And that is more or less what you're saying, I think. <br />But this cuts the other way, too, and in very interesting ways. All you need is, say, the conceivability of something suffering gratuitously to refute Anselmianism of this sort. It need not be so much as possible, so long as it is conceivable! All you need is conceivability since Anselmianism of this sort rules out such cases apriori. I don't think many Anselmians notice this serious vulnerability in their position.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-49386295041635832192009-09-08T12:49:25.875-05:002009-09-08T12:49:25.875-05:00By "the Anselmian predicate" I meant the...By "the Anselmian predicate" I meant the predicate "is such that nothing greater than it can be conceived." If this predicate denotes a property, then we can conceive of something that has that property, simply by thinking about that which "is such that nothing greater than it can be conceived."Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-82413470690713407682009-09-08T12:23:33.565-05:002009-09-08T12:23:33.565-05:00. . .and likewise it may not be appropriate to fig...<i>. . .and likewise it may not be appropriate to figure out by introspection whether the Anselmian predicate expresses a property</i><br /><br />Not sure what you mean by 'figure by introspection', but traditional Anselmianism holds that, for all essential properties P of God, it is apriori true that God has P (perhaps with some uninteresting exceptions). If for all God properties P, it is apriori God has P, then certainly (no question about it) the conceivability of God entails the possibility (and actuality) of God. The only remaining question concerns whether God is conceivable. And that does seem to involve introspection of some sort.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.com